This book examines the relationship between two policy approaches for managing the cultural diversity of contemporary societies: interculturalism and multiculturalism.

The relationship between these two approaches has been a matter of intense debate in recent years. Some commentators argue that they represent two very different approaches, while others argue that interculturalism merely re-emphasises some of the core elements of present-day multiculturalism. The debate arises, in part, because multiculturalism can take a variety of different forms, which makes it difficult to identify its key features in order to compare it with interculturalism. The debate has gained added momentum from the backlash against multiculturalism in recent years, and from the Council of Europe’s prominent championing of interculturalism as an alternative approach.

This book aims to clarify the concepts of interculturalism and multiculturalism, and to bring the various arguments together in a way that will assist politicians, policy makers, practitioners and interested lay people to understand the concerns that are driving the different orientations. The book is also intended to facilitate a comparison of the policy implications of interculturalism and multiculturalism. To this end, each chapter concludes with a concise statement of the implications for policy that follow from the viewpoint that has been expressed.
Interculturalism and multiculturalism: similarities and differences

Edited by Martyn Barrett

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Ted Cantle is Professor at the Institute of Community Cohesion (iCoCo), UK. He led the development of community cohesion in the UK following his seminal report on the riots in England in 2001 (known as the “Cantle Report”). His book Community cohesion: a new framework for race and diversity (Palgrave Macmillan 2005) builds on this approach. Ted Cantle led the governmental panel responsible for implementing community cohesion and oversaw new programmes in education, housing, health, regeneration and many other areas. In 2005, he established the Institute of Community Cohesion, supported by four universities, to develop both the theory and practice of community cohesion in the UK. He led around 50 local reviews and developed a wide range of cross-cultural techniques and programmes at both national and local levels. For the last few years, he has been developing the notion of interculturalism, and his new book on this subject, Interculturalism – The new era of cohesion and diversity (Palgrave Macmillan), was published in October 2012. This book provides a critique of multiculturalism and identifies a progressive conceptual framework upon which interculturalism might be based. Ted Cantle has previously worked in the local government, health, private and voluntary sectors. He was Chief Executive of Nottingham City Council from 1990 to 2001 and was awarded the CBE in 2004.
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Tariq Modood is Professor of Sociology, Politics and Public Policy at the University of Bristol, UK, and Founding Director of the University Research Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship. He has held over 40 grants and consultancies (UK, European and US), has written over 30 (co-)authored and (co-)edited books and reports and over 150 articles or chapters in political philosophy, sociology and public policy. He is also the co-founding editor of the international journal Ethnicties. Recent publications include Multicultural politics: racism, ethnicity and Muslims in Britain (Edinburgh University Press 2005), Multiculturalism: a civic idea (Polity 2nd edition 2013) and Still not easy being British: struggles for a multicultural citizenship (Trentham Books 2010); and as co-editor, Multiculturalism, Muslims and citizenship: A European approach (Routledge 2006) and Secularism, religion and multicultural citizenship (Cambridge University Press 2009). He is strongly committed to public engagement and is a regular contributor to the media and policy debates in Britain. He was awarded an MBE for services to social sciences and ethnic relations in 2001 and elected a member of the Academy of Social Sciences in 2004. He served on the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, the IPPR Commission on National Security and the National Equality Panel, which reported to the UK Deputy Prime Minister in 2010.

Robin Wilson

Dr Robin Wilson is an independent researcher in Belfast, an honorary senior research fellow of University College London and a research associate of Trinity College Dublin. He has advised the Council of Europe on intercultural dialogue since 2002. He analysed the responses from the member states to the consultation preceding the White Paper on intercultural dialogue – “Living together as equals in dignity”, and assisted Ulrich Bunjes with its drafting. He currently advises the Intercultural Cities network and has prepared bespoke intercultural strategies for three municipalities, in Serbia, Hungary and Greece. He advises the Football for All campaign of the Irish Football Association (in Northern Ireland) and has prepared intercultural plans for several football clubs in the region. He was the principal drafter of Many voices, one goal, the intercultural football plan of the Football Association of Ireland (in the Republic of Ireland). In 2008-09, supported by UEFA, he developed new governance arrangements for the INGO Football Against Racism in Europe. In 2012, a paper he co-wrote on the far right, commissioned by the European Network Against Racism, was launched at the European Parliament. He is an active member of the Belfast Friendship Club, a member of the board of the voluntary organisation Bryson Intercultural and chair of Horn of Africa People’s Aid Northern Ireland. He also advises the Ballynafeigh Community Development Association, which works to preserve the mixed character of this Belfast neighbourhood. For further information, see www.robinwilson.eu.
Foreword

The need for intercultural dialogue and understanding has been a constant concern for the Council of Europe for obvious reasons. Europe has always been culturally diverse and one of the main challenges facing the Organisation since it was founded in 1949 in the wake of the Second World War has been to foster unity while preserving diversity. The European Cultural Convention of 1954 recognised that in order for Europeans to live together harmoniously, they must be familiar with, respect and accept the culture of other peoples. The opening of membership of the Council of Europe to eastern European countries that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 also put the protection of the cultures of European ethnic minorities and the integration of migrants on the list of priorities. And over the past decade, in a new context of globalisation and migration movements, the Council of Europe has frequently referred to a “new context” or “times of change” to underline the urgent need for active intercultural dialogue.

This promotion of interculturalism has always been linked first and foremost to education: meaningful intercultural dialogue cannot exist if people are not prepared for it. If the importance of language learning and history teaching was already emphasised in the European Cultural Convention, the Council of Europe Standing Conference of Ministers of Education has, more recently, supported the integration of information and communication technologies in education systems in Europe “with a view to increased international understanding and mutual enrichment” (Intercultural education: managing diversity; strengthening democracy; 2003) and confirmed that intercultural competence is one of the “key competences for democratic culture and social cohesion” (Building a more humane and inclusive Europe: role of education policies, 2007). And finally, the White Paper on intercultural dialogue – “Living together as equals in dignity” adopted by the Committee of Ministers in 2008 set out the key features of interculturalism – or the intercultural approach – and ideas for policies on how to bring about an intercultural society where all human beings enjoy equal dignity.

Yet in the face of such widespread political support for interculturalism and recognition of it as an essential component of democratic society, how can one explain the growing debate, both in European societies and globally, about the value of multiculturalism and the criticism by a number of eminent political leaders who have declared that it has been a failure? Clearly there must be some confusion about the meaning of the two terms and the relationship between them, and perhaps a tendency to simplify the issues involved.

I am therefore particularly pleased that the Council of Europe has been asked to support the publication of this book, which, through the contributions of several experts, many of whom have already worked closely with the Council of Europe, proposes a journey into the various forms of multiculturalism, across countries and
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across time. It gives explanations about the links between multiculturalism and interculturalism, their similarities and their differences, which, as Martyn Barrett says in his introductory chapter, are “far from clear cut”.

In providing a better understanding of the concepts, the book also sheds light on the policies conducted in Council of Europe member states and beyond to integrate migrant communities and accommodate diversity. It explains the barriers preventing efficient intercultural dialogue that still exist in European societies, sets out the criticisms of interculturalism and underlines the crucial role of education in enabling people of different backgrounds to live together in a democratic and harmonious manner.

As Director responsible for the Education and Youth Departments at the Council of Europe, I am convinced that in the coming years we will need to prioritise education that enables individuals to acquire the knowledge, skills and attitudes they need to develop democratic and intercultural competence. Pursuit of this priority will not be without its challenges, but it is very necessary. This book is an important milestone in this endeavour and I would like to thank all the experts for their outstanding contributions.

Finally, I would like us to remember that diversity and interculturalism concern each and every one of us, and that we are all actors of change. We must strive to overcome the frontiers in our minds and our imaginations and develop our willingness and ability to understand and communicate with people from different cultural backgrounds.

Ólöf Ólafsdóttir
Director of Democratic Citizenship and Participation
Council of Europe

1 – Introduction – Interculturalism and multiculturalism: concepts and controversies

Martyn Barrett

Introduction

This book examines the relationship between two policy approaches for managing the cultural diversity of contemporary societies: interculturalism and multiculturalism. The nature of the relationship between these two approaches has been a matter of some debate in recent years. For example, in mounting its case in favour of interculturalism, the Council of Europe’s White Paper on intercultural dialogue – “Living together as equals in dignity” (2008) argues that interculturalism and multiculturalism represent two very different approaches. A similar argument is made by Cantle (2012). However, Meer and Modood (2012) argue that interculturalism is not distinct from multiculturalism – instead, it simply re-emphasises some of the key elements that are already contained within contemporary multiculturalism. Issues are further complicated by the fact that, within Canada, the term “interculturalism” is used to denote a specific model for managing cultural diversity in Quebec which has been articulated in explicit opposition to Canadian multiculturalism (Bouchard 2011), but which differs in an important respect from the European model of interculturalism. Moreover, some commentators (for example, Kymlicka 2012) have argued that even if the two approaches are not clearly distinct, there may nevertheless be strategic advantages in switching allegiance to the term “interculturalism” due to the fact that the term “multiculturalism” has become politically tainted over the past decade.

The current book brings together several of the key players in this debate. The book aims to clarify the concepts of interculturalism and multiculturalism, and to bring the various arguments together in a way that will assist politicians, policy makers, practitioners and interested lay people to understand the important points at issue and the concerns that are driving the different orientations. In addition, the book is intended to facilitate a comparison of the policy implications of the various perspectives that have been put forward within the debate. To this end, all of the contributors have been asked to specify explicitly at the end of their own chapters the principal implications for policy that stem from the arguments which they have articulated within their chapters.

The purpose of this introductory chapter is to outline the background to this debate about the meanings that have been attributed to the concepts of interculturalism and multiculturalism and the controversies that surround these concepts. I will begin with the concept of multiculturalism.
Interculturalism and multiculturalism: similarities and differences

Multiculturalism

The term “multiculturalism” and its associated adjective “multiculturalist” have acquired multiple meanings in everyday speech. As a consequence, they are often used in different ways by different speakers. Some of these uses are inappropriate. For example, one sometimes hears culturally diverse societies being called “multiculturalist societies”. However, this use of the word “multiculturalist” is incorrect because the term “multicultural” should be used here instead – properly speaking, these are “multicultural” societies.

Societies may be culturally diverse for a variety of reasons: through the immigration of people who have been born and raised in other cultural settings and who have therefore brought features of those settings to the new society in which they have settled; through the presence of indigenous national minority groups (such as Catalans and Basques within Spain, or the Welsh and Scots within the UK); or through the presence of long-established minority communities (such as Jews or Roma) within a country. For this reason, multiculturalism is not relevant only to societies characterised by high levels of recent immigration (another common misconception about the meaning of the term) – it is equally relevant to societies that are culturally diverse due to the presence of indigenous national minorities and long-established minority groups.

In its proper usage, the term “multiculturalism” denotes a particular kind of policy approach that may be used for the management of culturally diverse societies. In this approach, the cultures of non-dominant minority groups are accorded the same recognition and accommodation that are accorded to the culture of the dominant group (Kymlicka 1995, 2003). Thus, a multiculturalist approach involves acknowledging and respecting the cultural needs of minority groups by making allowances for the fact that their beliefs and practices may differ from those of the dominant group, and by adjusting and adapting laws, rules and regulations in order to enable minority individuals to adhere to their own cultural practices. It involves the rejection of the idea that minority cultural groups should abandon their distinctive cultural beliefs and practices and assimilate into the national majority culture.

Features of a multiculturalist country

Banting and Kymlicka (2006) have helpfully compiled a list of policies that may be used to assess the extent to which a particular country has or has not adopted multiculturalism. The policies included in this list provide a clear illustration of what multiculturalism means in practice:

- the constitutional, legislative or parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism at the central and/or regional and municipal levels;
- the adoption of multiculturalism in the school curriculum;
- the inclusion of ethnic representation and sensitivity in the mandate of public media or media licensing;
- exemptions from dress codes on religious grounds;
- the allowing of dual citizenship;
- the funding of ethnic group organisations or activities;
- the funding of bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction;
- affirmative action for disadvantaged immigrant groups.

Whether these features are clearly present in a country, are only partially present, or are absent, can be used to score countries for their overall degree of multiculturalism. Banting and Kymlicka (2006) propose that, for each feature, a score of either 1 (clear policy), 0.5 (partial policy) or 0 (no such policy) should be awarded, and these scores can then be totalled to yield an overall score ranging between 0 and 8, which represents a Multiculturalism Policy Index for that country. Banting and Kymlicka suggest that countries scoring between 6 and 8 on this index are strongly multiculturalist, countries scoring between 3 and 5.5 are modestly multiculturalist, and countries scoring between 0 and 2.5 are weak on multiculturalism.

Using this classification of the multiculturalism policies that were in place in countries in 2010, the following picture emerges (Banting and Kymlicka 2012):

- strong on multiculturalism: Australia, Canada, Finland, Sweden;
- modest on multiculturalism: Belgium, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom;
- weak on multiculturalism: Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Switzerland.

It is notable that, in 2010, the overall average score for European countries was 3.1. By contrast, Australia scored 8 and Canada scored 7.5. Within Europe, Sweden scored 7 and Finland 6, while Denmark scored 0, and Italy and Switzerland both scored 1. The full list of 2010 scores from Banting and Kymlicka (2012) is shown in Table 1.

Variability in the specific forms of multiculturalism across countries

While Banting and Kymlicka’s (2012) list of policies provides a useful indication of what multiculturalism means in practice, it fails to take into account a number of factors that have resulted in very different forms of multiculturalism being adopted in different countries. Multiculturalism varies across countries for a number of reasons, including differences in the culture of the dominant majority group, differences in immigration history, differences in indigenous national minority groups, and differences in the ways in which minority groups living in different countries wish to be recognised and accommodated. Multiculturalism also varies as a result of specific events that have occurred within individual countries and the policy actions that have been taken in response to those events. These factors have produced
significant variations in how multiculturalism has been institutionally implemented from one country to another.

Table 1: Multiculturalism scores in 2010 based on the Multiculturalism Policy Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Banting and Kymlicka 2012.

For example, the Netherlands has developed a form of integrationist multiculturalism. In the 1980s and early 1990s, minority groups were granted the right to organise themselves and given resources to establish their own schools, associations and news media, etc. However, in more recent years, while the significance of minority identity is still recognised, a far greater emphasis has been placed on shared citizenship, core Dutch civic values, and economic and social participation, with the introduction of integration exams, civic education and an official expectation that immigrants understand Dutch history and culture (Prins and Saharso 2010).

By contrast, the UK has adopted what may be termed pluralistic multiculturalism. This involves support for cultural pluralism, the implementation of anti-racist, anti-discrimination and equal opportunities legislation, the introduction of multicultural educational curricula, concessions over dress codes and the provision of public services information in multiple languages. In more recent years, in the Netherlands, there has been a growing emphasis on integration and community cohesion, but official support for cultural pluralism has been maintained, particularly at the local level (Rattansi 2011).

Other forms of multiculturalism have emerged in countries outside Europe. In the USA, for example, official rhetoric has long emphasised melting-pot multiculturalism, in which immigrant cultures are intended to fuse together to form a new overarching American culture based on loyalty to the American constitution but which is tolerant of hyphenated identities such as Italian-American and Asian-American that are allowed to retain their cultural distinctiveness. That said, in the 20th century, this rhetoric was accompanied by intense racism and segregation, which led to the birth of the black civil rights movement and the demand for equal group rights and affirmative action programmes to overcome historical inequities (Joppke 1996; Kivisto 2002).

India, by contrast, operates a constitutional multiculturalism based on individual rights and the protection of minorities, with each minority group being relatively self-ruling, operating within its own religious and cultural framework, and administering its own civil laws over personal issues such as marriage, caste, inheritance, etc. The official system is therefore characterised by legal pluralism and coexistence, with higher courts only becoming involved in cases of conflict (Benhabib 2002; Mitra 2001).

Variability in the specific forms of multiculturalism within countries across time

Multiculturalism does not only vary across countries – it also varies significantly within countries over time. An analysis of how multiculturalism has been implemented over the years within Canada is revealing in this respect. Kunz and Sykes (2007; see also Fleras and Kunz 2001) point out that, since its original introduction to Canada in 1971, multiculturalism has evolved through each successive decade in terms of its primary focus, identified problems and proposed solutions.

The 1970s were dominated by what Kunz and Sykes call ethnic multiculturalism with a focus on culture and the celebration of ethnic differences; in these years, prejudice was viewed as the primary problem, which needed to be tackled through individual adjustment to diversity through cultural sensitivity. In the 1980s, the emphasis shifted to equity multiculturalism, which was focused instead on race relations and removing barriers to economic participation; systematic discrimination was seen to be the primary problem, with employment equity and cultural accommodation being the required responses.

Civic multiculturalism emerged during the 1990s, which was focused on fostering constructive engagement, shared citizenship and a sense of belonging. Social exclusion was viewed as the problem, which needed to be tackled through participation and inclusiveness. In the 2000s, in response to ethnic- and religious-based conflicts and debates concerning multiculturalism in both Europe and Canada, Kunz and Sykes suggest that an integrative multiculturalism has emerged, where the focus has shifted to concerns about accommodating religious sensitivities and an emphasis on
rights and responsibilities. They argue that there is now a need for greater mutual understanding, and that intercultural dialogue is required for meeting this need.

**Three major forms of multiculturalism**

This wide array of different forms of multiculturalism across countries and across time is potentially bewildering. Moreover, it makes the task of identifying the key features of multiculturalism, in order to compare them with the key features of interculturalism, extremely difficult. That said, there are three major forms of multiculturalism that should be singled out for special attention. These are what may be called symbolic, structural and dialogical multiculturalism.

Symbolic multiculturalism involves the celebration of ethnic heritage cultures by taking symbolic markers of ethnic groups such as their clothing, food and music, and using these as the defining characteristics of the groups, characteristics that are then offered for celebration and enjoyment by others at multicultural festivals, taught through multicultural education in schools, and supported and promoted through cultural centres. The aim is to preserve and protect cultural differences. Somewhat scathingly, this approach to multiculturalism has been dubbed the 3S model of multiculturalism, as it involves reducing culture to “saris, samosas and steel drums” (Alihain-Brown 2000). As Kymlicka (2010) points out, symbolic multiculturalism is problematic because it ignores the fact that some minority customs and practices (for example, forced marriage) are not worthy of being celebrated, it encourages a view of culture as being defined exclusively in terms of a few trivial and safely inoffensive characteristics and practices which are immune to change and evolution, it tends to reinforce power inequalities within ethnic groups because traditional elites (typically older men) are consulted by the state in order to determine what constitutes the authentic cultural practices of the group, and it ignores the racism, discrimination and economic disadvantage which are commonly experienced by members of minority cultural groups.

In structural multiculturalism (or “equity multiculturalism”, to use Kunz and Sykes’ term), the emphasis is placed instead on tackling the deeper underlying political, economic and social disadvantages and inequalities that are routinely experienced by minority groups. This includes taking action to counter discrimination, giving special assistance to minority groups suffering from socio-economic disadvantages, remedying systematic educational disadvantages, and giving redress for group-based injustices and discrimination in the past. It entails the allocation by the state of appropriate resources to these various activities, with the goal of achieving educational, employment and economic equity, and equal treatment by public services and the law. Thus, structural multiculturalism involves the establishment of structures and processes which ensure that the members of minority groups are treated in a fair and just manner, the underlying assumption being that the political recognition of minority cultural groups can only be effective when it is embedded within a dismantling of the systems of subordination and domination which are responsible for the disadvantages and inequalities to which minority groups are often subjected.

Dialogical multiculturalism takes a very different perspective, and it currently represents a normative stance on how multiculturalism should be implemented rather than a description of an actual system of policies that has been applied within any given country to date. The primary exponent of dialogical multiculturalism is Parekh (2006). Noting that multicultural societies consist of multiple cultural communities, each of which has its own distinct system of meaning and significance, Parekh suggests that multiculturalism is about how these cultural communities should relate to one another. He argues that the norms that should govern this relationship between cultures cannot be derived from any one culture alone but only through “an open and equal dialogue between them” (2006: 13). Dialogical multiculturalism therefore attempts to delineate the ethical norms, principles and institutional structures that are required for such dialogue to occur. Parekh argues that intercultural dialogue requires a set of constitutional, legal and civic values which he calls the “operative public values” of the society; these values are required to determine the conditions under which, and the procedures through which, disagreements and conflicts about cultural practices may be resolved. Importantly, dialogical multiculturalism emphasises “a shared commitment to dialogue in both the political and non-political areas of life as the unifying focus and principle of society” (2006: 15).

Some of the sources of the debate concerning the relationship between multiculturalism and interculturalism should now be apparent. Multiculturalism has taken so many different forms across countries and over time that it is vital to know which form of multiculturalism is being used in the comparison with interculturalism before the accuracy of any conclusions about the relationship between the two can be assessed. Furthermore, there are forms of multiculturalism (such as dialogical multiculturalism) that stress the importance of intercultural dialogue. Because intercultural dialogue is arguably the central feature of interculturalism, the issue of the relationship between multiculturalism and interculturalism is far from clear-cut.

**The backlash against multiculturalism**

Despite the fact that there is an enormous variation in the forms of multiculturalism that have emerged in response to the specific circumstances of different countries, recent years have witnessed a dramatic upsurge in criticisms of all forms of multiculturalism at the level of political discourse. Within Europe, these criticisms culminated in statements that were made by three European leaders: by Angela Merkel in October 2010, who declared that multiculturalism had “utterly failed” (Merkel 2010); by David Cameron in February 2011, who stated that multiculturalism was a “failed” policy of the past which had weakened collective identity and encouraged different cultures to live separate lives (Cameron 2011); and by Nicolas Sarkozy also in February 2011, who claimed that multiculturalism had been “a failure” because it had been too concerned with the identities of immigrants and not enough with the identity of the receiving country (Sarkozy 2011).

These statements were made at the end of a decade in which a range of arguments had been put forward by numerous commentators questioning the suitability of
multiculturalism as a strategy for managing cultural diversity. Among the arguments made during this period, the following are probably the most salient:

- that multiculturalism encourages members of different cultures to live separately in parallel communities that have only minimal contact and interaction with one another, generating mutual ignorance and mistrust;
- that multiculturalism weakens collective identities and common values, and undermines national identity and loyalty to the country;
- that multiculturalism supports and encourages minority cultural practices that are morally unacceptable (such as female circumcision, forced marriage, and the subordination of women);
- that multiculturalism encourages disaffected minority youth to engage in civil disturbances and riots;
- that multiculturalism encourages Muslim youth to embrace religious fundamentalism, extremism and terrorism;
- that multiculturalism institutionalises cultural differences based on a view of cultures as monolithic static communities each of which is characterised by a clearly identifiable set of beliefs and practices that are shared by all of its members, a view which ignores the social reality of cultures as fluid, heterogeneous, internally contested and evolving social collectivities;
- that multiculturalism prevents honest debate about societal problems through a political correctness that brands any criticism of multiculturalism as “racist” and that denies the existence of social problems linked to immigration, race and ethnicity.

These arguments have been debated intensely over the past decade, with no consensus emerging (see, for example, the discussions in Alibhai-Brown 2000; Cantle 2005, 2012; Eade, Barrett, Flood and Race 2008; Joppke 2004, 2009; Kymlicka 2007, 2010; Modood 2007; A. Phillips 2007; M. Phillips 2006; Rattansi 2011; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007; Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010a; Wikan 2002).

Irrespective of the merits or demerits of these various arguments, there has been a retreat from the use of the term “multiculturalism” in political and policy discourse over the past decade. In its place, terms such as “culturally diverse”, “diversity management” and “interculturalism” have come to be used with increasing frequency instead. Vertovec and Wessendorf (2010b) argue that these terms in many policy documents are interchangeable with the terms “multicultural” and “multiculturalism”, and that there is no substantive difference in underlying meanings, with the shift in terminology disguising substantial continuities in policies. This terminological shift is a further reason why it is vital to look beneath the surface terms when making judgements about the relationship between older “multiculturalist” policies and more recent “interculturalist” policies, and to examine the details of policies, rather than relying on their labelling.

That said, it is clear that there has been a shift over the past decade towards a much greater emphasis on the civic integration of cultural minorities and immigrants in many European countries, with more restrictive and demanding integration policies having been introduced during this period. Analysing changes in integration policies between 1997 and 2009, Goodman (2010) found that civic integration requirements had increased very significantly across this time period in Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK, and had also increased in Finland, Luxembourg and Portugal. Integration requirements had remained broadly equivalent in Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy and Spain.

Surveying the integration policies and programmes in nine European countries, Carrera (2005) notes that integration programmes tend to include language classes, civic courses, which aim to familiarise migrants with the history, civic values and cultural traditions of the country concerned, and some kind of labour-market orientation or vocational training. These programmes are typically aimed at new adult immigrants, although in some countries, existing settled immigrants with integration needs also have to take the programmes. Exempted groups usually include EU citizens, highly skilled workers and professionals, students and asylum seekers. In several countries, these integration courses are mandatory and have to be completed successfully in order for immigrants to obtain residency rights and access to welfare benefits, and, in some countries, failure to successfully complete the course results in sanctions being applied, ranging from fines, loss of residency rights, and in some cases, expulsion from the country.

**Is there a retreat from multiculturalism over and above the new emphasis on integration?**

While integration has become a new emphasis of immigration policy in many European countries over the past decade, it is dubious that there has been a more general retreat from multiculturalist policies in Europe since 2000. The study by Banting and Kymlicka (2012) cited earlier in this chapter did not only examine the multiculturalism policies of countries in 2010 – it also examined the multiculturalism policies of the same countries in 1980 and 2000. It was found that in 1980, the average multiculturalism score for European countries was 0.7; in 2000, it was 2.1; while in 2010, it had risen to 3.1. These figures suggest that while multiculturalism has been under attack at the level of political discourse between 2000 and 2010 within Europe, there has not been a retreat from multiculturalism at the level of policy during the same period – in fact, the opposite would appear to be the case, with multiculturalism policies actually having been strengthened between 2000 and 2010 in many European countries. The countries in which there has been the most notable strengthening of multiculturalism policies between these years are:

- Belgium: score up from 3 to 5.5;
- Finland: score up from 1.5 to 6;
- Greece: score up from 0.5 to 2.5;
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- Ireland: score up from 1.5 to 3;
- Norway: score up from 0 to 3.5;
- Portugal: score up from 2 to 3.5;
- Spain: score up from 1 to 3.5;
- Sweden: score up from 5 to 7.

The only countries in which there have been retreats from multiculturalism policies between 2000 and 2010 are:
- Denmark: score down from 0.5 to 0;
- Italy: score down from 1.5 to 1;
- Netherlands: score down from 5.5 to 2.

Thus, with the notable exception of the Netherlands, there has not been a significant retreat from multiculturalist policies in recent years in Europe. At first glance, these findings might appear to be at odds with the enhancement of integration policies in many of the same countries during exactly the same period. However, there is no contradiction. Providing immigrants with opportunities to learn the language of the country of settlement, to learn about the history, civic values and cultural traditions of the country, and to receive labour-market orientation or training, is entirely compatible with multiculturalism, that is, with according the beliefs and practices of minority groups the same level of recognition and accommodation that is accorded to the majority cultural group. Proof that this is the case is provided by both Canada and Australia, whose robust multiculturalist policies have always been accompanied by equally robust integration policies, with cultural recognition and accommodation being combined with support for learning the national language, for learning about the traditions and values of the country and for employment (Banting and Kymlicka 2012).

An important conceptual distinction that needs to be borne in mind in this context is that between “integration” and “assimilation” (Modood 2007). The term “integration” denotes the incorporation of minority cultural groups into mainstream society through a two-way interaction process in which both cultural minorities and the cultural majority make accommodations to each other (which is fully compatible with multiculturalism). Integration is therefore to be distinguished from assimilation, where the accommodation is made only by cultural minorities, and not by the majority. Thus, while there is indeed a contradiction between multiculturalism and assimilation, there is no contradiction between multiculturalism and integration, as the examples of Canada and Australia demonstrate.

Not only has there not been a general abandonment of multiculturalism at the policy level over the past decade, evidence suggests that public opinion support for multiculturalism has also remained high during this period. For example, analysing data from Eurobarometer and the European Social Survey, EUMC (2005) reports that resistance to a multicultural society in the period from 1997 to 2003 was expressed by only about a quarter of Europeans in EU member states. This figure is consistent with that obtained in a more recent Eurobarometer survey conducted in 2007 (Gallup Organization 2007) in which data were collected from over 27,000 citizens living in the 27 member states of the EU. The 2007 survey found that almost three-quarters of respondents believed that people with a different ethnic, religious or national background enriched the cultural life of their country, while two-thirds of respondents were of the opinion that family cultural traditions should be retained by younger generations.

These findings are also consistent with those obtained in another study conducted by Breugelmans, van de Vijver and Schalk-Soekar (2009) in the Netherlands, the country which, as we have seen, has experienced the most dramatic retreat from multiculturalism between 2000 and 2010. Because of the assassinations of Pim Fortuyn in 2002 and Theo van Gogh in 2004, and the prevalence of negative political discourse about multiculturalism in the Netherlands, it is often assumed that majority Dutch attitudes towards multiculturalism have become much more negative over the past decade. However, analysing survey data on Dutch majority attitudes collected in 1999, 2001, 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007, Breugelmans and colleagues found that attitudes towards multiculturalism actually became progressively more positive across this nine-year period with the sole exception of a short-term dip in the positivity of attitudes in 2005 in the wake of the van Gogh assassination. Thus, attitudes towards multiculturalism in 2007 were the most positive of all, standing at 4.67 on a 7-point scale, significantly higher than they were in 1999 when they stood at 3.97. Exactly the same increasingly positive pattern over time held for more specific attitudes such as support for diversity in the Netherlands, support for the notion that minorities should be assisted by the majority, and support for minority rights and social participation.

Thus, the evidence reveals that, while discourse about multiculturalism by politicians and by political commentators has indeed become far more critical over the past decade, and while there has also been an increasing emphasis on integration over the same period, multiculturalism policies have typically been strengthened in European countries during this period, while public attitudes towards cultural minorities and multiculturalism have remained largely positive across the decade.

The core features of interculturalism

Turning now to the second broad approach for managing culturally diverse societies with which this book is concerned, it is notable that the movement towards multiculturalism within Europe has been accelerating in recent years, with the Council of Europe playing a leading role in its advocacy particularly through its publication of the White Paper on intercultural dialogue – “Living together as equals in dignity” in 2008. In addition to the White Paper, other notable statements of interculturalism are provided by Wood and Landry (2008), Bouchard (2011) and Cantle (2012), as well as by several chapters in the present volume. Drawing on all of these texts, it is possible to identify the following characteristics as forming the core features of interculturalism.
First, it is important to note that interculturalism shares a number of features with multiculturalism. In particular, interculturalism values cultural diversity and pluralism, which in turn necessarily entails the implementation of reasonable cultural accommodation. Interculturalism also places emphasis on integration and social inclusion, where integration is defined as a two-way process in which both minorities and majorities make accommodations towards each other. In addition, and again just like multiculturalism, interculturalism is concerned with tackling the underlying structural political, economic and social disadvantages and inequalities that are often experienced by members of minority groups, which involves taking action to counter discrimination, affirmative action to give special assistance to disadvantaged groups, and taking steps to eliminate systematic educational disadvantages. In other words, interculturalism builds upon the foundations of multiculturalism.

However, over and above these similarities, interculturalism places a central emphasis on intercultural dialogue, interaction and exchange. “Intercultural dialogue” itself may be defined as the open and respectful exchange of views between individuals and groups that have different cultural affiliations, on the basis of equality. This emphasis on intercultural interaction and dialogue is present in some versions of multiculturalism (such as Parekh’s dialogical multiculturalism) but not in all versions. Interculturalism proposes that intercultural dialogue helps people to develop a deeper understanding of cultural beliefs and practices that are different from their own, fosters mutual understanding, increases interpersonal trust, co-operation and participation, promotes tolerance and mutual respect. In addition, interculturalism proposes that, at the societal level, intercultural dialogue helps to reduce prejudice and stereotypes in public life, facilitates relationships between diverse national, ethnic, linguistic and faith communities, and fosters integration, a sense of common purpose and the cohesion of culturally diverse societies.

Interculturalism aims especially to generate a strong sense of a cohesive society based on shared universal values. Some versions of interculturalism propose that these shared values should be developed through the process of intercultural dialogue, in the course of which a new common culture will gradually emerge. By contrast, from the perspective of the Council of Europe, the universal values upon which interculturalism is based are human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and the recognition that all human beings have equal dignity and are entitled to equal respect. When based on the latter approach, interculturalism rejects moral relativism on the grounds of “cultural difference” and instead adopts a critical stance on illiberal cultural practices that violate these universal values.

Interculturalism also proposes that, in order to participate effectively in intercultural dialogue, citizens need to be equipped with intercultural competence. This competence includes, *inter alia*, open-mindedness, empathy, multiperspectivity, cognitive flexibility, communicative awareness, the ability to adapt one’s behaviour to new cultural contexts, and linguistic, sociolinguistic and discourse skills including skills in managing breakdowns in communication. The White Paper explicitly argues that intercultural competence is not acquired automatically: instead, it needs to be learned, practised and maintained throughout life. Formal educational systems have a major role to play in this regard, and there should be an increased emphasis on intercultural education throughout primary, secondary and higher education. In addition, civil society organisations, religious communities and the media have an important role to play as they can also contribute to the development of individuals’ intercultural competence.

Interculturalism proposes that intercultural dialogue requires a culturally neutral legal and institutional framework, as well as institutional structures that actively support and encourage intercultural dialogue. The design of institutions needs to be respectful of the specific cultural needs and requirements of minority groups so that members of these groups are not unfairly excluded from participation in society more generally and from intercultural dialogue more specifically. Hence, interculturalism once again emphasises the need for reasonable accommodation.

Discrimination, disadvantage in education and employment, poverty and marginalisation all represent structural barriers to intercultural dialogue. Individuals affected by these phenomena are less able to participate in intercultural dialogue. Interculturalism’s concern with these factors therefore stems not only from considerations of social justice. It is also concerned with these factors because they restrict the possibilities for intercultural dialogue. Hence, from the perspective of interculturalism, there are multiple reasons why public authorities need to take action to counter these phenomena, and public authorities also need to actively support access to intercultural dialogue by those who belong to disadvantaged or marginalised groups in order to ensure that they are not excluded from such dialogue by default.

A further significant barrier to intercultural dialogue is presented by individuals, groups and political organisations preaching hatred and intolerance towards people with different cultural affiliations. Interculturalism requires action to be taken throughout society to eliminate all forms of racism and xenophobia. Such action should be taken by public authorities, civil society organisations and the mass media, all of which should also aim to provide objective information about cultural minorities and migrants, and should seek to challenge stereotypes, myths and misrepresentations of people with other cultural affiliations whenever these occur.

Another potential barrier to successful intercultural dialogue is the difficulty of communicating without a *lingua franca*. Interculturalism advocates that the members of minority cultures need to learn the language of the dominant majority culture to enable them to participate in intercultural dialogue. At the same time, there should be provision for mother-tongue instruction not only because the use of minority languages is a basic human right, but also to ensure that such languages are protected and can continue to contribute to the cultural wealth of the broader society. In addition, all individuals, including members of the majority group, should be given the opportunity to develop their plurilingual competence so that they are more effectively equipped to engage in intercultural exchange and dialogue with others.
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A further emphasis of interculturalism is the need for public authorities to create and support meeting places and spaces for dialogue that are open to all, including public squares, parks, markets, community and social centres, kindergartens, schools, universities and youth clubs, churches, mosques and synagogues, museums, libraries, cultural venues and other leisure facilities. Measures need to be implemented to ensure that people have equal access to all of these spaces. Public authorities should also take action to promote ethnically mixed neighbourhoods, and to promote the recruitment of ethnically mixed workforces by public bodies, businesses and civil society organisations and associations.

Interculturalism requires leadership and vision from those in power. Politicians and other influential figures within society should actively champion intercultural dialogue and seek to enhance public awareness of the importance of intercultural interaction and exchange. At the same time, they should counter the belief among members of the majority culture that cultural pluralism and intercultural competence require them to abandon their own culture, and they should affirm the value of all cultures, both majority and minority, for the contributions they make to the cultural wealth of society.

Finally, interculturalism proposes that intercultural dialogue should not only operate at the interpersonal level. It should also operate at the community, organisational, institutional and international levels. Dialogue not only reduces prejudice and enhances mutual understanding and respect between individuals, but it can also facilitate mutual understanding between different communities (as in the case of dialogue between communities that have been involved in interethnic tension or conflict), between different organisations and institutions (as in the case of interfaith dialogue between religious institutions), and between different countries and groups of countries (as in the case of relationships between countries to the north and south of the Mediterranean).

In summary, interculturalism:

- values cultural diversity and pluralism;
- places an emphasis on integration and social inclusion;
- proposes that structural sources of political, economic and social disadvantage, inequalities, discrimination, poverty and marginalisation should be eliminated;
- places a central emphasis on intercultural dialogue, interaction and exchange;
- aims to generate a strong sense of a cohesive society based on shared universal values;
- proposes that all citizens should be equipped with intercultural competence, primarily but not only through education;
- proposes that structures and policies, including a culturally neutral legal and institutional framework, should be developed to support intercultural interaction and dialogue;

Interculturalist policies

The policies required to implement an interculturalist approach flow directly from the core features of interculturalism that have been listed above, and include all of the following:

- implementing reasonable accommodation measures;
- providing inclusion through employment, which may require forms of affirmative action;
- providing inclusion through education, which may require devising new non-discriminatory educational curricula and practices;
- facilitating access to citizenship by migrants in order to enhance their civic participation;
- legislating to combat all manifestations of discrimination, hatred and intolerance;
- promoting intercultural dialogue, interaction and exchanges, especially at school, in the workplace and in the community, but also at the organisational, institutional and international levels;
- implementing intercultural education throughout the formal educational system in order to equip individuals with intercultural competence;
- creating state institutions and supporting civil society organisations that promote intercultural dialogue and provide intercultural education;
- training in intercultural issues for staff working for public authorities, public services and educational, civil society and mass media organisations;
- providing instruction in the language of the dominant majority culture for those members of cultural minority and migrant groups who require this;
- providing instruction and support in the use of minority languages;
- providing foreign-language education for all;
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– ensuring that urban planners and architects create places and spaces which facilitate intercultural encounters and dialogue;
– mounting public information campaigns to encourage individuals to interact across cultural boundaries and to engage in intercultural dialogue.

Criticisms of interculturalism

There are several criticisms that have been made of interculturalism, some of which are more significant than others. One common criticism is that it underestimates the structural problems that are faced by cultural minorities and migrants, and that until these structural problems are tackled and remedied, intercultural dialogue is a superficial action which cannot yield the intended outcomes of enhanced mutual understanding, tolerance, respect and a sense of common purpose. This criticism is based on an incomplete understanding of interculturalism. Interculturalism does not propose that intercultural dialogue can achieve these goals on its own. Interculturalism instead proposes that the encouragement of intercultural interaction and dialogue must be accompanied by measures to tackle inequalities and structural disadvantages (including affirmative action, opposing discrimination and remedying educational disadvantage) if it is to achieve its intended goals. There is no equivocation within interculturalism over this matter.

A second criticism that is sometimes made against interculturalism is that it rests on a view of cultures as separate and clearly identifiable groups of people that, however, can be connected through a special form of dialogue that may take place between them. However, this criticism goes on to argue, cultures are not distinct, separate and clearly identifiable. Cultures are internally heterogeneous and contested collectivities that have unclear boundaries and which bear significant influences from other cultures, and all individuals hold multiple cultural affiliations and identities (for example, ethnic, linguistic, national, religious, local, etc.) which they move between in a fluid manner according to context and need, all of which makes it impossible to identify the so-called “cultures” between which dialogue is supposed to occur in intercultural dialogue. While this criticism may have some relevance to naïve formulations of interculturalism, it does not apply to the more sophisticated formulations. For example, the White Paper is explicitly based on the perspective that individuals are not homogeneous social actors, that cultural identities are complex, multiple, contextually sensitive and liable to change, and that intercultural dialogue is a process through which individuals can manage and enrich their own multiple cultural affiliations (see Section 3.2 of the White Paper). Furthermore, it may be argued that the term “intercultural” should properly be defined in terms of the subjective perceptions of individuals rather than in terms of any “objective” categorisation of people into cultures – so that “intercultural dialogue” is defined as dialogue that one has with others who are perceived to have different cultural affiliations from one’s own (see Chapter 8, where I develop this argument at greater length). Defining “intercultural” in terms of the perceptions of the individuals who are participating in the dialogue means that minimal assumptions are made about the nature of the cultures between which dialogue occurs.

A more challenging criticism of interculturalism stems from the fact that any dialogue is inevitably affected by status differentials and power relations between the participants within the dialogue and so it rarely takes place on a level playing field. Coupled with this concern, it is those individuals who occupy positions of power and privilege who tend to determine the implicit rules by which dialogue occurs, and their decisions are typically based on their own cultural perspective. Insofar as privileged elites tend to be drawn from the majority rather than minority cultures, these implicit rules often discriminate against cultural minorities. This is a significant problem for interculturalism. The pragmatic solution is to suggest that the rules of dialogue themselves must be drawn up through dialogue and consultation with those who are to participate in the dialogue (although, from a theoretical perspective, this solution leads to an infinite regress). More generally, this criticism of interculturalism serves to underline the crucial need to develop culturally sensitive policies that prevent the domination of cultural minorities by the cultural majority.

A further challenge for interculturalism is the fact that individuals may profess open-mindedness and respect for cultural difference but might only display these in relationship to some cultures and not others. There is a substantial body of social scientific research that has shown that people’s attitudes can be highly specific to the particular group being judged, so that an individual may have positive attitudes towards some groups but negative attitudes towards others (Barrett 2007; Brown 2010). Kymlicka (2003) also draws attention to this issue, noting that global interculturalism is sometimes privileged over local interculturality, with people deploying their intercultural skills on more distant cultures and world languages that open up economic opportunities for them, but not on other cultures and languages that are more immediately present within their own neighbourhood or locale. Interculturalism requires individuals to exercise local interculturality every bit as much as, if not more than, global interculturality. However, local interculturality is especially difficult and challenging as it can involve breaking down people’s preconceptions, prejudices, misinterpretations, sense of threat and anxieties about others within the ambit of their everyday lives, and it can impact significantly and negatively on people’s sensitivities through misunderstandings of cultural nuances. Intercultural dialogue is not easy. However, this challenge needs to be met through the open acknowledgement of these difficulties and by responding to them in an equitable and just manner using suitable communication, negotiation, conciliation or mediation techniques, as appropriate.

One final major criticism of interculturalism is that it does not differ in any substantial respects from multiculturalism and that all of the defining or core features of interculturalism are already core features of multiculturalism. The most detailed and developed statement of this criticism is that presented by Meer and Modood (2012). They mount a sustained argument that there are some forms of multiculturalism that are as equally committed to intercultural dialogue and social cohesion
as interculturalism, and that there is no substantive difference between these more progressive forms of multiculturalism and interculturalism. This final criticism is discussed at length by Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood in Chapter 6 of the present volume, and comments on this criticism are provided in Chapters 3 and 4 by Robin Wilson and Ted Cantle, respectively.

**The topics covered by the chapters in this book**

This introductory chapter has sought to provide a general background to the numerous issues that are discussed at length in this book. These issues are split up across the subsequent chapters in the following manner.

In Chapter 2, Ulrich Bunjes describes the development of the Council of Europe’s primary document on interculturalism, the *White Paper on intercultural dialogue* – “Living together as equals in dignity” (Council of Europe 2008). This document outlines the key features of interculturalism from the perspective of the Council of Europe. The Council of Europe has had a long history of involvement with intercultural matters, stretching back to the 1970s. Bunjes traces the history of this involvement through successive statements and declarations that have been made by the Council of Europe over the years. He also describes the process through which the White Paper was written. It was based on an extensive consultation with stakeholders, including the governments of the member states and numerous religious communities, migrant communities, cultural organisations and other non-governmental organisations across Europe. The consultation resulted in an enormous amount of feedback, and revealed near unanimity on the value of diversity and considerable support for interculturalism and intercultural dialogue as the best approach for dealing with cultural diversity as opposed to multiculturalism, which was viewed as encouraging communal segregation and mutual incomprehension and as undermining the rights of women. The text of the White Paper was written with the active involvement of the member states. Based on the messages that emerged from the consultation, it drew a clear conceptual distinction between multiculturalism and “the intercultural approach” (as interculturalism is called in the White Paper). Bunjes describes the key features of interculturalism that are laid out in the document. These include the use of intercultural dialogue to promote full respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law, to foster equality, human dignity and a sense of common purpose, to enable individuals to develop a deeper understanding of diverse world views and practices, to increase co-operation and participation, and to promote tolerance and respect for others. He also explains that the intercultural approach in the White Paper is based on three notions: the recognition that all human beings should be able to enjoy equal dignity; the vision of a cohesive society grounded on a set of universal values (i.e., human rights, democracy and the rule of law, the three foundational pillars of the Council of Europe); and the acknowledgement that everyone has a responsibility for bringing about an intercultural society, including individuals, public authorities, civil society organisations, religious communities and the media. Bunjes describes the key policy directions that flow from these principles, and some of the numerous initiatives and projects that have emerged in the wake of the publication of the White Paper.

In Chapter 3, Robin Wilson provides additional commentary on the context in which the White Paper was produced. While the White Paper was in part a response to the perceived failures of multiculturalism, it was also a response to a series of crises that had recently taken place across Europe, including the interethnic clashes in the UK northern towns of Oldham, Bradford and Burnley (2001), the murder of Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands (2004), the Islamist bombings in Madrid (2004) and London (2005), the urban riots by Maghrebian youth in France (2005) and the Danish Islamophobic cartoon affair (2005). These critical events signalled the urgent need for a new paradigm for managing cultural diversity within Europe, a need that the White Paper sought to address. Wilson reiterates how the vision of interculturalism contained in the White Paper is grounded on the universal norms of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. He also explains how the White Paper views the integration that takes place through intercultural dialogue as a genuine two-way process, in which both cultural minorities and cultural majorities are changed, enabling new synergies and transcultural possibilities to be realised. In this view, interculturalism differs from both the majoritarian ethos of assimilationism and the separationist ethos of multiculturalism – in the words of Wilson, “interculturalism vindicates the idea of a single moral realm, which allows differences to be resolved through dialogue, based on the reciprocal recognition of our common humanity”. He argues that both the state and civil society have key responsibilities within an interculturalist approach to offer safe spaces for intercultural dialogue and to provide institutions and actors who can actively encourage and support such dialogue.

In Chapter 4, Ted Cantle adds his voice to the case in favour of interculturalism. He argues that multiculturalism is ill adapted for dealing with the realities of life in the 21st century as it is based on an outmoded binary conception of majority–minority relations. As such, it fails to give proper attention to the challenges of globalisation, migration, diasporas, transnationalism, ethnic super-diversity, hybrid identities, multiple identities and the rise of mixed-heritage populations. It also encourages the self-segregation of minority groups into residential ethnic enclaves, institutionalises cultural group differences, promotes ignorance and mistrust of others, and has encouraged the rise of far-right extremist political parties. It also no longer enjoys either governmental or popular support. For all of these reasons, Cantle claims that multiculturalism has failed, and that interculturalism is instead required to meet the challenges of the contemporary world. Interculturalism, for Cantle, is based on intercultural openness, dialogue and interaction. It incorporates and builds on some elements of multiculturalism, especially multiculturalism’s emphasis on equal treatment and non-discrimination. But in contrast to multiculturalism, interculturalism concerns the creation of a culture of openness that challenges the entrenchment of separate communities and seeks to create common bonds, interdependency and interconnectedness. According to Cantle, intercultural contact and dialogue in themselves may not be sufficient to achieve these goals. Institutional support is also
required, especially from political, media and civil society institutions. In addition, it is vital for citizens to be equipped with cultural navigational skills and intercultural competence so that they are able to participate effectively in intercultural dialogue.

Chapter 5, by Gérard Bouchard, offers a vision of interculturalism that differs in an important respect from that offered in the three preceding chapters. His account of interculturalism has been developed within the context of Quebec, where the French-speaking population forms a majority while simultaneously forming a minority on the North American continent as a whole. For this reason, the French-speaking culture in Quebec is fragile and there are anxieties concerning its future. As Bouchard shows, Canadian interculturalism offers the most appropriate response for addressing these anxieties. He characterises this approach as one which shares a number of important features with multiculturalism: the recognition of minority rights; the practice of reasonable accommodation; strong concern for the economic and social inclusion of minority individuals; anti-racism and anti-discrimination; and the acceptance that some minority individuals may wish to retain transnational links with their country of origin. However, interculturalism differs from multiculturalism because, unlike multiculturalism, it focuses on reciprocal integration and the creation of social bonds between the cultural majority and cultural minorities; promotes interactions, exchanges and joint civic initiatives between the majority and minorities; encourages the formation of a new common culture that is sustained by both the majority and minority cultures while preserving their core features; fosters the development of a new national culture that comprises the majority culture, minority cultures and the common culture; and supports a regime of inclusive secularity. In addition, and importantly, Canadian interculturalism permits cultural interventionism in order to enable the majority culture to retain a sense of continuity with its heritage through the formal recognition of its legitimacy and through the legal protection and support of its practices. Bouchard argues that the non-neutrality of the state in the cultural sphere in favour of the cultural majority is not only legitimate but also necessary in cases such as Quebec, although such cultural interventionism must be carefully circumscribed to prevent it leading to any formalised dominance of the majority culture over minority cultures. He therefore differentiates Canadian interculturalism from Canadian multiculturalism, which posits that there is no majority culture within Canada and defines the country in terms of its diversity (a position which downgrades the status of Quebec culture to that of just one among many minority cultures). In developing the case for Canadian interculturalism, Bouchard notes that it may well have relevance to those European societies in which cultural majorities feel under threat.

Chapters 2 through to 5 therefore provide a detailed exposition of interculturalism, with all four authors making the case that interculturalism differs in important respects from multiculturalism, that multiculturalism has proved unsuitable for managing cultural diversity, and that interculturalism offers a much more suitable approach. However, in Chapter 6, Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood offer a very different perspective. They argue that interculturalism is usually contrasted positively with multiculturalism in four main ways: 1. interculturalism is more committed to interaction and dialogue than multiculturalism; 2. interculturalism puts less emphasis on groups and group identities than multiculturalism; 3. interculturalism is more committed to a sense of the whole and to societal cohesion than multiculturalism; and 4. interculturalism is less relativistic and less tolerant of illiberal cultural practices than multiculturalism. Meer and Modood take issue with all four claims. They point out, for example, that intercultural dialogue is an integral feature of both Taylor’s (1992) and Parekh’s (2000) foundational statements of the tenets of multiculturalism; that interculturalism relies upon a formulation of groups and group identities just as much as multiculturalism; that some versions of multiculturalism such as that advocated by Modood (2007) posit that multiculturalism should be tied to an inclusive national identity to foster commonality across differences and to provide a unifying framework of narratives, ceremonies and rituals to generate societal cohesion; and that the charge against multiculturalism of relativism and support of illiberalism derives from a confusion between religious and ethnic practices, a tendency to condemn religious practices, and a failure to examine issues on a case-by-case basis. Thus, they argue that interculturalism is not sufficiently different from multiculturalism to offer an original perspective or to represent an advance over it. Meer and Modood also suggest that multiculturalism is a preferable approach to interculturalism insofar as it recognises that social life involves not only individuals but also groups, and that the needs of both should be recognised and accommodated by the state. Because different groups experience disadvantage in different ways, policies need to be configured at the group level and not only at the individual level. Such an approach is, at its core, a multiculturalist approach.

The final three chapters in this book take a closer look at three specific topics in this debate between interculturalism and multiculturalism, namely language issues, intercultural competence and education. In Chapter 7, Maria del Carmen Méndez García and Michael Byram examine language issues and language policies. They argue that the White Paper and recent academic debates on interculturalism and multiculturalism (such as that which appeared in the Journal of Intercultural Studies 2012) have failed to pay sufficient attention to language. In particular, they point out that there is a common failure to observe the conceptual distinctions that may be drawn between “multilingualism” and “plurilingualism” and between “pluriculturality” and “interculturality”. “Multilingualism” refers to the co-existence of different languages in the same geographical area (which are not necessarily spoken by the same individuals), while “plurilingualism” refers to the ability of an individual speaker to use multiple languages, to varying degrees, for the purposes of communication and to take part in intercultural interactions. “Pluriculturality” refers to the situation where an individual identifies with at least some of the values, beliefs and/or practices of two or more cultures and is able to participate actively in those cultures, whereas “interculturality” refers to an individual person’s capacity to be open-minded and respectful towards other cultures, to be willing to learn about other cultures, to communicate with people from other cultures, and to mediate among people of different cultures. Thus, interculturality does not involve identifying with,
or adopting the cultural practices of, other cultural groups. As Méndez García and Byram note, a sine qua non requirement for intercultural dialogue to take place is that the people who participate in that dialogue share a common language. A common language is vital for overcoming the so-called “barriers” between cultures, and yet most discussions about intercultural dialogue pay little or no attention to language, and fail to observe the conceptual distinctions between “multilingualism” and “plurilingualism” and between “pluriculturality” and “interculturality”. For this reason, documents such as the White Paper contain ambiguous statements and claims whenever language issues are being discussed. Méndez García and Byram argue that for the proper conceptualisation of both multiculturalism and interculturalism, much greater attention needs to be paid to language. Without such attention, policy recommendations in relation to the role of language in cultural interaction and communication will inevitably be weak and potentially ambiguous and confused.

The same conceptual distinction between “pluriculturality” and “interculturality” is made in Chapter 8 by Martyn Barrett. This chapter discusses the nature of intercultural competence, and explores whether an emphasis on intercultural competence is a distinctive hallmark of interculturalism, which differentiates it from multiculturalism. Both the White Paper and Cantle (2012) argue that it is vital that citizens are equipped with the competence that is needed to engage in intercultural dialogue, but neither provides an explanation of what intercultural competence actually is. Reviewing the theoretical and empirical research that has been conducted by social scientists into intercultural competence, Barrett provides an account of what intercultural competence is, what its constituent components are, and what intercultural competence enables people to achieve (which includes engaging in intercultural dialogue, respecting other cultures, and using one’s encounters with such people to learn about oneself and one’s own cultural positionings). This account of intercultural competence is rooted in a non-essentialist view of culture, and distinguishes between interculturality (which does not require the individual to abandon their own cultural affiliations or to adopt the practices associated with other affiliations) and pluriculturality (that is, the competence to participate actively in multiple cultures). Barrett notes that situating intercultural competence within the framework of values of the Council of Europe implies that not all cultural practices should be respected irrespective of their nature; instead, respect ought to be withheld from practices that violate the principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. He further suggests that these three fundamental principles should form the core of the unifying civic values and public culture that are needed to foster a sense of common purpose and cohesion across cultural differences. Education is identified as the most important means through which people’s intercultural competence can be enhanced, with education being construed in a broad sense to include not only formal but also non-formal and informal education, thereby implicating not only schools and universities, but also civil society organisations and the family within its purview. Comparing intercultural education with multicultural education, Barrett concludes that there is overlap between the two as it is not only intercultural education which has as its primary goal the development of intercultural competence; some forms of multicultural education are also devoted to the development of “multicultural competence” which, in some formulations, is indistinguishable from “intercultural competence”. For this reason, an emphasis on intercultural competence cannot be said to be a distinctive hallmark of interculturalism that clearly differentiates interculturalism from multiculturalism.

Chapter 9, by Léonce Bekemans, continues the emphasis on education as the most important means for tackling the challenges created by cultural diversity. He argues that education has always been shaped throughout history by cultural developments, and the societal challenges that we are facing today mean that our current conceptions of education once again need to be re-shaped accordingly. He proposes that it is time for Europe to move away from multiculturalism, that is, away from policies that are designed to support the peaceful co-existence of different cultures within society so that they may provide a richness for all, towards interculturalism, that is, to a more dynamic policy approach which encourages respectful and open interaction between individuals from different cultural backgrounds in order to promote tolerance and mutual understanding, prevent conflicts and enhance social cohesion. As Bekemans points out, education has a key role to play in this transition as it is able to prepare people of different backgrounds for living together and for responsible citizenship. According to this view, the priority task of education should be to enable individuals to acquire the attitudes, knowledge, skills and behaviours which they need to become responsible citizens within multicultural societies, and it should also assist them in appreciating the values of democracy, human rights, equality, participation, partnership, social cohesion and social justice. Education should therefore aim to develop political and cultural literacy, respect for otherness, the skills that are needed to participate actively in public life, and knowledge of languages, and it should aim to instil behaviour patterns of availability, openness and dialogue, and promote the capacity for constructive conviviality. Bekemans argues that citizenship education needs to be revised and strengthened and transformed into intercultural citizenship education, which involves the learning and teaching of intercultural competence. Along with Barrett, Bekemans views intercultural education as a challenge not only for formal education but also for non-formal and informal education. In other words, all societal and social institutions and actors have a role to play in enabling people to live together harmoniously against a background of cultural diversity.

**Conclusion**

As noted at the outset of this chapter, there are very different perspectives on the relationship that exists between interculturalism and multiculturalism and these differences have led to a lively debate in this field. Some of the disagreements that have arisen in the course of this debate may stem from terminological differences, for example, the use of the same term (such as “multiculturalism”) to refer to a range of different underlying concepts, and of different terms (such as “multicultural competence” and “intercultural competence”) to refer to similar underlying
concepts. There has certainly been a shift in the terminology used in political and policy discourse in relationship to cultural diversity over the past ten years or so that appears to be related to a shift in the concepts under discussion, but because this shift has occurred in many countries without a corresponding change in policies, the potential for controversy is exacerbated still further.

In addition, it needs to be recognised that interculturalism and multiculturalism share a number of common features, including the need for the reasonable accommodation of minority beliefs and practices, and the need to tackle deeper structural inequalities and disadvantages. This overlap in the two approaches no doubt also contributes to misunderstandings concerning their relationship.

However, there are also some substantive differences in points of view within this debate. Some authors such as Meer and Modood argue that all of the supposedly distinctive characteristics of interculturalism are already present within some previous formulations of multiculturalism, while other authors such as Cantle and Bouchard (and indeed the White Paper) argue that while interculturalism builds upon some important aspects of multiculturalism, they nevertheless represent two very different approaches.

While a process of comparing and contrasting theoretical formulations is one way in which to examine whether or not interculturalism and multiculturalism differ, another way is by comparing and contrasting the policies that are yielded by the two approaches. To this end, each of the chapters that follow concludes with a statement of the concrete policy implications that flow from the theoretical position that has been articulated within the chapter; in addition, some of the policies indicative of both approaches have been outlined in this current chapter. The reader is invited to consider not only the theoretical arguments, but also these statements of policy implications in drawing their own conclusions concerning the relationship between interculturalism and multiculturalism.

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When the foreign ministers of the 47 member states of the Council of Europe finally launched the *White Paper on intercultural dialogue* – “Living together as equals in dignity” in May 2008, they were positively aware of the magnitude of the project. In the course of almost 20 high-level meetings, held over a period of several months in Strasbourg and elsewhere in Europe, it had become evident to everyone involved that the subject of intercultural dialogue is complex, controversial and challenging.

**Introducing “intercultural dialogue”**

Broadly speaking, everything the Council of Europe has done since its creation in 1949 is directly or indirectly related to the management and promotion of cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue. Its core mandate is to defend and extend human rights, democracy and the rule of law. These values are preconditions for a thriving, culturally diverse society.

The genesis of the White Paper, however, is intricately linked to the European political landscape of the 1990s.

Whilst the Council of Europe had since the 1970s organised with educators, young people and civil society organisations numerous projects on concepts like “intercultural understanding”, “intercultural education” and “global education”, the issue seldom if ever left the domain of experts and practitioners. Moreover, the problem was mainly seen in a worldwide North–South context, rarely as a domestic challenge although at that stage transfrontier migration had in many regions already set in.

The situation changed with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the violent conflicts it entailed, and the subsequent redrawing of many international borders in Europe. Large population groups found themselves suddenly in the position of “minorities”, where they had been “majorities” for as long as they could remember. The first Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe, in Vienna in 1993, explicitly acknowledged the need to protect the national minorities “which the upheavals of history have established in Europe” (Vienna Declaration) and argued that “a climate of tolerance and dialogue” is necessary for the participation of all in political life, for stability and peace.

It is not farfetched to see here the earliest trace of the emerging concept of intercultural dialogue, at the highest political level in Europe.
Intercultural dialogue was ennobled two years later in the first international legal document ever mentioning the concept. In 1995, the Council of Europe opened for signature the “Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities”, which instructs the ratifying state to “encourage a spirit of tolerance and intercultural dialogue and take effective measures to promote mutual respect and understanding and co-operation among all persons living on their territory, irrespective of those persons’ ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity, in particular in the fields of education, culture and the media.” By today’s standards, the concept of 1995 was however far from settled; the (unofficial) “Explanatory Memorandum” accompanying the convention described the aim of this paragraph rather loosely as the promotion of tolerance and intercultural dialogue “by eliminating barriers between persons belonging to ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious groups through the encouragement of intercultural organisations and movements which seek to promote mutual respect and understanding and to integrate these persons into society whilst preserving their identity.”

In the following years, the need to clarify the concept at an international level became increasingly urgent. In 1998, the UN General Assembly declared the year 2000 to be the “United Nations Year of Dialogue among Civilizations”, leaving open the exact character of the “positive and mutually beneficial interaction” which the decision invited. In the eyes of the world, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 raised profound questions related to cultural and religious diversity. In 2004, the initiative for an “Alliance of Civilizations” started at UN level.

Whilst the Second Summit of the Council of Europe in 1997 referred only to the need to promote the understanding “between the citizens of the North and the South”, some years later, the narrative had thoroughly evolved. The conferences of specialised ministers responsible for culture (Opatija, October 2003) and education (Athens, November 2003) recognised their new role and responsibilities in initiating intercultural dialogue and intercultural education. The European Heads of State and Government, assembled in Warsaw for their third summit in May 2005, agreed to “foster European identity and unity, based on shared fundamental values, respect for our common heritage and cultural diversity. We are resolved to ensure that our diversity becomes a source of mutual enrichment, inter alia, by fostering political, inter-cultural and inter-religious dialogue.”

Meeting in Faro, Portugal, a few months later, the European ministers responsible for culture finally formulated a proper Council of Europe strategy for developing intercultural dialogue. The “Faro Declaration” of November 2005 not only proposed to launch a White Paper (“on integrated policies for the management of cultural diversity through intercultural dialogue and conflict prevention”), it also contained in nuce already the basic elements of what, 30 months later, would become the White Paper on intercultural dialogue – “Living together as equals in dignity”. The process had started.

Designing the White Paper process

At that stage, the Council of Europe had hardly any experience of White Papers – unlike the European Commission and the governments of some member states, which frequently use White Papers as authoritative statements on future policies and as invitations for debate.

In 2000, the Council of Europe Steering Committee on Bioethics (CDBI) had worked on a White Paper on the protection of the human rights and dignity of people suffering from mental disorder; the document, drawn up by a group of experts, was explicitly published for public consultation purposes with a view to drawing up guidelines to be included in a new legal instrument of the Council of Europe. In 2002, the European Committee on Legal Co-operation (CDCJ) authorised the publication of a White Paper on principles concerning the establishment and legal consequences of parentage, prepared by an expert committee on family law. The plan to produce a White Paper on everyday violence in the member states (2002) did not materialise. None of these projects ever came close to committing the Council of Europe or its member states.

The absence of precedents, predetermined formats and procedures left the organs of the Council of Europe a wide margin of manoeuvre when the internal discussions set in after the Faro conference. Although the idea of a “Green Paper” (as a precursor of a later, more mature “White Paper”) was mooted for a while without result, a political consensus quickly emerged on three basic parameters: the new White Paper would be a document approved at the highest political level, i.e. by the Committee of Ministers; it would be the result of a wide consultation process with all major stakeholders; and it would reflect fully the achievements of the Council of Europe and its organs and institutions in all areas connected to cultural diversity.

Work started in 2005 under the direction of Gabriella Battaini-Dragoni, at the time Director General and Council of Europe Coordinator for Intercultural Dialogue. An editorial team and an inter-secretariat task force were set up, piloting the process.

Stakeholder consultations

The fact that after its publication the White Paper met with such widespread approval among governments and non-state actors, is mainly due to the decision to produce the document in a process of dialogue, and to give serious consideration to the views expressed by the various partners. As the document itself states, “it is in many ways a product of the democratic deliberation which is at the heart of intercultural dialogue itself”.

Consultations started in January 2007 with the publication of a 22-page “consultation document”, distributed widely among Council of Europe contacts and through the web; the document set out the political background, the procedures and issues, and formulated 33 generic questions.
The following consultation rounds were conducted at different levels and with different tools, but were always mindful of the emerging wide interpretation of intercultural dialogue as a task ideally for everyone (and certainly not just politicians and maybe some educators and experts, as the conventional view had it at the time). One advantage of the Council of Europe for this type of operation is that it is not purely intergovernmental in character; it also regularly brings together hundreds of experts sent by more than a dozen specialised ministries in all member states, members of national parliaments, representatives of local and regional authorities, and civil society organisations.

The first round of consultations, therefore, involved 12 relevant steering committees of the Council of Europe, the registry of the European Court of Human Rights, members of the Parliamentary Assembly and the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, as well as other bodies of the Council of Europe including the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), the High-level Task Force on Social Cohesion and the Commissioner for Human Rights.

Questionnaires were sent to all governments of member states, inviting them to formulate their overall policy vision on the management of cultural diversity in democratic societies; their understanding of the concept of cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue; the measures taken or planned to promote cultural diversity, intercultural dialogue and social cohesion at national and local level; and their expectations of the Council of Europe. They were also invited to identify examples of good practice.

A second group of consultations was conducted with large target groups outside the Council of Europe. Questionnaires, similar to the ones distributed to governments, were published online and sent to numerous religious communities, migrant communities and cultural and other non-governmental organisations across the continent.

Thirdly, the Council of Europe Secretariat organised (or co-organised) debates with selected organisations representing migrants, women, young people, journalists and media operators. International partner institutions were invited to contribute their views.

**A wealth of views and suggestions**

The White Paper itself classified the comments provided during these consultation rounds as “generous”, and offered a cursory summary. It notably acknowledged the confidence of all stakeholders “that the Council of Europe, because of its normative foundation and its wealth of experience, was well placed to take a timely initiative”.

The depth and variety of the arguments contributed by the consultees deserve three major observations.

Firstly, the sheer quantity of replies to the questionnaires astonished those who prepared the White Paper. The governments of almost two-thirds of the 47 member states of the Council of Europe responded in writing. Some of their replies were so substantial that they almost matched the White Paper in volume and argumentative differentiation; others were more formal and concise. This was in itself a strong indication that the topic had left the realm of academic debate; cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue had clearly become political issues in all parts of the continent.

Civil society organisations also replied in significant numbers. Almost 100 “mainstream” NGOs and organisations representing the interests of migrants, asylum seekers and IDPs used the occasion to provide – often very substantial – comments, which showed how far civil society reflection on the challenges of cultural diversity had progressed in recent years.

Secondly, with the exception of a few specific issues, the range of governmental positions on the concept of intercultural dialogue and promotional measures resembled the range of views among NGOs.

There was almost unanimity with regard to the value of diversity as an enriching element of modern society. Also, in both stakeholder groups there were strong “interculturalist” views. One government declared that its “long-term objective is the transformation of the … multicultural society into an intercultural society. In other words, the transformation of diversified society with various milieus living separately, into a society with positive mutual dialogue and interactions.” Several governments argued that they supported interculturality “as opposed to both assimilation and to the mere coexistence of parallel communities without a common ground”. Another government, which previously had been among the staunchest supporters of multiculturalism in Europe, said that in 2004 “the focus of cultural diversity policy shifted from multicultural to intercultural, with the emphasis now on making connections”. These views were echoed by many civil society organisations. Few governments, and even fewer NGOs, completed the questionnaire expressing fundamentally different positions.

The differences lay essentially in two areas. One was the perception of “Europe”. For many NGOs, it was “Europe” which had the prime responsibility to move the diversity debate forward and enforce its standards of human rights and democracy. They saw European values and a genuinely European identity as the basis of the emerging interculturalist society. Few NGOs acknowledged the sustainability and worth of national values and identities. Not surprisingly perhaps, Europe’s governments expressed positions that were much more oriented towards the nation state.

The other exception was the role of the state. NGOs often saw public authorities as having the main responsibility for the promotion of intercultural dialogue (including an appropriate financing of civil society organisations), whereas many governments emphasised a shared responsibility of all social actors and advocated an integrated approach, ideally involving religious communities.

Thirdly, the survey among Europe’s religious communities produced an unprecedented, massive response. More than 120 questionnaires were returned from a wide range of faith groups of Christian, Muslim, Jewish or Buddhist belief (plus
a number of replies from inter-confessional and non-religious organisations). As a secular intergovernmental organisation, the Council of Europe had hitherto little contact with religious leaders; it was suddenly confronted with very elaborate and outspoken religious value systems, some of which were not fully congruent with its own core values. As one consultee wrote, the attitude of his religious community “towards the generally accepted concept of human rights and fundamental freedoms is quite controversial”.

On the whole, however, the participating religious leaders and organisations shared the view that increasing cultural diversity is an inevitable and positive societal development. Many pointed towards the fact that diversity was quickly growing also within their own faith group, which often presented them with very specific challenges. The replies often showed a keen awareness of the dynamic, complex and evolutionary character of culture. Intercultural dialogue was strongly supported; many underlined the specific role and responsibility of religion in this context. Not untypically for many faith groups, one rabbi felt that religious communities have a determining role in the promotion of intercultural dialogue because they are “the conscience of man” and play the role of a guide in often troubled times and “towards a population that has largely lost its bearings”.

The political editing process

The six-month consultation process had provided ample proof that the starting point of the White Paper process, i.e. to root intercultural dialogue firmly in the values promoted by the Council of Europe, had the support of virtually all stakeholders. It had also shown that all stakeholders were aware of the day-to-day challenges of cultural diversity, and welcomed the Council of Europe initiative to bring clarity to the concept.

The following six months belonged to the Committee of Ministers, which negotiated every detail of the draft that the Secretariat had prepared with the valuable help of outside experts. Three aspects of this stage of the political debate deserve to be mentioned.

As could be expected, not all member states showed the same commitment to developing a substantial text on intercultural dialogue. It is however worth noting how intense and broad the involvement of member states really was. The final version of the White Paper can be rightly seen as a collective effort, which bears the traces of hundreds of amendments tabled by the diplomatic representatives of virtually all member states.

This being said, the amendments reflected of course the specific interests and priorities of the governments concerned. Thus, the initial plan to illustrate the main messages of the White Paper with examples of good practice had to be dropped; the definition of what constitutes good practice turned out to be politically sensitive and in one or two cases, openly controversial. Also, many days were spent on efforts to define the key term of “minority”, which is not a trivial exercise in view of the rights that minorities have under certain international instruments. Member states finally agreed on a definition for the purposes of the White Paper, without setting a precedent.

At no point of the debate was the broad approach of the White Paper put in question: the choice to describe first the value basis of intercultural dialogue; to summarise the achievements and standards of the Council of Europe; to propose a conceptual framework and formulate its implications for national governance structures, citizens’ participation, education, the spaces of dialogue and the international community; and to draft recommendations for future action in this field. Probably the most debated section was the chapter on the religious dimension of intercultural dialogue, which objectively broke new ground – not, of course, in its reference to the freedom of thought, conscience and religion, but in the paragraphs on the relations between public authorities and religious communities at European and national level. In contrast to that, the political support (but not responsibility) for the dialogue between religious communities themselves had already been a well-established topos for many years.

Especially in its initial phase, the White Paper debate revolved around the terminology to apply. Based on the strong message emanating from the consultation process, the text introduced a clear distinction between the policy approaches of “multiculturalism” and “the intercultural approach” (the exact equivalent term “interculturalism” is in fact not used in the text). Many consultees had expressed concern about the limitations of multiculturalism, mainly because of its tendency to nourish communal segregation and mutual incomprehension. The critique of multiculturalism also pointed towards the danger of reifying “cultures” (a term, as many pointed out, which often hides other concepts like “race” or “ethnicity”), creating the risk of imprisoning individuals in obsolete, static categories. The White Paper speaks explicitly of the menace that multicultural policies contribute to the “undermining of the rights of individuals – and, in particular, women – within minority communities, perceived as if these were single collective actors”.

Conceived in sharp contrast to multiculturalism, the “interculturalist paradigm” emerged in the debate as a concept based on three pillars: the unreserved recognition that all human beings must be able to effectively enjoy equal dignity; the vision of a cohesive society, offering all its members equality of life chances and grounded on a set of shared, culture-unspecific universal values (i.e. human rights, democracy and the rule of law); and the acknowledgement that everyone without exception has a responsibility for bringing about an intercultural society: individuals, civil society, religious communities, public authorities and all their institutions, the media, social partners, minorities and majorities.

These principles have obvious and far-reaching consequences, many of them already described in more or less detail in the White Paper itself. The necessary innovation of our democratic governance structures; the need to open new possibilities for effective participation; the duty to provide the individual with intercultural compe-
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– the continent-wide network of “Intercultural Cities” (together with the European Commission), which manage cultural diversity in an active and exemplary way;
– a campaign with media professionals and trainers (“Speak Out Against Discrimination”), developing intercultural curricular material together with journalism-training institutes;

At the end of the editing process, a few days before the final endorsement of the White Paper by the ministers of Foreign Affairs, the Ambassador of “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” (chairing the Rapporteurs Group on culture of the Committee of Ministers) described the document as “the first of its kind in the history of the Council of Europe, developed after an elaborate process of consultation with many stakeholders, to be approved at the highest political level of our Organisation and addressing an entire policy area in a medium-term perspective … Our White Paper is the first document of its kind that is unambiguous in its commitment to the values of human rights, democracy and the rule of law in the context of intercultural dialogue. The White Paper is crystal-clear in its rejection of cultural relativism. There is no misunderstanding that the acceptance of traditions and cultural practices has to find its limits in the universal human rights principles and particularly the human rights standards of the Council of Europe.”

Implementation and follow-up

The White Paper on intercultural dialogue – “Living together as equals in dignity” was officially launched at the 118th Ministerial Session of the Council of Europe on 7 May 2008. The official communique of the meeting underlined that the Ministers welcomed the document “as a significant pan-European contribution to an international discussion steadily gaining momentum as well as to the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue. The Ministers emphasised the importance of ensuring appropriate visibility of the White Paper, and called on the Council of Europe and its member states, as well as other relevant stakeholders, to give suitable follow-up to the White Paper’s recommendations.”

The most immediate follow-up was the translation into additional languages. So far, the White Paper has been produced in some 20 languages, including Hebrew and Arabic. The latest version, in Greek, appeared at the end of 2012.

This is not the place to analyse even superficially the implementation and follow-up given to the recommendations of the White Paper. Some projects, developed by the Council of Europe together with or after the adoption of the White Paper in 2008, may illustrate the breadth of the action taken:

– modules developed for the training of teachers, covering democratic citizenship, human rights, mutual understanding in diversity, “multiperspectivity” in history teaching, media literacy, prevention of crimes against humanity, prevention of discrimination and violence;
– “Youth Peace Camps” bringing together young people from both sides of regional conflicts, and since 2012 a new youth project entitled “Human rights defenders online”, which trains youth activists to combat the rampant hate speech against minorities on the Internet;
– annual “exchanges” between the Committee of Ministers and representatives of religious communities and non-religious convictions on the religious dimension of intercultural dialogue, dealing with issues like the teaching of religious facts in schools; the freedom of expression of the media and respect towards cultural and religious diversity; or youth and social media.

Intercultural dialogue has since become a constant concern of standard-setting, monitoring and training activities of the Council of Europe, in all regions and in many institutional contexts. The Council of Europe plays its role in the “Alliance of Civilizations” initiative of the UN Secretary-General, which officially acknowledged the White Paper as its reference. In 2011, the “Group of Eminent Persons” who drafted the report on “Living Together – Combining diversity and freedom in 21st-century Europe” recommended “the creation of a regular process of follow-up or assessment of the development of intercultural dialogue in Council of Europe member states (in the form of a European Forum every three years or a European report) with the 2008 White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue as a reference”, and the production of a junior edition of the White Paper for use in schools and youth work.

The process continues. As the White Paper had formulated, it was conceived as an open invitation to all stakeholders. That, at least, has been achieved.

Suggestions for further reading

For further information about each of the following recommended texts, please see the contents of this chapter where each text is commented upon in turn. All of the documents are available on the website of the Council of Europe (www.coe.int).


Wrocław Declaration on 50 years of European cultural co-operation, adopted by the Ministers responsible for culture, education, youth and sport of the signatory states of the European Cultural Convention, gathered at Wrocław, Poland, 2004.


### 3 – The urgency of intercultural dialogue in a Europe of insecurity

**Robin Wilson**

**Introduction**

There are essentially three problems that European progressives need to solve in the 21st century. They are whether we can live together as equals (the welfare question), whether we can live together (the diversity question) and whether we can live at all (the ecological question). The second question constitutes a major challenge in itself, as instantiated by how those who had lived as neighbours in former Yugoslavia became embroiled in brutal nationalistic wars in the 1990s and by the international “war on terror” unleashed in the name of a “clash of civilisations” following the Al-Qaeda attacks in the US in 2001. More, this represents a growing challenge, as globalisation (particularly of electronic communications) and large-scale population movements have brought the Self and Other into contact, physically or virtually, more intensively and extensively than ever before.

This trio of political tasks clearly comprises a very tall order. And it looks taller still when we take account of the structural crisis of European capitalism which erupted in the same year as the launch of the Council of Europe (2008) *White Paper on intercultural dialogue – “Living together as equals in dignity”* – a crisis which has issued in a self-exacerbating austerity unrecognising of Keynes’ “paradox of thrift” effective in rolling back historic welfare entitlements and which, in turn, has fostered gross labour-market insecurity readily exploited by those who would scapegoat members of minority communities.

But if we can learn from past achievements and mistakes, success is not impossible. The enduring capacity of Nordic welfare states to constrain social inequality, as well as to balance the budgetary books, remains testament to what can be achieved by the twin formula of progressive taxation and universal benefit, as compared with the unsustainable insurance-based systems of continental Europe or the meanness of Anglo-American means-tested benefits. And those anxious to secure global sustainability can draw upon Marx’s elegant account in *Capital of how British capital was prevented from destroying the workforce upon which it relied during the industrial revolution by the labour movement’s successful pressure for an end to child labour and limits to working time, seeing an analogy in how today’s international environmental movement could similarly prevent global capital from destroying the planet upon which it relies through precipitating ever-stricter regulation of its consumption of finite natural goods and its pollution of the ecosystem. Equally, if we can avoid being between the Scylla and Charybdis of what I will describe as
assimilationism and multiculturalism in the management of cultural diversity, a viable political course can be steered there too.

This chapter begins with the attack on multiculturalism in recent years, showing how it has been associated with a retreat to assimilationism that can only be characterised as retrograde. Nevertheless, it goes on to ask: is multiculturalism progressive? This is an important question to answer before rising to its defence, for if the answer is no then multiculturalism is not worth defending – particularly if its flaws have only fuelled the conservative reaction to it. And, indeed, it will be argued that, despite often being advocated by liberals, multiculturalism is incompatible with the individualistic concept of society on which they rely and has an older conservative provenance which has had unwitting effects, fostering ghettoisation and mutual incomprehension rather than tolerance and empathy. In this context, the chapter contends that a new paradigm is essential, going beyond both these obsolete models for the management of cultural diversity, and which has come to be captured in the phrase “intercultural dialogue”. I will identify its progressive intellectual foundations and describe what it offers in practice, before concluding with its relevance to the chronic combination of crises besetting Europe and, like other authors, the policy consequences that follow.

**Multiculturalism under attack**

There is no doubting that multiculturalism has been subject to sustained assault by the main ruling centre-right leaders in Europe in recent years, and in remarkably similar terms. In October 2010, the German Christian-Democrat chancellor, Angela Merkel, said multiculturalism had “failed, utterly failed”. Four months later, the British Conservative prime minister, David Cameron, said it had “failed to provide a vision”. In the same month, the UMP French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, also declared multiculturalism to have been “a failure”.

Sarkozy faced a strong challenge from the far-right Front National in the presidential election a year later and such populist parties of the radical right have thrived, albeit unevenly, across Europe in recent times (Mudde 2007). They have used immigration in general, while targeting Islam in particular, to paint a picture of an idealised and homogenised imagined national community menaced by the “barbarians at the gate” and betrayed by a supposedly liberal elite (Wilson and Hainsworth 2012). While the rise of the far right predated the crisis and represents the politics of cultural defence, it has nevertheless been able to open an economic front by pointing the finger of blame at immigrants for soaring unemployment among indigenous workers, despite the clear responsibility of what Keynes called the “capitalism of the casino”.

Nor does such political hostility to the stigmatised “Other” lack a public constituency. Indeed, significant evidence of popular intolerance, albeit again uneven, emerges from an eight-country survey of public attitudes supported by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Around half of respondents agreed with statements such as there were too many immigrants in their country, jobs should be given to locals first when work was scarce and (contradictorily) that immigrants placed a strain on the welfare state. A majority of respondents agreed that their “own culture” needed to be protected from the influence of others and that Islam was a “religion of intolerance” (Zick et al. 2011).

**The retreat to assimilationism**

This attack on multiculturalism has been associated with a renewed emphasis on assimilation in the management of cultural diversity. If multiculturalism avoids the issue of integration by putting the onus on the state to engage in a “politics of recognition” vis-à-vis variously culturally defined “communities”, assimilation evacuates the “host” community of any responsibility by burdening the migrant (or refugee) with the responsibility to integrate into a taken-for-granted national society.

This trend has mainly been manifested in a growing emphasis across Europe on tests acting as a hurdle to naturalisation, in which applicants must prove they support “national” values if they are to secure citizenship – albeit this has been associated with some liberalisation of access to citizenship in principle (Joppke 2010). The inherent contradiction of such tests is that it is impossible meaningfully to define, say, “Dutch” values that are distinct from the universal norms of democracy, human rights and the rule of law which the 47-member Council of Europe exists to advocate – and which all citizens of any state, indigenous or migrant, are obliged to uphold – in a world where such “methodological nationalism” gives way to “really existing cosmopolitanisation” (Beck 2009).

The retreat to assimilation has, however, been marked in more extreme fashion. In 2011, the burqa was banned in public places in France and Belgium. Such bans have been given some progressive legitimacy on the claim that the covering of women has always reflected patriarchal control of their bodies. But this substantive liberal argument does not justify the illiberal resort to coercion, rather than public political dialogue, when it comes to the process by which such control should be challenged (Joppke 2009). The focus on dress with religious connotations has been very much on Islam, even though in fact the custom of wearing veils goes back to Greek and Roman times – one can find sculptures of the veiled heads of women in ancient Greece in the Louvre in Paris – representing a “tradition” which Islam, emerging in the 7th century AD, merely incorporated.

It is then but a short step to suggest that Muslims, or indeed Roma, cannot be assimilated. In March 2011 the then new German interior minister, Hans-Peter Friedrich
of the Christian Social Union, affirmed the “Western Christian origin” of German “culture” and suggested the presence of Islam in the country was not “substantiated by history”. Two months later, the right-wing Italian president, Silvio Berlusconi, warned that Milan was “besieged by foreigners” and would turn into “an Islamic city, a zingaropoli full of Roma camps”, if his mayoral candidate was defeated in local elections. From there it is but another short step to mass deportations, as Sarkozy pursued with regard to the Roma from July 2010 – until stopped by the belated intervention the following September of the European justice commissioner, Viviane Reding, appalled by the revived imagery of Vichy France and the Jews. A bigger step takes us into the sub-cultural world of Anders Breivik, the far-right author of the deadly Oslo bombing and the Utøya island massacre in July 2011, whose rambling “manifesto” issued subsequently makes the sustained claim that Europe cannot assimilate Islam.

**Is multiculturalism progressive?**

Multiculturalism, it should be stressed, had quite a patchy international purchase even before the recent assaults upon it. In as far as it has dominated official discourse on the management of cultural diversity, this has been particularly associated in Europe with the UK and the Netherlands – significantly both former colonial powers.

At the heart of Britain’s empire was India and its partition of the sub-continent after the second world war caused at least a million deaths and created 10-15 million refugees. Fifty years on, Yasmin Khan (2007: 20) reflected on the stereotyped colonial gaze which had fuelled this egregious human horror:

> Generations of European administrators, travellers and scholars foregrounded the “spiritual” in all their interpretations of India and, in their eyes, Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs were inescapably separate and mutually incompatible. As a result of this short-sightedness and an inability to see the finely grained distinctions and differences within, and between, these peoples, all sorts of misguided imperial interventions on behalf of “communities” were put in place.

The political philosopher Andrew Vincent (2002: 137-43), exploring how “community” emerged in the 18th and 19th centuries to convey a sense of a “natural” order rather than an “artificial” construction, highlights its normative political connotations (ibid.: 141): “This idea of being pre-established and unavailable to ‘reasoned alteration’ is central to conservative thought.”


If the “community” (Bauman 2001) of the multiculturalist is always an imagined community, the idea of “voice” and “exit” in the multiculturalist sense is often inapplicable, as Amartya Sen (2006: 157, 158) puts it, “The vocal defence of multiculturalism that we frequently hear these days is very often nothing more than a plea for plural monoculturalism.” In as far as multinational Europe has been influenced by the “reasoned alteration” of the moderate interculturalist, as opposed to the “reflexive modernisation” of its radical counterpart, then it suggests that multiculturalism in the liberal and progressive sense may be reasonably viewed as a natural response to a “reasoned alteration” of the modern world. 

**Pertinent effects of multiculturalism**

These misconceptions have not only limited the purview of multiculturalism but also engendered outcomes – some unwitting, some linked to issues of power and control – which have undermined its credibility. Beck (2006: 67) thinks it through clearly:

> The strategy of multiculturalism presupposes collective notions of difference and takes its orientation from more or less homogeneous groups conceived as either similar to or different, but in any case clearly demarcated, from one another and as binding for individual members ...

According to multiculturalism, there is no such thing as the individual. Individuals are merely epiphenomena of their cultures.

Multiculturalism thus perversely presents “apartheid as a human right” and this “[t]alk of “identity” and “autonomy” ends in the principle of ghettoization” (ibid.: 115, 116). Hence the “parallel lives” Ted Cantle so notoriously discovered in dilapidated northern English towns in his 2001 review (Home Office 2001).

If the “community” (Bauman 2001) of the multiculturalist is always an imagined one, the linked rights claims can only ever be pressed by an association which claims to speak on behalf of the collective. Yet how is its _locus standi_ to be determined? The supposedly ascriptive nature of such “communities” (i.e., one’s allocation to them by accident of birth) often means the democratic norms related to associations of affinity (a club one chooses to join) are absent (Hollinger 2005). As Amartya Sen (2006: 157, 158) puts it, “The vocal defence of multiculturalism that we frequently hear these days is very often nothing more than a plea for plural monoculturalism.”

**The urgency of intercultural dialogue in a Europe of insecurity**

Mass immigration from former colonies in the post-war period transferred this conservative official gaze to domestic minority populations in the UK and the Netherlands. As Rogers Brubaker (2004: 219) puts it, these “refitied and groupist understandings of culture as a bounded and integral whole” were “institutionalized in the ideology and practice of multiculturalism”. Yet, premised on the “community” as the unit of politics as it is, multiculturalism flies in the face not only of much evidence of individualisation in contemporary societies characterised by “reflexive modernisation” – in which the individual becomes “actor, designer, juggler and stage director of his own biography” (Beck 1997: 11-19, 95, emphasis in original) – but also of the “individualistic concept of society” which underpins the progressive post-war discourse of human rights from the Universal Declaration of 1945 (Bobbio 1996). It confines damage to the dignity of individuals who have affinities to particular imagined communities with damage to the latter perceived as hypostasised groups, and it confuses the requirement that equality be substantive as well as formal with the suggestion that it must be difference-sensitive as well as difference-blind (Lægaard 2008).
are the latter to enjoy? This bears down particularly heavily on women (Okin 1999), as the notion of “group voice” can “in actuality collude with fundamentalist leaders who claim to represent the true ‘essence’ of their collectivity’s culture and religion, and who have high on their agenda the control of women and their behaviour” (Yuval-Davis 1998: 29).

**Why a new paradigm?**

Given the earlier discussion of the unmerited re-emergence of assimilationism, it is important to stress that both these previous models for the management of cultural diversity – not just multiculturalism – are obsolete. This became evident in the debates sponsored in this area by the Council of Europe from 2002, following the wars in ex-Yugoslavia and the events of September 11, and was particularly clear from the responses from the member states to the consultation on the White Paper discussed in Ulrich Bunjes’ chapter in the present volume.

What made it plain that these models were no longer adequate, however, was not so much the intellectual debate as the sheer pressure of a series of real-world shocks that moved the challenge of living together higher and higher up the European political agenda. If assimilationism can be briefly characterised as the idea that minority individuals should subscribe to a dominant ethos (the “nation-state”), it was dealt a body blow in its locus classicus, France, by the 2005 riots en banlieue. For here were masses of alienated, mainly maghrébin, youth who knew from daily life that the discrimination by name and arrondissement which they experienced belied the “republican values” – most notably equality – which France proclaimed, and they took their anger out on the state and its forces. By the same token, if multiculturalism can be encapsulated in the notion that minority “communities” have homogeneous “cultures” which should be politically recognised, that too was exploded by the 2001 riots in northern England. For if multiculturalism had focused attention solely on the vertical relationships between such “communities” and the state, the interethnic clashes in Oldham, Bradford and Burnley highlighted the pathological horizontal relationships which had developed out of mutual incomprehension and which led to youngsters venting their anger on each other.

Nor were these the only symptoms of the crisis – quite the contrary. The Islamist bombings in Madrid (2004) and London (2005), the murder by an Islamist of the Dutch film-maker Theo Van Gogh (2004) and the eruptions across the world precipitated by the publication of Islamophobic cartoons by a Danish newspaper (2005) were other indicators of political morbidity. And if the Muslim/non-Muslim cultural axis was the most neuralgic in Europe, it was not the only one either. The attempt by the Berlusconi government to nominate the homophobic Catholic figure Rocco Buttiglione as Italy’s European Commissioner in 2004 provoked a row ending in the decisive rejection of his candidacy by a committee of the European Parliament.

It was against this backdrop in 2005 that the member states of the Council of Europe called for the White Paper, to offer them guidance on policy and good practice: they recognised they had a problem; what they lacked was a viable solution. And the challenge continues to manifest itself in various ways: large numbers of Poles and Roma were forced in 2009 to flee attacks by members of the Protestant community in Belfast, where bitter sectarian tensions were renewed in late 2012. Roma came under vicious attack in Hungary by vigilantes linked to the far-right party Jobbik in 2011 and 2012. And anti-Semitism remains an enduring phenomenon, particularly in central and eastern Europe, including Poland, where it is linked to football hooliganism.

**Intercultural dialogue**

The phrase “intercultural dialogue” has encapsulated the new paradigm for management of cultural diversity since the launch of the White Paper in 2008. It is important to stress that the document was, formally, “launched” by the foreign ministers of the 47 member states in May that year. This meant that, despite having been involved in a protracted prior process of amending the draft presented to them in a series of meetings in Strasbourg over the preceding months, the member states did not endorse the final version. This was very unfortunate, because it gave centre-right political leaders of big member states the licence to stake out subsequent public stances quite contrary to the spirit of the White Paper, as we have seen.

Nevertheless, the White Paper has proved influential. It has been translated from the initial official English and French into some 20 languages – including, for example, Hebrew and Arabic. The focus on the issue was sustained by the Council of Europe with the publication of the report of the Group of Eminent Persons (2011), appointed by the Secretary General to take stock of the challenges arising from the resurgence of intolerance in Europe. And the 21-member Intercultural Cities network, stemming from the White Paper and the parallel European Union Year of Intercultural Dialogue, has provided progressive municipalities with the support to pioneer and share good practices on the ground.8

In detailing the new paradigm, the White Paper framed the question of the management of cultural diversity in three new ways. First, it identified the universal norms of democracy, human rights and the rule of law as an essential condition of intercultural dialogue (Council of Europe 2008: 19). The Council of Europe was established in 1949 to uphold these norms, as post-war (western) Europe said “never again” to the particularistic identity claims and associated anti-Semitism, aggressive nationalism and xenophobia associated with the Nazi interlude, which had led to huge political polarisation and a de facto European civil war. The White Paper thus established the necessary common language for intercultural dialogue to be other than a dialogue of the deaf, and simultaneously disavowed the legitimacy of claims, incompatible with universal norms, in defence of particular “cultural traditions”: “honour” killings, forced marriage and female genital mutilation were all explicitly condemned in the document (ibid.: 20).

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Secondly, the White Paper demonstrated how the new intercultural paradigm incorporated the best elements of the preceding models, while also offering innovation. It said (ibid.: 19): “It takes from assimilation the focus on the individual; it takes from multiculturalism the recognition of cultural diversity. And it adds the new element, critical to integration and social cohesion, of dialogue on the basis of equal dignity and shared values.” It is, by the by, a literalist misreading to assume this reduces the sociological to the interpersonal (Cantle 2012: 143): the White Paper addresses the need for dialogue at all levels of society – from the municipal to the national to the international – and focuses on the significance in this regard of major institutions such as the school and the media.

Thirdly, the White Paper approached the task of integration in a new way. If multiculturalism is unconcerned about integration, assimilationism places all the onus on the newcomer to integrate into a taken-for-granted “host” society. By contrast, and based on the equality of human dignity universal norms enshrine, the White Paper defined integration as “a two-sided process” (ibid.: 11). By implication, neither the migrant/refugee nor the indigenous person is unchanged by the dialogue in which they engage. This is critical because it allows of recognition of what the Intercultural Cities network has come to call the “diversity advantage” (Wood and Landry 2008): rather than immigration being represented as a threat, the synergies and transcultural possibilities diversity makes possible can now be publicly articulated.

**Intellectual foundations**

While, because of its normative heritage, the Council of Europe has become the international standard-setter in the arena of intercultural dialogue, the new paradigm has solid intellectual foundations. In particular, across the social sciences the critique of essentialism – of the reduction of a complex totality to a putative single essence – has meant that it is no longer acceptable to treat identity as simple and unchanging and ethnic “groups” as homogeneous.

The political philosopher Seyla Benhabib (2002: 4) complains that such essentialism is based on “faulty epistemic premises”, notably that “cultures are clearly delineable wholes” congruent with population groups. Modern anthropological thinking no longer accepts the essentialised notion of “culture” that has entered political rhetoric (Cowan et al. 2001: 3) and almost all anthropologists “would flatly reject the idea that ethnicities are discrete cultural entities”, rather than social constructs (Allen and Eade 1999: 13, 16). Within cultural studies, as Tony Bennett (2001: 53) says, “it is no longer adequate to think about the relations between cultures in a society in the form of their compartmentalised division into separate ways of life and identities”. He speaks instead of “overlapping trajectories”, building on the insight of the foundational figure in cultural studies Stuart Hall (1996: 444), that identification should not be conceived “as a simple process, structured around fixed ‘selves’ which we either are or are not”.

Aziz Al-Azmeh (2008: 208-10), concluding a volume on Islam in Europe, complains that “we are being told repeatedly [that] Muslims, European or otherwise, are above all Muslims, and that by this token alone they are distinctive and must be treated as such”, at the behest of “nativist right-wing movements” on the one hand and Muslim organisations and “state-sponsored multiculturalist vested interests” on the other. Ethnicity is in this sense a fundamentally relational phenomenon (Allen and Eade 1999: 24-6; Eriksen 1993: 9). Far from it being the case that “difference” is a simple datum, as Thomas Hylland Eriksen (1993: 39) argues, “It is only when they make a difference in interaction that cultural differences are important in the creation of ethnic boundaries.”

Such essentialist conceptions have been replaced by the recognition that identity is what makes individuals unique (Maalouf 2000) and that it is complex and contextualised (Sen 2006). Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood (Chapter 6 in the present volume) seek to argue that multiculturalists were interculturalists avant la lettre. But the apparently semantic distinction between multiculturalist and interculturalist approaches is a profound one, neatly encapsulated by Bauman (2002) as between the perspectives of a “variety of cultures” and “cultural variety” respectively. By the first, Bauman means an essentialist conception, in which “cultures” are thought of as things – simple, separate and homogeneous wholes – for which individuals are cyphers. The second, by contrast, is premised on the individualistic concept of society and recognises that individuals have complex identities that occupy a range of overlapping networks of relationships. This requires us to engage in reasoned deliberation but it holds out the possibility of overarching solidarities.

Here it is relevant to introduce the specific intellectual innovation in recent years of new thinking around cosmopolitanism (Beck 2006, 2012; Held 2010; Vertovec and Cohen 2002). Cosmopolitanism here is not understood in the popular sense of transnational rootlessness but as a capacity at all social levels – from the local to the global – to relativise the self and see it from the perspective of others, to “develop the art of translation and bridge-building” (Beck 2006: 89). David Held (2003: 169) has identified three principles as central to cosmopolitanism:

- egalitarian individualism – humankind is regarded as belonging to a single moral realm;
- reciprocal recognition – this status of equal worth is recognised by all;
- impartial treatment – all claims made on public authorities are subject to rules that all can share.

These characterise what might be described as the best possible shell for intercultural dialogue: that there is equality of citizenship among the diverse individuals who comprise a social unit, that civil society provides a public square in which they can resolve their differences and, if not, that the state will treat impartially their competing claims upon it.
What interculturalism offers in practice

From the standpoint of policy-makers and practitioners, the interculturalist paradigm offers practical solutions to otherwise apparently intractable dilemmas. Take the perpetual challenge of the French banlieue: throwing money at the problem – though better than not throwing money at the problem – will never achieve real change. As against the majoritarian ethos of French-style assimilationism, interculturalism recognises that public authority must be impartial and must affirm the diversity of les citoyens, and so militates against the discrimination and exclusion which fuel the alienation and rage of members of minority communities. Or take the recurrent eruptions over freedom of expression and its limits where deliberate insults are visited upon Muslims. Here, as against the moral relativism of multiculturalism – which can only lead to shouting and, worse, violence – interculturalism vindicates the idea of a single moral realm, which allows differences to be resolved through dialogue, based on reciprocal recognition of our common humanity.

Furthermore, both prior dominant models for the management of cultural diversity place the onus entirely on the state to solve problems. This not only requires an omniscience and omnicompetence which no state presiding over today’s diverse and volatile societies can match, but also is inadequate to cope with challenges which more and more engage “global publics” beyond the nation-state in a world of “communicative abundance” (Keane 2012: 62-5). By contrast, the interculturalist approach identifies a key role in addition for civil society – in the sense both of the “public square” which can offer safe spaces for dialogue, and of the agents, associations and activists who can stimulate such dialogue fruitfully. A very good practical example is the Belfast Friendship Club, Co-ordinated by an energetic NGO activist, in a city notorious for its culture of intolerance, the club provides a hospitable arena for newcomers to insert themselves into networks of social solidarity (Wilson 2012).

Finally, in an era of globalisation and mass migration, the interculturalist perspective chimes with a Europe of “really existing cosmopolitanisation”. As Beck (2012: 34) puts it, “regardless of how much we hate or critique the ’other’, we are destined to live with the ’others’ in this Europe at risk”. Whereas assimilationism enforces homogenity and multiculturalism sacrifices cohesion, interculturalism thus gives life to the European motto of “unity in diversity”.

Conclusions

Europe is at a critical point. In October 2012, less than 24 hours after I strolled through Syntagma Square in Athens, at the conclusion of my work that week on an intercultural strategy for the municipality of Patras, I was watching, en route to Belfast, TV footage of baton charges and Molotov cocktails, as police clashed with demonstrators during yet another Greek general strike against austerity. It is not hyperbole to affirm that a Europe which is “first of all an insurance against war” and secondly a potential response to “the world at risk” is being torn apart, as “the basic rules of European democracy are suspended or are even being inverted into their opposite, bypassing parliaments, governments and EU institutions” (Beck 2012: 31).

In this Europe, nationalistic stereotypes of diligence versus idleness are replacing informed debate about how to fix a monetary union designed in a manner oblivious to the inherent risk of asymmetric fiscal shocks. Undocumented migrants have come under repeated assault in Athens, as the far-right Golden Dawn has sought to pit the desperate against the destitute. Never has there been a greater need for “a realistic utopia to create another Europe” (Beck 2012: 32). Never has reasoned dialogue, which recognises our common humanity, been at a greater premium.

I started this chapter with the three big political questions of our times to which answers must be sought: welfare, diversity and ecology. And it is worth concluding with the observation that, to a significant extent, the first and third can only be answered if the second challenge is met. For to live together as equals requires that as individuals we see each other not as fellow Christians or fellow Muslims or fellow Jews, but as fellow citizens entitled to an equality of life chances countermanding the yawning inequalities which an off-the-leash capitalism inherently engenders. And to live at all requires that we come to identify even far-flung individuals whom we do not know as fellow global citizens jointly responsible for the stewardship of the planet.

For this we need what Keane (2012: 64) calls “citizens of a new global order”. He describes them thus:

They live here and there; they learn to distance themselves from themselves; they discover that there are different temporal rhythms, other places, other problems, many different ways of living. They discover the “foreigner” within themselves; they are invited to question their own dogmas, even to extend ordinary standards of civility – courtesy, politeness, respect – to others whom they will never meet.

It does sound utopian to imagine a generation of such cosmopolitan citizens on a large scale. But through schools, the media, NGOs and so on, the intercultural paradigm is all about, concretely and in practice, forming such individual activists who can be architects of another Europe. So if we can develop adequately intercultural responses to the huge social challenges that we face, locally, nationally and on the European scale – and we now know that no other responses are adequate – then this could prove a realistic utopia after all.

Policy implications

The policy consequences that follow from the above discussion are clear and really quite simple. At the most abstract level, they are always to treat the (diverse) individual citizen, not the imagined community, as the unit of democratic constitutionality: only the individual can exercise their democratic right to vote (and “community leaders” should never be allowed to hoover up such choices into vote banks); only the individual can vindicate their human rights, including before a court of law (where the status of any proxy “community leader” must always be
in question); and only the individual can be protected by the rule of law (since any talk of “community defence” must descend into vigilantism).

This is inevitably to foreground the demand for equality of citizenship, which has two dimensions. The first is of course that many persons belonging to minority communities – undocumented migrants, for example – find themselves to be mere denizens, in a netherworld where rights which citizens take for granted are routinely denied them. This places such individuals in a status of severe insecurity, including risks of exploitation and sexual abuse, and denies society the full contribution they can legitimately make. It is therefore not only morally compelling but also in the interests of integration and social wellbeing that naturalisation should be made as quick and easy as possible for those who would seek to become citizens of the society in which they find themselves – without subjection to onerous and nationalistic tests of their “assimilability” but on the basis of the acceptance of universal norms.

Secondly, even where persons belonging to minority communities are accorded formal citizenship entitlements, they may still suffer from various forms of discrimination and marginalisation. Here states need to ensure that they do genuinely act as impartial public authorities by complying with the repertoire of recommendations advanced over the years by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance. By instituting the necessary legislative and administrative arrangements, including the adequate training of key public officials, and exhibiting the requisite cross-party political leadership against all manifestations of intolerance, they can diminish the discrepancy between formal equality and substantive inequality.

But if persons belonging to minority communities are genuinely to experience a sense of “fellow” citizenship, they must be party to a process of mutual recognition in which persons belonging to the “host” community feel just as responsible. Here states should institute integration plans or intercultural strategies that provide an environment conducive to dialogue, in safe spaces and on equal terms, at all levels of society. Such plans, which should also be developed by local authorities at municipal level, should be elaborated in partnership with minority and intercultural associations, which should also be involved in their implementation. States should offer “joined-up” solutions to problems straddling conventional silos of education, health, housing and so on and should be co-ordinated by the office of the prime minister (or the mayor), sending out a signal of high-level political commitment.

**Suggestions for further reading**

For those interested in the critique of multiculturalism from a progressive perspective – particularly UK readers, given the relative isolation of the debate there from wider European discourses – Paul Sniderman and Louk Hagendoorn usefully analyse the other paradigm case where multiculturalism has been official policy in Europe in their *When ways of life collide: multiculturalism and its discontents in the Netherlands* (2007, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ). They show that multiculturalism has unwittingly alienated liberal individuals from the “host” majority, favouring the emergence of a series of right-wing, populist figures, and that tolerance is a more desirable policy goal than the “respect” demanded by the multiculturalists.

**Generous betrayal: politics of culture in the new Europe** (2002, University of Chicago Press, Chicago), by Unni Wikan, explores the outsourcing of such communalist “respect for difference” claims in a Norwegian context. Wikan demonstrates how these rights claimed by multiculturalists have become “uniforms”, at the expense in particular of the individual human rights of women belonging to minority communities. Christian Joppke’s *Veil: mirror of identity* (2009, Polity Press, Cambridge) compares France, Germany and the UK specifically in their treatment of the wearing of Islamic dress in public by women. Joppke shows using public-attitudes evidence that persons belonging to the Muslim community paradoxically feel significantly more integrated in assimilationist France than in (residually) multiculturalist UK, because of the socially distancing effects of multiculturalism.

My own book, *The Northern Ireland experience of conflict and agreement: a model for export?* (2010, Manchester University Press, Manchester) looks at what might be called examples of multiculturalism *in extremis*: Northern Ireland and Bosnia-Herzegovina. I highlight the perverse entrenchment of ethnic divides to which this has led and the associated rendering unworkable of practical politics.

The last five years have seen the first intellectual elaborations of the concept of intercultural dialogue. Léonce Bekemans has edited two volumes by himself and with colleagues centred on the University of Padua, offering a broad European approach: *Intercultural dialogue and citizenship* (2007, Marsilio, Venice) and *Intercultural dialogue and multi-level governance in Europe: A human rights based approach* (2012, Peter Lang, Brussels). Phil Wood and Charles Landry have developed the notion in the critical urban milieu in *The intercultural city: planning for diversity advantage* (2008, Earthscan, London) – Wood’s thinking continues to be trialled and refined in the Intercultural Cities programme. And Ted Cantle has charted a direction for the UK debate in *Interculturalism: the new era of cohesion and diversity* (2012, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke).

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4 – Interculturalism as a new narrative for the era of globalisation and super-diversity

Ted Cantle

Introduction

Globalisation has created an era of “super-diversity” in which most Western societies have become far more dynamic and complex. This has impacted upon notions of both personal and collective identity and necessitates a re-think of policy and practice and a new vision of how we live together. Multicultural societies are the new reality and, whilst the far-right and popular extremist parties have grown across Europe on the pretence of their ability to turn the clock backwards, we must all begin to accept that all societies will inevitably become more multicultural.

We cannot stop the process of globalisation: the world is more interconnected than ever before. Indeed, the pace of change will accelerate as political, economic and social networks become more intertwined and interdependent. But change will not be easy and tensions and conflicts are inevitable as many cultures, faiths, value systems and global forces interact and come to terms with each other. There is, however, only one direction of travel and our urgent need is to find ways in which we can make the transition as easy as possible and allow different peoples to learn to live with each other.

Globalisation will ensure that the world – and almost every country – will become more multicultural. That is to say, each country will find that its population is increasingly made up of more people from many different cultures, nationalities, faiths and ethnic backgrounds – and become “super-diverse”. The ease of travel, and the opening up of labour and financial markets means that this is inevitable.

The multiculturalist policies which governments have devised are no longer appropriate to mediate this new era and do not contribute sufficiently to the promotion of community cohesion. Despite some past successes, they no longer enjoy either governmental or popular support. There is now both the need and an opportunity to consider a new approach, based upon “interculturalism”. This is not defined by “race” and, unlike multiculturalism, embraces all areas of difference. It also recognises that cultures are more fluid than ever before and the interconnectedness of the world demands interaction between and within cultures to build trust and understanding, and that a high level of cultural navigational skills will be necessary to enable people to accept and endorse the change process.
This is of course, a challenge for communities and the way ordinary people live their lives. However, it is also a challenge for governments, which have been slow to recognise the fluidity of population change and the impact of transnational and diaspora influences, and have hardly begun to consider the implications for the notion of national solidarity and governance. Governments inevitably cling to the idea of clear national boundaries and any suggestion of the loss of sovereignty is quickly contested. Rather than reflecting the process of globalisation, they feel threatened by the interconnectivity of the modern world and are not prepared to acknowledge, let alone argue for, the ceding of their power to international agencies.

The ideal of a more integrated international community, in which ideas and cultures may bridge national boundaries to create a world in which we are more at ease with each other, is seldom advanced as a desirable political objective, despite the evident interdependency of economic and political decision-making. Similarly, whilst people are themselves increasingly crossing borders, inter-marrying, building new virtual networks, and creating real and tangible personal relationships at all levels, they are often fearful about the impact of globalisation on their communities and collective identity. “Identity politics”, whether on a narrow national, ethnic, faith or regional basis, often holds back the transition, rather than supporting and inspiring a new and interconnected world.

Multiculturalism is completely out of step with this new world order. It was founded on the heavily racialised basis of majority–minority relations within each nation, in which “accommodations” were to be negotiated or imposed. The era of transnational relationships, the growth of diasporas, new and pervasive international communications and travel, make such policies no longer tenable. “Interculturalism”, based upon a wider view of the world, must now replace multiculturalism and develop as a new positive model to mediate change across regions and nations and recognise the multivariate relationships across all aspects of diversity.

The impact of globalisation

One of the most evident results of globalisation is that populations have become far more mobile and willing and able to relocate in search of better employment prospects and a higher standard of living, or because of other short- or longer-term considerations. In 2010 there were 214 million international migrants, and if they continue to grow in number at the same pace there will be over 400 million by 2050 (IOM 2010). There are now 20 cities with more than 1 million foreign-born residents each which, combined, means that these metropolitan areas have 37 million foreign-born residents accounting for 19% of the world’s foreign-born stock. These few points on the globe are the destinations for one in five of the world’s immigrants. There are another 59 cities worldwide with a presence of 100,000 or more foreign-born residents, including 11 cities with an immigrant presence of between 500,000 and 1 million people (Clark 2008: 27). Many other countries have similarly high rates of internal migration and cross-border movement. The growth of global business, the removal of barriers to trade and the creation of economic

unions – most notably in Europe – have inevitably led to a more mobile international workforce. And meanwhile, the continuing impact of wars and conflicts, together with accelerating climate change, has contributed to population instability.

Migrant communities are also increasingly diverse and this inevitably leads to much greater diversity within nation states, particularly in the Western economies, which are often the target countries for migration. The extent of population movement is such that all Western economies are now characterised by “super-” or “hyper-” diversity, with over 300 language groups living in cities like London, Stockholm, Toronto, New York and Amsterdam. This has re-defined our notion of multiculturalism which had previously been seen as the then essentially White countries coming to terms with migrants from a limited number of former colonies. Multiculturalism is now much more complex and community relations are multifaceted, no longer simply revolving around visible majority/minority distinctions.

The impact of the diversity resulting from global patterns of migration and the rise and importance of diasporas means that the homogeneity and distinctiveness of national and regional identities is seen to be under threat as external influences become more accessible and persuasive. The far-right parties in many countries are increasingly exploiting the fear of the erosion of a simple national identity to build substantial popular support. There is also a more genuine and widespread concern amongst host communities about the advantages that economic migrants have to employers – willingness to accept lower pay and worse conditions, less unionised and less aware of their rights. Extreme far-right parties take this still further and demand the repatriation of migrants, including those born in the countries to which their parents or grandparents migrated and in which they are citizens. Concerns are, then, turned into fear and hatred and an ongoing antipathy to migration and diversity.

The movement of labour inevitably follows from the movement of finance and capital and often simply reflects the shifting economic patterns, especially the huge differences between richer and poorer nations. Many national leaders are themselves caught in something of a bind as they generally continue to promise and promote economic growth and know that inward migration is often the easiest and quickest way of achieving this – migrants are generally more ready and willing to work and have a lower labour cost. They will also fill gaps in the labour market and undertake tasks which are unattractive to host populations. And meanwhile, the continuing impact of wars and conflicts, together with accelerating climate change, has contributed to population instability.

Minorities are often the visible expression of the change brought by globalisation and whilst their movement and growth is often seen as the cause of changing economic and social patterns, it is simply the consequence of those changes. This makes them highly vulnerable.
Globalisation has also brought many new international agencies and structures into being and fundamentally altered power relationships. The new agencies have responded to a range of common issues from international finance, crime, environmental concerns like climate change, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and many more. The European Union perhaps stands out most in this regard. This, together with the process of Western de-industrialisation, the growth of global business and brands and international migration on a new scale, has created a popular sense of powerlessness and alienation. This has also had a profound impact upon the way people see themselves and the claim of nationalistic identities has inevitably been weakened. The growth of regional and separatist movements – and identity – has grown as people “hunker down”.

Castells (1997/2010) supports the view that the state has been bypassed by networks of wealth, power and information and lost much of its sovereignty. Barber (2013) agrees and believes that nation states might be replaced by cities as the main instrument of the polity and are more capable of responding to cross-border challenges than are states. In later work, Castells (2006) draws upon the research of Norris who has analysed the World Values Survey to show that regional and local identities are trumping national loyalties. Norris calculated that for the world as a whole, 13% of respondents primarily considered themselves as “citizens of the world”, 38% put their nation-state first, and the remainder (the biggest group) put local or regional identities first.

None of this should suggest that national identity could or should be downplayed. In fact, there is a great danger in suggesting that the one area of identity that lower socio-economic groups feel able to cling to in a time of uncertainty should be wiped away. The reality is, however, that national and cosmopolitan identities do now need to sit alongside each other – they are not opposed – something that multiculturalism has never acknowledged.

Solidarity and identity

Multiculturalism, as we now know it, is very different from its early form and the impact upon personal and collective identity and the forms of governance and mediation of tensions has been profound. Whilst it is clear that most people are now exposed to diversity in all aspects of their daily lives – either in local communities, schools and workplaces, or indirectly through television, social networks and other media – there appears to be something of a “paradox of diversity” (Cantle 2011). The more diverse societies have become and the more people have been exposed to difference, the more they seem to retreat into their own identity, embrace identity politics and support separatist ideologies. This may be, in part, due to the lack of real engagement with difference, a rather wary detachment which makes us more determined to cling to our own community’s certainties.

Robert Putnam supports this view. Having looked at this through the lens of “social capital” (Putnam 2000), he has demonstrated that social capital is inversely related to diversity because “immigration and ethnic diversity challenge social solidarity and inhibit social capital” or, more graphically expressed, “diversity, at least in the short run, seems to bring out the turtle in all of us” (Putnam 2007). However, in the same work he suggested that in the medium to longer term:

successful immigrant societies create new forms of social solidarity and dampen the negative effects of diversity by constructing new, more encompassing identities. Thus, the central challenge for modern, diversifying societies is to create a new, broader sense of “we”.

This is indeed the challenge and, as yet, there is little by way of vision and established policy and practice to make the broader sense of “we” into a reality.

Similarly, the world seems more prone to ethnic and faith conflict with over 70% of conflicts having an ethnic or faith dimension (Baldwin et al. 2007). In fact, there are indications of a rising number of divisions and more ardent separatist movements, where people no longer feel able to even share the same land or government. Around 20 nations have been created in recent years, which stem partly from the break-up of previously constructed federations in the Balkans and eastern Europe, or divisions have been turned into separation, for example, in the recently divided Sudan. More divisions are possibly on the way with states like Belgium becoming virtually ungovernable as a single entity and there are around 20 secessionist movements in Europe alone, with Scotland and Catalonia being the most notable. Where we might have expected more collaboration across borders and the separate identities of regions and states to give way to common or globalised identities, the opposite seems to be true.

Sen also argues that conflict and violence are sustained today, no less than in the past, by the illusion of a unique identity (Sen 2006). He agrees that the world is increasingly divided between religions (or “cultures” or “civilizations”), which ignore the relevance of other ways in which people see themselves through class, gender, profession, language, literature, science, music, morals or politics. He challenges “the appalling effects of the miniaturisation of people” and the denial of the real possibilities of reasoned choices.

Others support this view and believe that the elevation of identity is caused by the erosion of democracy which may be inherent in globalisation, and that globalisation undermines the democracy and sovereignty of the nation state and turns individuals into a “universal tribe of consumers” who are “economically interdependent but isolated and impotent as citizens” (Younge 2010). Younge’s argument is compelling, in the context of the creation of the euro and the globalisation of brands which reduce local corporate markers, and especially with regard to the recent financial crisis. These changes enable him to conclude that the greater the loss of control and access to democratic levers, the more we retreat into separate identities or tribes.

The sense of collective identity has changed profoundly in all Western societies, but it is inevitably interpreted and understood in different ways by minority and majority groups. This is reflected in the changing nature of personal identities, with
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The separate components shaped by increasing diversity in terms of faith, present locality, and ethnicity – as well as an apparently declining sense of nationality. For example, in the case of Britain, a recent Searchlight Educational Trust report (SET 2011) found that whilst many ethnic groups saw themselves in a similar way, “Asian” and “Black” groups differed significantly from “White” groups in certain respects. The three components of “country” – nationality, country of birth and domicile – were most important for White groups (67%) compared to Asian (46%) and Black (21%), and minorities were also more likely to regard religion and ethnicity as the most important element of their identity.

The impact of diversity upon personal identities is particularly profound, with individuals often able to draw upon their heritage, faith, language, diaspora and new national identity to create hybrid or multiple identities. It should also be presumed that the variation within ethnic groups will be as great as those variations between them and there is a great danger in homogenising any particular identity. All types of hyphenated identity also run the risk of simply replacing the limited notion of a single identity with a hybrid identity, which also becomes bounded and ascribed. As Brah (2007) points out, identity is a process and not a fixed category – although that is how it has often been regarded in the past.

Identity is increasingly complex and, as well as the now routine hyphenating of nationality, faith and ethnicity, the consequence of people from different identity groups sharing the same society has also led to the growth of “mixed-race” or multiple identities. This is now the fastest-growing minority in Britain, for example. However, this group is not actually recognised in policy terms: there is no funding, representation, support, nor champion. This is partly for practical reasons, as the boundaries of the mixed-race group are necessarily blurred and cover many different combinations of Black, Asian, White and other ethnicities and any combination of faith and nationality. But it also maintains an overtone of racial purity, whereby “pure breeds” in ethnic or religious terms are recognised with leaders chosen to represent their particular constituency of interest, whereas “our mongrel selves” (Slattery 2003) have no particular identity, nor recognition.

In the face of this broader diversity and changing patterns of identity, governmental responses have been ambivalent. For the most part, they have attempted to reinforce their view of national identity through such measures as the teaching of national history and promoting national citizenship and identity. By steadfastly retaining the pretence of the integrity of national borders and governance, and by attempting to deny the interdependence brought by globalisation, they reinforce a fear of “others”. They then appear to lag behind the current reality of multifaceted identities within their communities and may well find that the new phenomenon of social media will begin to create new transnational relationships that transcend traditional power structures. Already there is clear evidence of a decline in traditional democratic traditions across Europe, with election turnouts and political party membership in decline.

Such policies also reinforce the outdated concept of multiculturalism, which has positioned identity as static and bounded – or ascribed and fixed. The reality for many people today, however, is that identity is transitory and, at least partly, chosen. The growth of mixed-race intermarriage across national, faith and other boundaries, means that “you can’t put me in a box” (Fanshawe and Sriskandarajah 2010) is a reality for many people:

In an age of super-diversity where people do not identify around single identities and feel conflicted allegiance (if any allegiance at all) to pre-defined groups, activism around particular “strands” seems irrelevant to many people and may not even be that effective in addressing the true causes of inequality. Even the very categorisations that we rely on (for example, “black”, “gay”, “Asian” or “disabled”) no longer seem to be able to tell us much about who people are, what lives they lead, who they identify with, or what services they need from government and society. And the tick box approach seems to be missing out on growing numbers of people who fall outside or across standard classifications. Yet society seems to treat ethnic identities as if they are clearly bounded, static and meaningful, and public bodies insist on a tick box classification. (Fanshawe and Sriskandarajah 2010: 11)

Multicultural theorists have never accepted this perspective and have attempted to reinforce past conceptions of identity, supported by systems of over-protective community leaders and single-identity funding which have homogenised and hardened in-group boundaries and stereotypes.

The “failure” of multiculturalism

The notion of the “failure of multiculturalism” has confused rather than assisted the debate about how we learn to live together in an increasingly interdependent and interconnected world. “Multiculturalism” can simply describe the modern reality of most countries in that they contain a large number of migrant groups at various stages of permanent settlement and that are from many different countries and indigenous peoples. In this sense, it is purely descriptive and cannot be said to have “failed”. The idea of “failure” is more often based upon the perception that the policies of multiculturalism have failed. The far-right and popular extremist parties often wilfully confute the policies of multiculturalism with the very idea of multicultural societies, as part of their assault on all aspects of diversity.

The more recent suggestions of “failure”, however, relate to the current political and international context and specifically refer to the perceived different values of the Muslim communities within Western democracies. The UK Prime Minister (Cameron 2011) focused his suggestion of failure on the practice of “state multiculturalism” in general terms, but it was the Muslim community that formed the major part of his speech. The Chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel, in referring to the “utter failure” of multiculturalism in Germany (Merkel 2010), also set her remarks in the context of various reports and comments by political colleagues on the view that “people from different cultures, like Turkey and Arab countries, find it harder to integrate”. Nicolas Sarkozy, the French President, also remarked upon...
the failure of multiculturalism following public debate and policies that almost entirely relate to the French Muslim communities (Sarkozy 2011).

The Eminent Persons Report for the Council of Europe (Council of Europe 2011) recognised this current debate but only provided a range of principles and policy guidelines rather than a conceptual framework:

- We are of course well aware of this debate, but find that the term “multiculturalism” is used in so many different ways, meaning different things to different people and in different countries – is it an ideology? a set of policies? a social reality? – that in the end it confuses more than it clarifies. We have therefore decided to avoid using this term and instead to concentrate on identifying policies and approaches that will enable European societies to combine diversity and freedom.

This rather prosaic approach, based upon a series of community-based and policy interventions, has been adopted by many countries as a means of trying to ensure that diverse groups share a common society.

However, early forms of multiculturalism were not based upon a grand scheme or “ideology”, but were coping strategies that were inherently “defensive”. The focus was on protecting minorities from racism and discrimination and on positive action programmes to begin to provide those communities with some semblance of equal opportunities. Given that in the immediate post-war period racism and discrimination was rife, policies of separateness at that time were inevitable, as were the attempts to impose tolerance and equal opportunities through legal and regulatory frameworks; and to minimise conflict and tensions by avoiding contact between different communities. It could be argued that the policies were right for the time, and the “failure” may simply have been to not modify the approach subsequently to take account of changing social, economic and political circumstances.

Ranjit Sondhi (2009) has explained the essence of this “failure”:

- Concerned less with the complexities of integration, the practice of multiculturalism came to be centred largely on managing public order and relations between majority and minority populations by allowing ethnic cultures and practices to mediate the process. Minority languages, religions and cultural practices were encouraged, and gradually the right to be equal was overshadowed by the right to be different.

- Such multicultural policies led, albeit unwittingly, to the creation of culturally and spatially distinct communities fronted by self-styled community leaders who traded in cultural, as opposed to social capital. … there was everything to be gained from difference and non-mixing. This resulted in the tendency at the neighbourhood level to live in entirely separate ethnic worlds, a kind of self-imposed apartheid, a cocooned existence.

- As a result, far from being a system that spoke to the whole of society, multiculturalism spoke only to each specific minority in isolation. This served to maintain the exoticism and essentialism of minority cultures hindering a two way conversation with the majority culture.

The “right to be different” has political as well as cultural drivers. In this sense it can perhaps be characterised by the notion of identity politics and is played by both political and community leaders who seek to heighten differences in order to create a political advantage for one group or another; or is advanced by communities themselves, who have been quick to learn that the recognition of difference carries with it rewards in terms of representation and resources. Identity politics therefore militates against community collaboration and encourages competition and perhaps even conflict. This phenomenon was difficult, though manageable, when the number of minorities was limited, but has become extremely problematic in an era of super-diversity.

The earlier forms of multiculturalism have been built upon and developed with a view to both avoiding the assimilationist tendencies of some European countries and at the same time avoiding the reliance on the separationist British model. The Canadian approach perhaps most exemplifies this model (a view perhaps only challenged by the French-speaking provinces of Canada – see below). The Canadian Government11 believes that, in 1971, they were the first in the world to adopt multiculturalism as an official policy, setting out their vision in these terms:

> [A]ll citizens are equal. Multiculturalism ensures that all citizens can keep their identities, can take pride in their ancestry and have a sense of belonging. Acceptance gives Canadians a feeling of security and self-confidence, making them more open to, and accepting of, diverse cultures. The Canadian experience has shown that multiculturalism encourages racial and ethnic harmony and cross-cultural understanding.

> … As Canadians, they share the basic values of democracy with all other Canadians who came before them. At the same time, Canadians are free to choose for themselves, without penalty, whether they want to identify with their specific group or not. Their individual rights are fully protected and they need not fear group pressures.

Multiculturalism encompasses a range of notions of both “multi” and of “culture” and is always heavily contextualised. It will therefore be understood in many different ways around the world and the policies and practices will also have developed in many different ways. Nevertheless, “progressive multiculturalism” in the Canadian sense leans towards the concept of interculturalism and relies upon the development of commonality and a sense of belonging and inclusion across all areas of difference.

The growth of the far-right and popular extremist parties

The failure of multicultural policies is no more evident than in the growth of the far-right and popular extremist parties across Europe. Multiculturalism has been firmly rooted in racial constructs and has failed to notice that ideas about difference have profoundly changed. Sexual orientation, gender, faith and disability and other aspects of identity are now firmly in the public sphere and contributing to notions of personal identity alongside race and ethnicity. The far right appear to have accepted the change more readily than avowed multiculturalists and are now less preoccupied with race, and instead stand on the supposed threat of “others” in both economic and social terms. They also try to engender a fear in the host community of a loss of

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The concept of interculturalism

The concept of interculturality is not new and can be traced back to 1959, while European perspectives date from the 1980s and 1990s (James 2008). It has also been used in the particular context of education (Gundara 2000, 2001). However, there has been little by way of academic development until very recently (Rattansi 2011; Cantle 2012a), nor agreement over the term. In addition, it has not been adopted in policy and practice to any great degree on a consistent basis. Within the differing approaches to interculturalism, however, there would appear to be some acceptance that its key features are a sense of openness, dialogue and interaction. A cautionary note was introduced by Wood and Landry (2008) to the effect that although openness provides the setting for interculturalism to develop, it does not provide a guarantee that it will take place.

Meer and Modood (2012a; see also Chapter 6 in this volume) have described the different tenets of interculturalism as:

First, as something greater than coexistence, in that interculturalism is allegedly more geared toward interaction and dialogue than multiculturalism. Second, that interculturalism is conceived as something less “groupist” or more yielding of synthesis than multiculturalism. Third, that interculturalism is something more committed to a stronger sense of the whole, in terms of such things as societal cohesion and national citizenship. Finally, that where multiculturalism may be illiberal and relativistic, interculturalism is more likely to lead to criticism of illiberal practices as part of the process of intercultural dialogue.

However, as supporters of the retention of multiculturalism, Meer and Modood stretch credibility by attempting to argue that the above features were “foundational” elements of multiculturalism. They produce no real evidence in support of this and their view has been contested (Cantle 2012b).

Interculturalism should nevertheless build upon the essential elements of multiculturalism – the framework of rights to equal treatment and non-discrimination are critical – as well as developing the interaction and belonging programmes initiated by community cohesion. Creating a culture of openness that challenges identity politics and otherness and the entrenchment of separate communities is essential, but not sufficient. Bloomfield and Bianchini (2004) support a wider view and argue that the intercultural approach goes beyond equal opportunities and respect for existing cultural differences to the pluralist transformation of public space, institutions and civic culture. It does not recognise cultural boundaries as fixed but in a state of flux and remaking. An intercultural approach aims to facilitate dialogue, exchange and reciprocal understanding between people of different backgrounds.

The contribution of community cohesion

The concept of “community cohesion” was established following a number of riots and disturbances in England in 2001 (Cantle 2001). It represented a fundamental challenge to the then multicultural model, and found that White and Asian communities in some areas of England lived in “parallel lives” which:

- often do not seem to touch at any point, let alone promote any meaningful interchanges, and are based upon: separate educational arrangements, community and voluntary bodies, employment, places of worship, language, social and cultural networks. (Cantle 2001)

The first formal definition within the UK was constructed by representatives of the co-authors of the Guidance on Community Cohesion, the Local Government Association, the then Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, the then Commission of Racial Equality and the Inter-Faith Network (LGA 2002):

A cohesive community is one where:
- there is common vision and a sense of belonging for all communities;
- the diversity of people’s different backgrounds and circumstances are appreciated and positively valued;
- those from different backgrounds have similar life opportunities; and

12. For a fuller discussion of community cohesion see Cantle 2008 and Cantle 2012.
Community cohesion programmes represented the first real attempt in the UK to promote meaningful interaction between communities from different backgrounds and to promote trust and understanding and to break down myths and stereotypes. Initially, these programmes were regarded as “cross-cultural” interaction, though this began to give way to, or to be used interchangeably with, “intercultural”. The notion of intercultural dialogue gathered pace from about 2008.

The programmes attempted to build understanding between different groups and to create mutual trust and respect by breaking down stereotypes and misconceptions about the “other”. Community cohesion thus rehabilitated the concept of “contact theory”, building on the earlier work of Allport (1954) and others. New models based on this approach clearly demonstrated that prejudice and intolerance can be reduced by direct contact and interaction (for example, Hewstone et al. 2006a, 2006b).

However, as the above definition indicates, community cohesion was predicated upon wider programmes of change. In addition to the small-scale programmes focused on divided communities, community cohesion tackled inequalities and was also developed at a city-wide level to promote unity and to develop a broader consensus in support of diversity. This often included high profile campaigns featuring people from a range of backgrounds who “all belong” and contribute to the economic and cultural life of the area. These campaigns were important in that they tried to present a new positive picture of diversity and, whilst recognising the value of cultural heritage and distinctiveness, they placed a new emphasis on the commonalities between groups and thereby contributed to a less defensive and more progressive form of multiculturalism. These local forms of intercultural programmes have not, however, been supported by a compelling national narrative or international perspective. Further, apart from a limited number of mainstream programmes, such as the statutory duty to “promote community cohesion” in all state schools in England from 2006, they developed through a series of very local and contextualised programmes and, while they have seemingly created improved conditions within local communities (DCLG 2011), an overarching interculturalism meta-narrative would have provided much greater coherence.

**Interculturalism and intercultural dialogue**

It is also important to distinguish interculturalism from intercultural dialogue. They have often been used synonymously but should be viewed as very different concepts. Intercultural dialogue has certainly helped to challenge “otherness” in a spirit of openness, utilising processes of interaction. Intercultural dialogue, however, is simply an instrumental part of interculturalism, contributing to and fostering understanding and empathy with others. It is almost entirely “relational” in both concept and practice. Interculturalism represents a broader programme of change, in which majority and minority communities think of themselves as dynamic and outward looking, sharing a common objective of growing together and overcoming institutional and relational barriers in the process.

This confusion between terms is illustrated by Meer and Modood (2012b) who rightly see the European intercultural dialogue approach, as typified by the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue in 2008, as “relatively apolitical, offering civil society-based local encounters and conviviality in everyday life to critique multiculturalism”, but they unfortunately refer to it as one type of interculturalism. James (2008) also suggests that the European Commission understands interculturality to be “about dialogue between different cultural groups ... to enable European citizens to acquire the knowledge and aptitudes to enable them to deal with a more open and complex environment”.

The concepts of “interculturalism” and intercultural dialogue had been little used as a policy driver in the UK. The introduction of the iCoCo national Awards for Bridging Cultures (ABCs), supported by the Baring Foundation, is the only recognisable intercultural dialogue programme and this ceased in 2011. This built upon the ideas of community cohesion which, from its inception in 2001, had urged “strong and positive relationships between people of different backgrounds” (LGA 2002) and this was later developed into programmes for “cross-cultural” interaction. The UK programme was based on the premise that “intergroup contact reduces prejudice and improves intercultural dialogue and communication” (James 2008).

While the emphasis has been different and despite the separate genesis, the “cross-cultural interaction” component of community cohesion programmes and intercultural dialogue activities have been used for a number of similar purposes, including:

- to disconfirm stereotypes, change attitudes and behaviours to “others”;
- to promote understanding and tolerance more generally (for example as in inter-faith dialogue);
- to create the conditions for peaceful co-existence, following conflict;
- as a component of wider programmes of community cohesion (in the UK and more recently some other countries);
- to promote more positive views of nation states and their citizens across national boundaries;
- as a means of building social capital, neighbourliness, trust in local institutions and “good citizenship”.

The British Council (British-based, but with many offices around the world and involved in the promotion of community relations) has also invested in exploring both the concept and practice of intercultural dialogue and (with iCoCo) produced a “toolkit” and resource guide to promote their ideas (British Council 2010). This work has also usefully set out to define intercultural dialogue in the following layered terms:

National – A dynamic process by which people from different cultures interact to learn about and question their own, and each other’s, cultures. Over time this may
lead to cultural change. It recognises the inequalities at work in society and the need to overcome these. It is a process which requires mutual respect and acknowledges human rights.

International – Intercultural dialogue aims to equip individuals with the knowledge and skills – so-called “intercultural competences” – to participate in increasingly diverse societies. Knowledge of democratic values, citizenship and civil rights are essential elements of dialogue. (EU – European Year for Intercultural Dialogue 2008)

Global – The idea of “intercultural dialogue” takes as its starting point the recognition of difference and multiplicity of the world in which we live. These differences of opinion, viewpoint, and values exist not only within each individual culture but also between cultures. “Dialogue” seeks to approach these multiple viewpoints with a desire to understand and learn from those that do not see the world in the same way as ourselves.

While, on its own, the BC/iCoCo toolkit focuses on intercultural dialogue, it does begin to recognise the wider basis of interculturality to shape community relations. Gérard Bouchard (2011; see also Chapter 5 in this volume) also suggests that interculturalism should shape our ways of living together in the future and sees it as a search for balance and mediation between often-competing principles, values and expectations. In this sense, he suggests that it is a sustained effort aimed at connecting majorities and minorities, continuity and diversity, identity and rights, reminders of the past and visions of the future; and that it calls for new ways of coexisting within and beyond differences at all levels of collective life.

Bouchard draws upon the work of the Council of Europe (2008) to define interculturalism as:

- the rejection of multiculturalism, which was associated with fragmentation and seen as harmful to social cohesion;
- the rejection of assimilation due to the violation of individual rights that it entails; and
- the choice of interculturalism as a middle path, as a model of balance and equity.

Viewing interculturalism as some sort of middle way between assimilation and separation, however, fails to develop the potential of this new model and perhaps reflects Bouchard’s preoccupation with the relationship of the French-speaking province of Canada, drawing upon his report (with Taylor) for the Government of Quebec (Bouchard and Taylor 2008). The Bouchard–Taylor Report was developed on the basis of the rejection of Canadian multiculturalism (which was seen as the vision imposed on French-speaking Canadians by English-speaking Canadians – see earlier) and proposes its replacement by “interculturalism”. Bouchard’s alternative concept of interculturalism is a form of integration based on agreed accommodations but proscribed by the embedded “fundamental values” of Quebec society: presented as gender equality, secularism and the French language. Given that these “accommodations” amounted to the children of new migrants, including those from English-speaking backgrounds, being required to attend schools where teaching is conducted in French and who are denied the choice of English-speaking schools in the same province, and that English is generally not permitted in many aspects of the public sphere, including road signage and by retailers, this concept of interculturalism may therefore be seen as somewhat limited and coercive.

Such conceptual problems arise where integration is positioned on a simple linear path between the extremes of separation and assimilation and fails to recognise that there are several domains and many more layers of integration that can operate at different levels. It also fails to recognise the dynamic nature of societies that are constantly in flux and cannot rest upon a fixed notion of “culture”. In addition, the “middle way” rests upon the idea that culture revolves around some form of mediation between the host community(ies) and newcomers, rather than a more dialectical view of the modern globalised world in which both national and international parameters are also changing.

Bouchard’s view of interculturalism, however, does begin to recognise the dynamic nature of societies and that integration is neither a process in which migrants are assimilated into a host culture, nor one which results in the adaptation of the host community to the extent that their fundamental nature is eroded:

interculturalism concerns itself with the interests of the majority culture, whose desire to perpetuate and maintain itself is perfectly legitimate, as much as it does with the interests of minorities and immigrants – we thus find no reason to oppose either the defenders of the identity and traditions of the majority culture on one side, or the defenders of the rights of minorities and immigrants on the other; it is both possible and necessary to combine the majority’s aspirations for identity with a pluralist mindset, making for a single process of belonging and development. (Bouchard 2011)

Many majority communities would, no doubt, find Bouchard’s thesis very reassuring, as almost any form of change can be unsettling and threatening. However, the reality is that host communities too are in a state of flux and ever more so in a period of globalisation. The arrival of migrants is only one part of the change – though often the most visible. As a result migrants are often identified with the change and seen as the cause rather than the consequence of the underlying processes of globalisation which are much more pervasive – and inevitable. Trying to “buck the market” of cultural change by holding on to a fixed conception of culture is a fairly useless exercise, even for a majority group, making some communities even more isolated from the real world and the likelihood that even greater change will be more sudden and difficult.

Ironically, the concept of multiculturalism advanced by the Canadian Government, and so soundly rejected by the Bouchard–Taylor report, may be somewhat nearer to more generally accepted ideas about interculturalism. It is the case that the idea of more dynamic and outward-looking communities applies to majorities as much as to minorities – indeed they need to share a common objective of growing together.

“Interculturalism” is, then, much more than “intercultural dialogue”. Whereas intercultural dialogue may be considered as the process by which two or more
communities with different identities interact, break down barriers and build trust and understanding, interculturalism envisages a society in which people are at ease with difference more generally and with the opportunity for themselves and other cultures, from within and beyond national borders, to engage and develop along a mutually agreed growth path, overcoming institutional barriers in the process. In this sense, programmes of community cohesion, which rely upon more deliberative programmes to tackle inequalities, promote diversity, belonging and interaction, contribute from a more localised and grassroots basis.

**Interculturalism and policy development**

In terms of policy development, however, we have not yet seen the full potential of the concept of interculturalism and there is little by way of an accepted body of academic opinion on the subject (it is notable that only 2 of the 26 references cited by James (2008) use the term in their title), with the first academic text based on interculturalism appearing only in 2012 (Cantle 2012a). There is even less by way of established practice. The Eminent Persons Report for the Council of Europe (2011) has recently set out the ways in which they believe “peaceful co-existence” can be achieved. They reject the concept of “multiculturalism” and set out 17 “guiding principles” for living together. These mainly revolve around legal rights, which apply equally to all, with an emphasis on citizenship and participation, in which people retain their distinctive cultural heritage, possibly hyphenated with nationality or faith. They argue for early voting rights for migrants and for tolerant and respectful leadership. There is little new in the report and much of it could be attributed to a “progressive form of multiculturalism” referred to earlier. However, there is more emphasis on integration, particularly from the perspective that “in order to live together in peace people need skills or ‘competences’ which are not ‘automatically acquired’”.

Interculturalism is constructed around the multifaceted nature of “difference”, whereas, multiculturalism was founded – and remained rooted – on the outmoded concept of “race”. This was based upon spurious notions of physical distinctiveness, or on other salient and contextualised differences, such as language or religion, which then became essentialised as “culture”. Multiculturalism generally developed throughout Europe into a policy based on ethnic difference and faith divisions, some of which were identified as “racial” groups for the purposes of public policy and essentially became viewed in much the same primordial sense. And, in terms of the “failure of multiculturalism” referred to earlier, they became understood in this way. Progressive forms of multiculturalism embraced ideas about hyphenated identities, often combining the country of origin or domicile with ethnicity and/or faith. However, these dual or multiple identities also tended to become singular and fixed in much the same way as those based upon just one conception of identity.

Interculturalism recognises the dynamic nature of culture and all aspects of difference, which, in this era of globalisation, also includes wider geo-political and international components. However, the visionary sense of internationalism that emerged in the post-war period, with the creation of a number of international bodies including the United Nations, appears to have diminished in recent years. Rather like the “paradox of diversity” referred to earlier, the growth of international institutions appears to drive people towards separate identities instead of a shared conception of themselves. Younge (2010) explains this in relation to the introduction of the euro currency, which he sees as the ceding of national power over interest rates and economic sovereignty and the loss of an important element of national identity through the much-reduced symbolism and national markers that individually designed currency notes and coins contained:

But the truth is that, when it comes to identity, the global and the parochial have a symbiotic relationship. The smaller the world seems and the less control that we have over it, the more likely we are to retreat into the local spheres where we might have influence.

As noted earlier, the forces of globalisation may cause people to “hunker down” into their own identities and to build bonding social capital around their own identity group, rather than engage with difference. Some see this as just a natural tendency of people to want to be with people who are superficially like themselves – as in “birds of a feather flock together”. But as we have seen in the “race” debate, the evident support for the idea of primordial distinctions has been a false and dangerous path and in reality difference is determined by cultural, political and economic frameworks. In other words, we soon begin to think of others as being the same once we engage and the metaphorical and literal “skin-deep” differences are superseded by deeper understanding and more nuanced relationships.

**Implications for policy and practice**

The perspective for interculturalism in conceptual terms is becoming settled but the consequential implications for policy and practice have been little considered. However, there is growing agreement on the following points.

- Leadership and vision is needed to give effect to interculturalism. This should be in the form of a new meta-narrative, replacing the outmoded ideas and divisive conception of multiculturalism.
- Part of the vision must be for one of mixed communities, in which shared spaces – schools, communities and workplaces – are facilitated. This does not mean creating “melting pots” where groups lose their heritage, but rather dispensing with those segregated environments that are so “bonded” to be almost impermeable by outsiders. This has to go hand in hand with equality programmes that ensure that people have access to shared spaces and so that all communities believe that they are being treated fairly.
- Too many political leaders – at a national and local level – rely on identity politics and the fear of other nationalities, faiths and backgrounds to engender the loyalty of their own constituency or interest. This, sadly, also includes some faith leaders who nevertheless preach “goodwill to all men”. We need a new
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– Political leaders should be prepared to experiment with new democratic structures that can reflect the needs of mobile populations and hybrid and fluid identities. These may, however, also emerge through social media with people connecting across boundaries on a horizontal basis, rather than through more traditional “top-down” and vertical systems.

– The notion of identity needs to be reformed, so that fixed and ascribed conceptions are replaced by developmental and chosen forms; and, rather than constantly imagining and flagging difference, new ways need to be found to value what we have in common. Taking pride in our particular identity or identities is not threatened by an additional universal or cosmopolitan form that is shared. This will require replacing the outmoded “tick box” classification system of identity.

– It is vital that pervasive programmes of intercultural education and experiential learning opportunities are provided to develop cultural navigational skills and the competence and confidence in people to relate to those who are different to themselves and to see “others” as an opportunity rather than as a threat.

– People of multirace, multifaith and multinationality should be valued on an equal basis to those who claim a single or pure identity. This means an end to the privileges of financial and representational benefits enjoyed by people of supposedly single identities.

– In a multifaith society (which also includes people of no faith), space should be provided for genuine belief systems as part of democratic debate, but if faith is in the public sphere those communities must expect their views to be contested too. And they should not expect to have special funding or state aid for promoting their particular views or for providing services.

– In the sense that faith is part of the public sphere, the idea of a “secular society” is no longer appropriate, but “secular governance” must be more clearly delineated to ensure that no faith is privileged over another, or that faith systems are not privileged over non-faith views.

In more visionary terms Sondhi (2009) suggests it is fundamentally about a “new kind of living dialogue”:

So what then is different about the new concept of interculturality? The basis of this approach lies in the creation of a new kind of living dialogue – creating the space and opportunity and the inclination for two different entities to know a little more about how to reassure and interest the other while also avoiding those things that might insult or alarm them, thus minimising the potential obstacles to the transaction. But it is more than just a tool of communication – it is a process of mutual learning and joint growth. This implies a process of acquiring, not only a set of basic facts and concepts about the other but also particular skills and competencies that will enable one to interact functionally with anyone different from oneself regardless of their origins. This implies a different way of reading situations, signs, symbols, and of communicating which we would describe as intercultural literacy. This indicates the acquisition of an intercultural competence, a certain frame of mind, which in a diverse society, becomes as important a competency as basic numeracy and literacy. No child should leave school without it and no public official with responsibility for deciding on local policy and resources should be without it either.

However, a cohesive society also depends upon a model of interculturalism that has a clear sense of justice and equality to enable the barriers associated with particular backgrounds to be overcome and for a spirit of belonging to be established. Interculturalism must therefore draw upon some of the progressive elements of multiculturalism but develop policies and practices that are less hidebound by rigid conceptions of identity and provide for new cultural competences. Interculturalism must also embrace, and give effect to, the idea of identity as a dynamic process that can accommodate the international and transnational impacts of globalisation.

Suggestions for further reading


This recent book provides a fuller account of the issues raised in this chapter and also discusses how the silo-based approach and “evidence-free” approach of some academics has protected the outmoded concept of multiculturalism. An earlier work by Ted Cantle (2008, Community cohesion: a new framework for race and diversity, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke) sets out the history of race relations and the journey to community cohesion in the UK which gave rise to early programmes of “cross-cultural” interaction.


This article neatly encapsulates some of Castell’s more developed work (2010, The power of identity: the information age, economy, society and culture, Wiley-Blackwell, Chichester) and he explains that globalisation will not result in a single universal culture, though as identities are socially constructed, they are subject to considerable change.


This report, by an independent group of “eminent persons” and published by the CoE identifies the risks facing Europe, including rising intolerance and the development of parallel societies. It also develops a range of largely practical responses and tends towards a more intercultural view of modern societies.

Gundara uses his personal experience to effectively argue for more inclusive education that goes beyond a narrow national story. He suggests a more global perspective for education that goes beyond the school and ranges from the role of the state to a discussion of basic issues in intercultural education.


Rattansi’s work is relatively short – only 177 pages, based on a small format – but he packs a great deal in. He is not afraid to confront some of the most difficult questions, such as “Is multiculturalism bad for women?”. His conclusion is clear: that across Europe, the period of multiculturalism is over and that the time has come to “move on” to interculturalism.


This reader has around 30 contributions from notable academics, policy makers and practitioners. The opening scene by Leonie Sandercock sets out the “struggle for interculturalism against fundamentalism” particularly well. As a whole, the reader places great emphasis on the value of diversity in terms of innovation and entrepreneurship. It is supported by a number of more practically based sister publications including: Wood, P., Landry, C. and Bloomfield, J. (2006), The intercultural city; Comedia, Stroud; Wood, P., Landry, C. and Bloomfield, J. (2006), Cultural diversity in Britain: a toolkit for cross-cultural co-operation, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, York; and Wood, P. and Landry, C. (2008), The intercultural city: planning for diversity advantage, Earthscan, London.

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5 – Interculturalism: what makes it distinctive?

Gérard Bouchard

In the wake of the attacks against multiculturalism during the past decade, interculturalism has emerged not really as a substitute but as a different model that could meet specific challenges in a number of nations. The recent literature has described the model of interculturalism in a few broad strokes, i.e. essentially a focus on dialogue, mutual understanding and interaction between ethno-cultural groups at the micro-social level. However, as far as I know, no one has as yet proposed a detailed definition that spells out the foundations and the major components of the model in a manner that highlights its distinctiveness, including at the societal level. The goal of this chapter is to present a brief overview of interculturalism that emphasises its main components while showing how it departs from multiculturalism.

Models and paradigms

Prior to addressing interculturalism and multiculturalism per se, it is useful to look at the paradigms in which these and other models are grounded. These paradigms are basic schemata that serve as a global lens through which societies or nations perceive, discuss and manage ethno-cultural realities. They feed on deep collective representations that structure the national imaginary, shape public debates and inspire state policies. In light of the major models of diversity management that have been developed in the Western world, five paradigms can be identified.

– According to the “homogeneity” paradigm, there is and should be only one culture in a nation. Consequently, in matters of intercultural differences, forced or voluntary assimilation to the host culture is the rule. In nations that embrace this paradigm, there are no such things as majority or minority cultures, at least theoretically, since every citizen is required to embrace the national culture. Japan, Greece, North and South Korea and several other countries come to mind.

– In the “mixity” paradigm (mostly followed in Latin America), ethno-cultural diversity is expected to disappear thanks to extended and intense miscegenation. The envisioned long-term outcome is the morphing of initial, contributing cultures into a new and supposedly superior national encompassing configuration.

– The “bi- or multipolarity” paradigm prevails in nations comprising two or more founding ethno-cultural groupings (think of Belgium or Switzerland).

13. As far as possible, I will avoid using the word “ethnic” because of the controversial meanings it conveys (see, for instance, Brubaker 2004).

In principle, since each of these groups enjoys official recognition in a statute or a charter provision, none is expected to be assimilated by the other(s).

In nations endorsing the “diversity” paradigm, this latter concept is paramount. As can be seen in English Canada or in the United States, the nation is defined as an association of autonomous individuals sharing equal rights and expressing their individuality as they see fit within legal limits. There is no official recognition of a majority culture, although a variety of cultures are encouraged and protected as expression of individuals’ choice in need of a linkage with their original culture.

Finally, according to the “duality” paradigm, ethno-cultural realities are perceived through the prism of an us/them relationship made up of a majority and minority cultures. Quebec exemplifies this paradigm, along with a number of European nations that have recently evolved toward a dual vision of themselves. Duality manifests itself in many ways, including in the debates over so-called national values and traditions allegedly threatened by immigrants reluctant to integrate into the host society. The emergence of the duality paradigm in a nation can be driven by various factors or circumstances, but a significant level of anxiety among a large segment of the population is a common feature. This feeling may originate in the fact that the majority culture is itself a minority in its political (the case of federations) and continental environment, which fosters a sense of fragility and a defensive mood. In other cases, the majority culture worries about what it perceives as its progressive values confronted with incompatible, backward and corrosive traditions brought in by immigrants. Duality can also be created and sustained by xenophobia and racism on the part of a dominant majority.

Under the pressure of tensions and criticisms expressed in public debates, paradigms are constantly shifting. They must also adapt to changing contexts and challenges. Lastly, they usually compete with alternative options. In the United States, for example, the diversity paradigm is regularly attacked by advocates of a dual view of the nation that emphasises various forms of cultural clashes and a deep concern for the universal ideals inherited from the Founding Fathers (for example, Huntington 1996).

In any given nation, the prevailing paradigm is always a choice. The demographic and geographic morphology of ethno-cultural realities or the weight of national traditions and institutions are not deterministic. The latter, needless to say, are contributing factors of change but they do not exert structural primacy. This statement is substantiated by the numerous instances of paradigmatic changes that have occurred lately in several countries as a consequence of political reorientations. Quebec and English Canada are two cases in point. Since the 1960s, they have both rejected the homogeneity paradigm, which previously held sway, the former adopting duality and the latter turning to diversity.

Finally, each paradigm suffers from its own weaknesses. For instance, bi- or multipolarity and the duality paradigms can give way to confrontation, the diversity paradigm is vulnerable to fragmentation, the mixity paradigm to assimilation, and so forth.

Against this background, let us first examine interculturalism and then multiculturalism.

### Interculturalism

Interculturalism shares with several models an embracing of pluralism as a basic orientation advocating a respect of diversity. This leads to the recognition of minority rights, the practice of reasonable accommodation, various forms of affirmative action, a strong concern for the social and economic inclusion of immigrants and members of minorities, a constant fight against xenophobia, racism and discrimination, and public policies designed to allow newcomers to maintain a link with their original culture if they wish to do so. While they are not peculiar to interculturalism, all these elements are an integral part of it.

In the same vein, like a few other models, interculturalism operates on two distinct levels. At the global (or macro-social) level, it relates to state and institutional policies and programmes and therefore offers a set of guiding principles and a general approach to ethno-cultural relations. At the micro-social level (interculturality), interculturalism is concerned with the daily management of ethno-cultural diversity in various institutional settings (such as the education system, health services, or private enterprise), and in the community at large. This is the area of the day-to-day dynamic of relations among individuals and groups coming from different cultures.

### The distinctive components of interculturalism

I will now concentrate on other components that are either exclusive to this model or, without being exclusive, are more accentuated than in other models.

- Interculturalism finds its most familiar ground in the duality paradigm. It is worth noting that the model does not create the duality structure nor does it promote it. Interculturalism simply operates where duality already prevails as a vision of ethno-cultural relationships. Indeed, one of the main objectives of the model is to ease the us/them relationship and to manage the majority/minorities duality so as to prevent it from lapsing into tensions, conflicts and ethnicism. That being said, 15. For practical purposes, I will use “nation” and “society” interchangeably.

16. In the legal but also the philosophical sense as defined by Taylor (1992/1994) and others.

17. Formalised or not, accommodation practices are commonplace in the Western nations, even where they have no legal or official status. They consist in protecting minorities against laws or any collective rules adopted by a majority oblivious to the fact that such laws and rules may discriminate against citizens who are not fully part of the mainstream culture. However, accommodations are not freely granted. They are subject to a set of conditions designed to protect the fundamental values of a society, to secure the normal functioning of institutions and organisations, and more generally, to preserve the social order. For a detailed presentation, see Bouchard and Taylor (2008, Chapter VIII).
according to the logic of pluralism, it may seem desirable to not only reduce but
to suppress the duality for the sake of individual freedom as well as a deeper and
more “equal” integration. However, doing so would go against pluralism, that is,
the right of all citizens to maintain a sense of belonging to their culture of origin,
which is also part of the pluralist creed. This reveals an interesting paradox inherent
in pluralism.

Lastly, by tackling upfront the major/minorities duality, interculturalism brings
(and maintains) to the fore the power game that, in all nations, underlies intercultural
relationships, irrespective of the paradigm involved. It is well known that political
and other elites everywhere are inclined to pattern their decisions on their own
cultural and social backgrounds at the expense of minorities. As a result, collective
rules often discriminate against some categories of citizens. It is precisely the
function of reasonable accommodations to remedy this universal bias and to right
the wrongs that may ensue among the minorities. More generally, interculturalism
is keen to promote policies that prevent minorities from being dominated by the
majority, particularly in the political and economic spheres.18

– In keeping with the requirements of the law and of social ethics, integration is
a centerpiece of the model. According to the most commonly accepted view in the
North American sociological tradition, the term “integration” refers to the mechani-
isms and processes of inclusion through which social bonds are created, along
with their symbolic and functional foundations. Such processes and mechanisms are
of concern to all citizens (whether new or long-standing), operate on many levels
(individual, community, institutional, and state), and in multiple dimensions (eco-
nomic, social, cultural, and so forth). On a cultural level, the concept of integration,
thus defined, is devoid of any assimilationist overtone.19

A democratic society must be concerned with the social and economic inclusion of
its citizens, particularly those who are underprivileged, which is the case with many
immigrants and members of minorities. Likewise, civic and political participation
must be encouraged. It should also be understood that a rule of reciprocity prevails:
integration is a dual process wherein both immigrants and members of the host
society share a responsibility.

In a different vein, a focus on integration also resonates with a sociological require-
ment. In order to function normally, i.e. to set and pursue common goals, to share
resources, to respond positively in case of crisis, and to efficiently mobilise so that
reforms and social changes can be carried out, a society needs a layer of solidarity
and a symbolic foundation made up of a core of values, beliefs and ideals.

Lastly, emphasis on integration is all the more relevant in a situation of duality sus-
sceptible to mutual distrust, marginalisation and confrontation. But, in the opposite
direction, it must not go so far as to jeopardise the future of minorities as distinct
collective actors. In keeping with the spirit of interculturalism, a delicate balance
must be struck.

– As a corollary of its focus on reciprocal integration, interculturalism promotes
interactions, exchanges and joint civic initiatives between the majority and minori-
ties. This provision also contributes to alleviating ethno-cultural boundaries by
countering stereotypes that fuel discrimination and exclusion.

– Still in a spirit of integration and rapprochement, the model favours the
formation of a common culture sustained by the majority and minority cultures,
while preserving their core features. The common culture also taps into the daily
encounters of symbolic codes, traditions, beliefs and worldviews spurred by the
dynamics of exchange. In this way, the common culture is meant to perform the
following functions:

- to further integration by making diversity an open field;
- to mitigate the us/them relationship;
- to build bridges for citizens who wish to redefine their relationship with
  their original culture and to participate in a wider horizon;
- to allow a society to take full advantage of ethno-cultural diversity.

– Overall, interculturalism fosters the development of a societal or national
culture made up of three closely interwoven, ever-changing threads: the majority
culture, the minority cultures and the common culture. Yet, this view is set forth
with reservations since one should avoid hardening these distinctions. The three
threads harbour some deeply rooted loci of belonging, loyalty and identity but
fluidity, change and interpenetration are also pervasive.

– Because it promotes pluralism and integration, interculturalism supports a
regime of inclusive secularity relying on five principles or values:

- mutual autonomy and the separation of state and church;
- state neutrality in religious matters;
- freedom of conscience and religion;
- equality of worldviews, deep-seated convictions and beliefs, whether they
  are religious or not;
- protection of religious heritage as part of national patrimony.

For the sake of equity and flexibility, interculturalism refrains from establishing any
_a priori_ hierarchy between the five components. It is also receptive to the expression
of religion, for example, the wearing of religious signs in public or state institutions,
although this remains subject to some restrictions when, for example, a practice
goes against a fundamental value (say, gender equality) or when the functioning of
a major institution is jeopardised.

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19. Nevertheless, in the course of a recent controversy in Europe, the concept has occasionally acquired
this kind of connotation. To avoid any confusion, perhaps we should use the term “integrationism” when
referring to those forms of integration that are not respectful of diversity.
To sum up, interculturalism is basically characterised by an embrace of pluralism as an ethics of cultural encounter, the vision of ethno-cultural realities as structured by a majority/minorities relationship (cf. the duality paradigm), an emphasis on integration (through policies of social and economic inclusion and a dynamic of interaction) and a strong concern for the societal level (development of a common culture).

Comments

An attribute of interculturalism that warrants emphasis is the encompassing meaning of the notion of citizenship that it sets forth. Indeed, no less than four dimensions are taken into account:

- cultural: harmonisation of differences;
- legal: the protection of rights;
- social: economic and social inclusion, the fight against racism and domination relationships;
- civic: participation in the community and political life.

Thus construed, interculturalism invites a global view of the social fabric that takes into account the sociological conditions of its reproduction and historical continuity. This, in turn, draws attention to what could be called the founding component of a society. This concept refers to the mainstream segment – the majority culture – which embodies the continuity of a society through a centuries-long if not a millennial historical process of settlement and expansion, economic, social and institutional development, interspersed with setbacks, achievements and traumas. The formation of a culture is also part of this long process, i.e. a language, a body of traditions, norms, beliefs, myths, and so forth, all of which coalesce into a collective memory and an identity. Together, they constitute the core of the symbolic foundation of a society.

One might argue that, after all, such a national imaginary has been somewhat artificially constructed by the elites – which is true – and must not be given too much weight. But this should not detract from the important fact that, as a result of an intense and prolonged acculturation process (through school, media, state discourse, and so forth), such symbolic “artefacts” have been internalised by large segments of the population and they have taken on a life of their own: in other words, over the years, they have evolved from cold constructs to warm truths and deep feelings. What I seek to stress here is the sociological significance of this founding component as a staple of the social fabric, and its enduring impact on the structure and the course of a nation.

For a society to function, a sense of continuity is needed that is guaranteed to a large extent by the majority culture and the symbolic capital forged in the past. The relevance of this comment is not confined to social cohesion. A society takes hold of its destiny by asserting and pursuing principles and ideals that combine both its heritage and its future. If the former is unquestionably the responsibility of all citizens, the latter is primarily the work of the founding majority. It follows that, within the duality, both the majority and the minority cultures warrant nurturing. Again, the difficulty is to strike the right balance in terms of sociological requirements and rights, considering the unequal distribution of power between the majority and the minorities.

The idea of supporting the majority culture for the sake of the whole society may be a source of concern for some readers. According to some influential liberal intellectuals, a truly liberal state should refrain from cultural interventions in favour of a group or even to promote a set of moral values as the standard of the “good life” in a society. This is seen as a violation of individuals’ freedom. Unfortunately, as numerous liberal thinkers have also come to realise, this virtuous principle has proven to be an out-of-reach ideal. Even in the most liberal, democratic and “civic” nations, the state routinely intervenes to bolster the majority culture (for the sake of “national interest”), often going as far as to encroach on the basic rights of minorities. For example, despite its pluralist and multiculturalist allegiance, the Canadian Government maintains in the preamble of its constitution a reference to the supremacy of God, celebrates the almighty through the annual ritual of Prayer Breakfast (with the participation of the judges of the Supreme Court, the ministers of the cabinet, the presidents of the Senate and the Parliament), promotes monarchic symbols in public life, limits the diffusion of American cultural goods, and so on. In the United States, Christian symbols permeate the political life and the WASP culture is still very influential as well as the assimilating melting-pot. Likewise, France refuses to extend to Islam the official status that Catholicism and Protestantism already enjoy and it imposes French values as universal.

As has been amply demonstrated, no state is culturally neutral (or abstentionist); all states feel entitled to considerable leeway. So, the idea of cultural interventionism is mentioned here but it is not a distinctive trait of interculturalism. Far from that, it is an overt or covert practice associated with all models. For some liberal thinkers, this is an inescapable fact that must be reckoned with, willy-nilly. For others, cultural interventionism is sociologically useful, even necessary for the sake of democracy and social justice. According to Maclure and the political philosopher Taylor (2010: 86), “it is normal that some public norms are rooted in the attributes and the interest of the majority”. One must come to terms with the idea (and the fact) that all liberal states impose official languages, select immigrants, promote specific values enshrined in charters and laws, strongly influence the construction of collective memory and identity, prescribe the content of the school curriculum, and so forth.

20. From pioneers like John Locke, Stuart Mill and Immanuel Kant to contemporary thinkers such as Rawls (1971) or Dworkin (1978).
22. For a criticism of the cultural neutrality thesis, see Kymlicka (2000, especially pp. 185-7).
In this respect, I wish to highlight the following.

- Under specific conditions, the non-neutrality of the state in the sphere of culture (or cultural interventionism) in favour of the majority can be legitimate, even sometimes necessary from a sociological standpoint.
- But this leeway needs to be carefully circumscribed and kept under the control of the law so as to avoid ethnicism. In other words, any measure meant to help the majority culture must pass the test of the law and, if need be, the tribunal.
- In no way whatsoever should this idea be interpreted as or lead to a structural or formalised primacy or official precedence accorded to the majority, thus establishing a hierarchy between citizens. Cultural interventionism must be seen as working as an ad hoc practical procedure enacted only in particular circumstances and under stringent conditions.
- State cultural interventionism can also work for old minority groups which have contributed, with the majority, to the formation of the society and partake of its continuity. In Quebec, for instance, the anglophone minority enjoys particular rights (see below). Likewise, according to a tradition, the Montréal City Council never convenes on the day of the Yom Kippur out of consideration for its Jewish members (presently: 3 out of 65 councillors).
- Needless to say, cultural interventionism works better in a society where intercultural relationships are devoid of deep tensions and conflict. For the majority, this should act as an incentive to be open and accommodating to minorities, in a spirit of reciprocity. Granted, the idea of cultural interventionism runs against the abstract, ideal and unworkable vision of a culturally neutral state, but it is in tune with the complex facts of collective life and the moral responsibilities that are entrusted to democratic states. This is a practical lesson that, in all modesty, sociology and history can teach to normative political philosophy. Sometimes, aiming for the perfect moral society can sow the seeds of unpalatable outcomes.

In the Quebec context, cultural interventionism by the state in favour of the francophone majority is all the more relevant since this majority is itself a fragile minority within Canada and North America. This is what led the Supreme Court of Canada to acknowledge the legitimacy of the French language law (known as “Bill 101”, enacted by the Quebec government in 1977) even though it imposes significant restrictions on the use of English language in public life and limits the right to English education at the primary and secondary levels – while maintaining major rights for the anglophone minority which enjoys a separate education system, newspapers, radio and television channels, etc.24 One imagines that the same argument could be extended to some European societies that replicate the structure of Quebec population or other societies made up of small ethno-cultural “majority” groups which feel threatened in their continental environment. That being said, the general sociological argument in favour of cultural interventionism should apply to all societies – if I am allowed this paradoxical statement since, as I said, interventionism is already part of common practice anyway.

To support my comment about the recognition of the majority culture as a founding component, I have stressed its sociological significance. But there is also an element of practical relevance involved. In recent decades, the promotion of pluralism and its well-deserved criticism of dominant majorities have driven home the message that all majorities are intrinsically bad, thus creating among them an acute sense of guilt and shame that has swayed many people who have become leery of, if not opposed to, pluralism. Needless to say, all majorities are potentially threatening, but a number of them have a rather decent record. Some have even been victims of ill-treatment at the hands of more powerful majorities (colonised societies are a case in point). In such instances, arguing from the vantage point of guilt and shame can be counter-productive. This calls for a recognition of the legitimacy of majority cultures.

Could this be understood as an acceptance of, if not an incentive to “majoritarianism” (Pathak 2008) as well as nationalism in the negative sense that the word usually carries in Europe, that is, the promotion of withdrawal, chauvinism and confrontation rather than openness and collaboration?25 Of course not. What I said about interventionism is just a reminder of the importance and the legitimacy for a nation to preserve its symbolic foundation, specifically a sense of continuity drawing on founding myths. As it were, I have just put a word on a universal practice among democratic societies (cultural interventionism is a blind spot of political liberal thought), while bringing to light its sociological relevance. I have also clearly marked the legal limits of this practice.

In another vein, some assertive forms of promotion of pluralism can lead many members of the majority to believe that they are required to sacrifice their own culture – to renounce who they are, as it were – in order to accommodate immigrants and minorities. Quebec illustrates this point. Opposition to pluralism has developed recently among some networks on these grounds (Bouchard 2012, Chapter IV, Part 1). Indeed, what is required of the majority is to be open to change and compromise, not to “sacrifice” itself. There might be something to learn from the foregoing with regard to the way pluralism should be promoted.

24. In a nutshell, Bill 101 established the language of the francophone majority (80% of Quebec’s population) as the official language of civic life in Quebec. It enables immigrants – and all Quebecers – to access full citizenship, including easier employment and social mobility. Prominent Canadian intellectuals known for their liberal and pluralist commitments – for instance, Charles Taylor, Will Kymlicka, Joseph Carens and Michael Ignatieff – supported the bill.

25. This (rightly) assumes that there are positive forms of nationalism. A society which has relentlessly contributed to improving the condition of human beings and pursued the advancement of peace and social justice can legitimately take pride in its accomplishments and use them to feed a national consciousness. We also know about the decolonisation process in the Third World, made possible thanks to a collective mobilisation largely driven by nationalism. In several European cases as well, nationalism was instrumental in the establishment of democracy in the 19th century.
As is evinced by this overview, the thrust of interculturalism lies in the quest for equilibrium (the “juste mesure”), that is, balancing competing requirements, be they philosophical, normative, legal or sociological. To some extent, this is true of all models of diversity management committed to pluralism. Interculturalism nonetheless stands out because of the challenge involved in managing the majority/minorities relationship. Here are some examples of conundrums to be transcended:

- arbitrating the tension between identity and citizenship (the former speaks of uniqueness, the latter of universal);
- reconciling the historical continuity of a society, mainly embodied by the majority culture, with the rights of minorities;
- striking a balance in intercultural dynamics between fluidity and identities and boundaries (recognising difference is necessary, enclosing it in boxes is wrong);
- identifying within the overall cultural sphere what can be promoted as elements of the common culture – as opposed to particularist ethno-cultural traditions or symbolic contents;
- elaborating, for the sake of integration, a common, inclusive vision of the past beyond the duality, while making room for a plurality of memories;
- making the principle of cultural interventionism in favour of the majority culture compatible with the rights of the minorities;
- fairly adjudicating the disparity between the values of the majority and those of the minorities, where they compete.

The foregoing discussion reflects the spirit of interculturalism defined as an integrative pluralism,26 that is, a model that seeks to i) harmonise the continuity of the founding (or majority) culture with the rights of immigrants and minorities, and ii) promote an encompassing societal dynamic amid diversity. This is not an easy task. It calls for patience, vision, caution and fairness, all virtues that must be cultivated in civic life.

**Interculturalism and multiculturalism**

I am now turning to a question that is often raised about interculturalism: how and to what extent does it differ from multiculturalism? In looking for an answer, one must be very careful to choose the right terms of comparison. Indeed, there is a significant variety among the multiculturalisms that have emerged in the world in recent decades. Besides, in each case, changes have occurred. For example, Canadian multiculturalism has changed a lot since the 1970s and it is still evolving, as we will see. So, as a first step, for the sake of the comparison, I will draw on the most common perception of multiculturalism in the Western world which, unsurprisingly, is quite negative since this model has lost much of its glamour lately, particularly in Europe.

Many scholars, officials and media people, when referring to multiculturalism today, emphasise five characteristics:

- a model that does not recognise the existence of a majority or an official culture (all brands of multiculturalism actually belong to the diversity paradigm);
- a broad receptiveness to ethnic diversity that can verge on fragmentation and jeopardise the integration and the cohesion of a society;
- a loose conception of pluralism that may lead to relativism at the expense of fundamental, universal values;
- a promotion of ethnic minorities that runs the risk of transforming them into enclaves, thus imposing a permanent label upon its members;
- a limited concern for the institution of a common culture, of a “core” that provides a society with a symbolic foundation that acts as a glue.

Against this rough characterisation, the distinctiveness of interculturalism is obvious: on each count, it is just the opposite. But then, is it fair to equate multiculturalism with the common Western configuration I have just outlined? The answer is no. This picture is distorted and is at odds with the new discourse about multiculturalism in countries where it is still operating, a statement that I will document using English Canada as an example.27

First, I recall that in the 1970s, the promotion of a diversity of languages, cultures and “ethnic” groups was the mainstay of the Canadian model. Then, beginning in the 1980s, a social dimension (the struggle against inequalities and exclusion) emerged at the same time as a strong concern for citizens’ rights that sparked a struggle against discrimination and social inequality. Throughout the 1990s, social cohesion became a major priority. More to the point, over the last 10-15 years, a growing concern has emerged for a “Canadian culture”, for the promotion and the protection of “Canadian values” and traditions, and for a stronger national memory, all features that, according to many citizens, are threatened by the weight of increasing diversity and immigration. Some signs of an emerging duality framework were apparent. I am not saying that the diversity paradigm is being abandoned in Canada. It still prevails and enjoys fairly widespread popular support, as several surveys reveal. Nevertheless, there seems to be some movement away from its basic tenets.

Second, various calls have been heard lately for a stronger national identity and sense of belonging, for more “connections” and integration, even for “harmonious interactions” and “intercultural dialogue” between individuals and groups, i.e. calls

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27. I am referring to English Canada since Quebec rejected multiculturalism when the Canadian Government adopted it in 1971. The model was deemed inappropriate for Quebec, which set about developing its own model. This is the origin of interculturalism. Since the mid-19th century, Quebec francophones had fought to gain acceptance of the idea that Canada comprised two nations, one English-speaking, the other French-speaking. This vision of the country as a two-nation state was rejected once and for all with the introduction of multiculturalism, which made francophones in Quebec simply one “ethnic” group among many others throughout Canada. In this sense, multiculturalism weakened Quebec politically and for this reason it is the source of a keen opposition among the French-speaking Quebecers.
to counter perceived centrifugal tendencies by reinforcing the center, by making sure that every component of the Canadian mosaic is “part of a whole”; in short: by promoting the development of a common culture. And here one recognises the familiar language not only of duality but of interculturalism.

I am not making any judgement about the strength of such trends and I would not dare speculate about their future. But again, the foregoing discussion suggests that Canadian multiculturalism is shifting and it is shifting in unexpected directions.

That being said, Quebec interculturalism and Canadian multiculturalism still differ on a few major counts. For instance:

- The two models are rooted in different paradigms. The federal government still adheres to the idea that there is no majority culture in Canada, that the country is defined by diversity, and that these assumptions should guide the reflection and action on Canadian ethno-cultural reality. For its part, Quebec continues to embrace the duality paradigm and to emphasise the majority/minorities structure, a choice that fits the minority status of this French-speaking population on the North American continent and the anxieties that it inevitably entails.
- The crucial point here is that there really is a majority culture within the nation of Quebec whose fragility is a permanent fact of life. More generally, as a result, interculturalism is sensitive to the problems and needs of the majority culture, while multiculturalism does not even recognise the existence of such a culture.
- Since French-speaking Quebecers constitute a minority in North America, they instinctively fear all forms of socio-cultural fragmentation, marginalisation and ghettoisation, hence the primacy that interculturalism places on integration, interactions, connections between cultures, the emergence of a common configuration and the development of a sense of societal belonging. Traditionally, for obvious reasons, multiculturalism does not cultivate these concerns to the same degree.
- An extension of the preceding element reveals the strong collective dimension (interaction, integration, common culture, founding component, solidarity) that permeates interculturalism, which distances it from the liberal individualism that is more salient in multiculturalism.

These remarks bring to light the contrasting visions of the two models. Nevertheless, when compared, the policies enacted by the Canadian and the Quebec Governments in recent decades display many similarities. How can we explain this paradox? Aside from the common endorsement of pluralism mentioned earlier and the recent shift of multiculturalism towards interculturalism, I think that these similarities mostly stem from the fact that the Quebec Government has not adequately aligned its policies with the interculturalist model, allowing a gap to develop between the philosophical orientations and the policies actually implemented.

Conclusion

Interculturalism calls for a complex dynamic that comprises a mixture of interactions, continuity and change that is constantly negotiated and renegotiated at all levels of society, within a framework of respect for basic values and in a spirit of equilibrium that can be summarised in a single maxim: firmness in basic principles, flexibility in their application. This seems to be the best recipe for fostering integration in accordance with the pluralist orientation in nations that embrace the duality paradigm. Interculturalism builds on the basic tenet of democracy, that is, a capacity to reach a consensus on forms of peaceful coexistence that preserve the essential values of a society and make room for the future of all citizens, regardless of their origins or cultural background.

As mentioned, this path is not the easiest one. For a majority culture, the simplest way would be to protect its traditions and identity at the risk of isolating, freezing and impoverishing them, while excluding many other citizens from the mainstream culture and civic life. A more promising but also more difficult option consists in coming to terms with diversity and orchestrating a fair integration by promoting mutual trust and pursuing a shared destiny through diversity. This last option, contrary to what is sometimes said, does not involve self-renunciation on the part of the majority but a real affirmation through exchange, expansion and enrichment.

Beyond Quebec, interculturalism has a future for all nations that, for various reasons, have chosen to follow the duality paradigm. In Europe in particular, a number of countries embraced or were receptive to the diversity paradigm in the 1980s and 1990s. However, a clear overall trend toward duality is now apparent. We are witnessing not only a backlash against multiculturalism, as most observers concur, but also a departure from the diversity paradigm driven by the sense of a threat, the feeling that Western values and cultures are not readily compatible with the traditions of many immigrants, especially Muslims.

The new trend is echoed in the thorough consultation conducted by the Council of Europe among its 47 member states in the wake of the 2005 Summit of Heads of State and Government in Warsaw. Asked about the best model for managing interethnic or intercultural relations, the countries arrived at a consensus on three points: (a) the rejection of multiculturalism, seen as associated with fragmentation and harmful to social cohesion; (b) the rejection of assimilation and the violation of individual rights that it entails; and (c) the promotion of interculturalism as a middle path, as a model of balance and equity. Interestingly, the survey also emphasised that
Interculturalism retains the best facets of multiculturalism (sensitivity to diversity) and of republicanism (sensitivity to universal rights).  

**Interculturalist policies: some priorities**

Given the basic principles of interculturalism and the duality setting in which it operates, what kind of public policies and programmes should be enacted? The fight against discrimination should be the first priority. In this respect, facilitating access to legal services is paramount. Likewise, promoting exchanges and interactions in public life, especially at school, in the workplace and at the community level, is an efficient way of fighting stereotypes that are the major source of xenophobia and racism. For instance, in Quebec, a promising and inexpensive programme has been operating in the 1980s, consisting of a one-week exchange of children between Montreal immigrant families and francophone children from other parts of the province. Another major priority is economic inclusion through employment. Here, various forms of affirmative action are needed.

More specifically, in the cultural sphere, contacts and joint initiatives between members of the majority and the minorities must be widely supported. It is not enough to initiate activities that are attended only by immigrants and/or members of minorities. Moreover, these initiatives should go beyond friendly or social encounters. They should be aimed at pursuing practical and socially useful goals within a neighbourhood, a community or an institution. They should be designed to change and improve civic life. That way, participants might share a feeling of solidarity and pride from what they have been able to accomplish together. It is also the right formula to put diversity at work.

Another priority is to counter the belief among the members of the majority that pluralism compels them to renounce their culture and identity. This is a serious misperception of pluralism which threatens to jeopardise interculturalism. It is important to drive home the idea that interculturalism is a search of equilibrium that seeks to strike the best balance between competing rights, aspirations, norms, traditions and beliefs. It does not ensure that the host society must do away with its memory and the core of civic and universal values that have been forged in its history. Therefore, information should be made available at various levels and in all spheres of society about what is required of members of the majority and the minorities. Likewise, public debates should be promoted in numerous venues with the collaboration of the national and local media.

According to another detrimental widespread belief, the practice of accommodations is not to grant privileges or introduce special rights but, on the contrary, to restore a right that has been violated.

Still in the cultural sphere, immigrants and members of minorities should be made more visible in the media and public institutions so that they become part of the cultural landscape. Diversity should be displayed everywhere in order to break the old embedded vision of an homogeneous society, to prevent the formation of rigid boundaries and help people to come to terms with the new ethno-cultural order. That means a reform of the school curriculum designed to favour mutual knowledge, especially a familiarity with religious diversity.

As for the loci and the channels that should be put to use in order to promote pluralism and to educate people about interculturalism, schools, colleges and universities are primary targets, as well as the media and the workplace. Cities and municipalities should be given more financial resources to manage diversity, and integration, especially at the local level.

Finally, increased efforts should be directed at the teaching of both the official language of the host society, so that immigrants are more able to fend for themselves, and the language of origins of the newcomers. It has been amply demonstrated that allowing the immigrants and their children to maintain a link with their primary culture is a powerful means to assuage the so-called immigration shock and to make integration easier.

**Suggestions for further reading**


The author provides a detailed analysis of Quebec during the 2007-08 accommodation crisis. An attentive and well-informed witness, he sheds light on the work of the Bouchard–Taylor Commission, skilfully reconstitutes the debates and the stakes, and brings out the lines of fracture in public opinion. He also offers a synthesis of Quebec’s approach in matters of ethno-cultural relationship and integration, especially with regard to secularism. From there, he proceeds with a criticism of the French republican model, suggesting – not without some provocation – that something could be learned from Quebec.


Relying on a comparison between Canada and the USA, the book examines the way societies redefine their identity and policies such that a new cohesion and political fabric is created amid increasing ethno-cultural diversity. The Canada/USA comparison allows to elicit differential patterns of integration leading to contrasted forms of citizenship. Canada emerges as performing better than its neighbour in integrating immigrants and developing a sense of belonging, thanks to a more active state providing better support and promoting more convivial multiculturalist policies.

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This electronic book contains the proceedings of an international symposium on interculturalism held in Montréal in May 2011. The participants, from various countries, were invited to explore interculturalism and other models from multiple standpoints. Education, citizenship, discrimination, integration, accommodations, public policies and secularism are some of the topics addressed.


Drawing on many recent reports and monographs, this book presents an overview of the state of multiculturalism in Canada. It is an essential and refreshing reading in that it displays compelling evidence that contradicts many common misconceptions and groundless criticisms of Canadian multiculturalism. One is led to conclude that, despite obvious shortcomings, this model has worked rather well in English Canada.

Winter E. (2011), *Us, them, and others: pluralism and national identity in diverse societies*, University of Toronto Press, Toronto.

The book offers a critical reflection on the power relation that underlies the majority/minorities duality and how to prevent the domination of the latter by the former. It introduces a fascinating innovative insight into this duality by showing the usually ignored role of a third party acting either as a foil or as a model. On these grounds, it also presents the reader with a criticism of Canadian multiculturalism.

**References**


6 – Interacting interculturalism with multiculturalism: observations on theory and practice

Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood

In this chapter we engage with some recent authors who believe that an alternative to multiculturalism must be sought in order to understand and live with diversity. These authors are not anti-diversity, on the contrary; but they share the view that multiculturalism is no longer a persuasive intellectual or policy approach. For example, the Council of Europe’s White Paper on intercultural dialogue – “Living together as equals in dignity” (2008) includes the finding that the majority of practitioners and NGOs across Europe have come to the conclusion that multiculturalism is no longer fit for purpose, and needs to be replaced by a form of interculturalism. Similar views were expressed in the UNESCO World Report, Investing in cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue (2008). More recently still, Ted Cantle (2012: 2) has described interculturalism “as an opportunity to replace multiculturalism as a conceptual and policy framework”, while Maxwell et al. (2012: 429) maintain that “Interculturalism represents a gain over Multiculturalism while pursuing the same set of most uncontroversial political ends”. These statements therefore invite the question: in what ways – if at all – is interculturalism different, substantively or otherwise, from multiculturalism?

Our primary interest in this chapter is how interculturalism functions as a critique and alternative to political multiculturalism (Booth 2003; Powell and Sze 2004; Wood, Landry and Bloomfield 2006; Bouchard 2011). We are therefore open to the possibility that interculturalism as “anti-multiculturalism” may be used in a manner that is not necessarily endorsed by all advocates of interculturalism (in a not dissimilar manner to how Western feminism (Moller Okin 1997) may be appropriated in the critique of non-Western cultures; cf. Phillips 2007; Malik 2008). With this focus on the political uses of interculturalism, we sketch out and critically evaluate four ways in which conceptions of interculturalism are being positively contrasted with multiculturalism. These are, firstly, as something greater than co-existence, in that interculturalism is allegedly more geared toward interaction and dialogue than multiculturalism. Secondly, that interculturalism is conceived as something less “groupist” or more yielding of synthesis than multiculturalism. Thirdly, that interculturalism is conceived as something less “groupist” or more yielding of synthesis than multiculturalism. Finally, that...
Interculturalism and multiculturalism: similarities and differences

Interculturalism is something more strongly committed to a sense of the whole, in terms of opportunities for societal cohesion and national citizenship. Finally, that where multiculturalism may be illiberal and relativistic, interculturalism is more likely to lead to criticism of illiberal cultural practices (as part of the process of intercultural dialogue). We then offer a consideration of some policy questions, broadly conceived, which draw upon and channel the preceding discussions.

**Dialogue**

According to Wood, Landry and Bloomfield (2006: 9) “communication” is the defining characteristic and the central means through which “an intercultural approach aims to facilitate dialogue, exchange and reciprocal understanding between people of different backgrounds.” Our question is to what extent this can be claimed as either a unique or distinguishing quality of interculturalism when dialogue and reciprocity too are foundational to most, if not all, accounts of multiculturalism. To put it another way, what makes communication unique for interculturalism in a manner that diverges from multiculturalism? According to some advocates, a difference is perceptible in the social or convivial “openness” in which communication is facilitated. As Wood, Landry and Bloomfield (2006: 7) maintain:

> Multiculturalism has been founded on the belief in tolerance between cultures but it is not always the case that multicultural places are open places. Interculturalism on the other hand requires openness as a prerequisite and, while openness in itself is not the guarantee of interculturalism, it provides the setting for interculturalism to develop.

The “openness” or “closedness” here is a sociological concern related to a spatial configuration of community and settlement. But it is also an openness not so different from what Smith (2004) characterises as models of inter-religious dialogue. These models come from the North American context, including the “Dialogue as Information Sharing” and “Dialogue to Come Closer Model”, which encourage religious groups to focus on commonalities in a way that seeks to eschew differences in the pursuit of mutuality and sharing. What is striking, however, is the extent to which Wood, Landry and Bloomfield’s (2006) characterisation ignores how central dialogue and communication are to multiculturalism. This might easily be illustrated with reference to some philosophical contributions that have provided a great deal of intellectual impetus to the advocacy of multiculturalism as a political or public policy movement.

Charles Taylor’s essay from 1992, widely considered to be a founding statement of multiculturalism in political theory, characterises the emergence of a modern politics of identity premised upon an idea of “recognition”. This idea is explained by two concepts of equality. The first is the most familiar and is characterised as a rights-based politics of universalism, namely that everybody should be treated the same. The second refers to a politics of difference where the uniqueness of context, history and identity are salient and potentially ascendant. According to Taylor, even though in modern societies the demand for the first kind of equality means that people can no longer be recognised on the basis of identities determined by their positions in social hierarchies alone, yet we are all still dependent on the recognition of others. We cannot create our identities monologically; without a conversation with others (see the discussion of Taylor and Parekh in Meer 2010a: 31-36). As such, he maintains that we are “always in dialogue with, sometimes in struggle against, the things our significant others want to see in us” (Taylor 1992: 33). This is why “recognition” is relevant to equality and social justice:

> [O]ur identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. Non recognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning some in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being.

This is one illustration of how central a concern with dialogue and communication is to multiculturalism. Another landmark text on this topic is Bhikhu Parekh’s *Rethinking multiculturalism* (2000). The central argument here is that cultural diversity and social pluralism are of an intrinsic value precisely because they challenge people to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of their own cultures and ways of life:

> Since human capacities and values conflict, every culture realizes a limited range of them and neglects, marginalizes and suppresses others. However rich it may be, no culture embodies all that is valuable in human life and develops the full range of human possibilities. Different cultures thus correct and complement each other, expand each other’s horizon of thought and alert each other to new forms of human fulfillment. The value of other cultures is independent of whether or not they are options for us … inassimilable otherness challenges us intellectually and morally, stretches our imagination, and compels us to recognize the limits of our categories of thought. (Parekh 2000: 167)

His argument that cultures other than one’s own have something to teach us, and that therefore members of minority cultures should be encouraged to cultivate their moral and aesthetic insights for humanity as a whole, has intercultural dialogue at its heart. Indeed, for both Taylor and Parekh communication and dialogue are in different ways integral features to their intellectual and political advocacy of multiculturalism, and must necessarily be considered so by those drawing upon their work unless a different reading is offered. The point is that to consider multiculturalists who draw upon these and similar formulations as being unconcerned with matters of dialogue and communication is to profoundly misread and mischaracterise their positions.

Moreover, even amongst those theorists who do not elaborate a philosophical concept of dialogical multiculturalism, dialogue is important at a political level. Whatever their varying views about the importance of say entrenched rights, democratic majoritarianism, special forms of representation and so on, they all see multiculturalism as the giving of “voice” in the public square to marginalised groups (Young 1990; Kymlicka 1995; Tully 1995; Modood 2007a). Specifically, these authors also argue that dialogue is the way to handle difficult cases of cultural practices such as clitoridectomy, hate speech, religious dress, gender relations and so on (see also Eisenberg 2009, on public assessment of identity claims). So, whether
It is at a philosophical or a political level, the leading theorists of multiculturalism give dialogue a centrality missing in liberal nationalist or human-rights or class-based approaches—and is missed by interculturalist critics of multiculturalism. The multiculturalists assume, however, that there is a sense in which the participants to a dialogue are “groups” or “cultures” and this leads us to a second point of alleged contrast with interculturalists.

**Less groupist and culture-bound: more synthesised and interactive**

A related means through which the concern with “closed” communities or groupings that advocates of interculturalism conceive multiculturalism as giving rise to, takes us to our next characterisation of interculturalism versus multiculturalism. The recent BRAP (2012: 55) policy document thus states:

In the multicultural model it is very hard to engage in the type of discussion that will help people challenge and move beyond the particular cultural boundaries that are ascribed to them or which they choose to adopt.

This shares something with the assertion that “one of the implications of an intercultural framework, as opposed to a multicultural one . . . is that culture is acting in a multi-directional manner” (Hammer 2004). This depiction of interculturalism as facilitating an interactive and dynamic cultural “exchange” informs a consistent line of distinction, as the following two portrayals make clear:

Multiculturalism tends to preserve a cultural heritage, while interculturalism acknowledges and enables cultures to have currency, to be exchanged, to circulate, to be modified and evolve. (Powell and Sze 2004)

[Interculturalism] is concerned with the task of developing cohesive civil societies by turning notions of singular identities into those of multiple ones, and by developing a shared and common value system and public culture. In building from a deep sharing of differences of culture and experience it encourages the formation of interdependencies which structure personal identities that go beyond nations or simplified ethnicities. (Booth 2003: 432)

This emphasis is warranted for advocates of interculturalism who maintain that the diversity of the locations from where migrants and ethnic minorities herald, gives rise not to a creation of communities or groups but to a churning mass of languages, ethnicities, religions all cutting across each other and creating a “super-diversity” (Vertovec 2007) (see Policy implications). An intercultural perspective is better served to facilitate management of these sociological realities, it is argued, in a way that can be positively contrasted against a multiculturalism that emphasises strong ethnic or cultural identities at the expense of wider cultural exchanges.

Notwithstanding this problematic description of how groups feature in multiculturalism, which is challenged in other readings (cf. Modood 2007a), such interculturalist approaches do not present a positive politics of their own. Their political content, indeed purpose it seems, is as critiques of multiculturalism (Booth 2003; Powell and Sze 2004; Wood, Landry and Bloomfield 2006; Cantle, 2012) – though this may not necessarily be endorsed by all advocates of interculturalism.

To find a positive political theory of interculturalism one has to turn to Quebec. Gagnon and Iacovino (2007) are an example of Quebecer authors who contrast interculturalism positively with multiculturalism. The interesting aspect for our discussion is that they do so in a way that relies upon a formulation of groups. They argue that Quebec has developed a distinctive intercultural political approach to diversity that is explicitly in opposition to federal Canadian multiculturalism (cf. Bouchard 2011, and in this volume). Their starting point is that two broad considerations are accepted by a variety of political positions, including liberal nationalists, republicans and multiculturalists; indeed by most positions except liberal individualism, which they critique and leave to one side. These two considerations are that, firstly, “full citizenship status requires that all cultural identities be allowed to participate in democratic life equally, without the necessity of reducing conceptions of identity to the level of the individual” (2007: 96). And secondly, with respect to unity: “the key element is a sense of common purpose in public matters”; “a centre which also serves as a marker of identity in the larger society and denotes in itself a pole of allegiance for all citizens” (ibid.).

For Gagnon and Iacovino, however, Canadian multiculturalism has two fatal flaws, which means that it is de facto liberal individualist in practice if not in theory. Firstly, it privileges an individualist approach to culture: as individuals or their choices change, the collective culture must change; in contrast, Quebec’s policy states clearly the need to recognise the French language as a collective good that requires protection and encouragement (Rocher et al., cited in Gagnon and Iacovino 2007: 99). Secondly, Canadian multiculturalism locates itself not in democratic public culture but rather that “[p]ublic space is based on individual participation via a bill of rights” (ibid.: 110-11); judges and individual choices, not citizens debating and negotiating with each other, become the locus of cultural interaction and public multiculturalism.

Gagnon and Iacovino’s positive argument for interculturalism can therefore be expressed in the following five stages. Firstly, there should be a public space and identity that is not merely about individual constitutional or legal rights. Secondly, this public space is an important identity for those who share it and so qualifies and counter-balances other identities that citizens value. Thirdly, this public space is created and shared through participation, interaction, debate and common endeavour. Fourthly, this public space is not culture-less but nor is it merely the “majority culture”; all can participate in its synthesis and evolution and while it has an inescapable historical character, it is always being remade and ought to be remade to include new groups. Finally, Quebec, and not merely federal Canada, is such a public space and so an object which immigrants need to have identification with and integrate into, so it is important to maintain Quebec as a nation and not just a federal province (the same point may apply in other multinational states, but there are different degrees and variations of “multinationalism”). It is interesting however
that Bouchard (2011: 463), in pointing to recent evidence of dynamism in Canadian multiculturalism, specifically in what he interprets as the emphasis of previously ignored civic features of participation, applauds Canadian multiculturalism for having “slowly grown closer to Quebec interculturalism”. This is at least one reading of a political struggle internal to Canada in which the direction of travel has also been identified as heading the other way (cf. Kymlicka 2012).

Either way, these characterisations of interculturalism are very different to that proposed by Booth (2003), Hammer (2004), Powell and Sze (2004) or Cantle (2012) because it makes a moral and policy case for the recognition of relatively distinct sub-state nationalisms. As such it is less concerned with the diversity of the locations from where migrants and ethnic minorities herald or the “super-diversity” that this is alleged to cultivate therein. Its emphasis on multinationalism does distinguish it from post-immigration multiculturalism (and post-immigration interculturalism) but not multiculturalism per se (cf. Kymlicka 1995). Discourses of interculturalism in Europe tend to be relatively apolitical, focusing on civil society-based local encounters, conviviality and everyday life: politically deconstructive of the alleged essentialism of multiculturalism without a constructive politics of their own, and so leave an empty space where there should be national discourses, policies and debate. One could perhaps say there is an implicit philosophy of freedom or emancipation from discrete, monistic group identities in favour of individual self-expression and hybridity, but it is rarely translated into proposals for national policies or laws. The less-macro-level interculturalism, which focuses on neighbourhoods, classroom pedagogy, the funding of the arts and so on, is not an alternative to political multiculturalism but a different exercise, so therefore political multiculturalism and apolitical interculturalism do not need to be opposed to each other and may indeed be complementary. Given that society, including post-immigration, ethno-religious formations, consists of both groups and individuals, there seems to be a case for drawing on the repertoires of both multiculturalism and interculturalism. Some aspects of society might have the features of “super-diversity” but proud, self-defined communities, such as Muslims, clearly mobilise and seek accommodation in terms of group identities, and the policy frame relevant for the former is unlikely to be adequate for the latter, or vice versa (Meer 2009, 2010b; Modood 2007a, 2012).

**Committed to a stronger sense of whole: national identity and social cohesion**

A third related charge is, that far from being a system that speaks to the whole of society, multiculturalism, unlike interculturalism, speaks only to and for the minorities within it and, therefore, also fails to appreciate the necessary wider framework for its success. As Goodhart (2004) has argued, multiculturalism is asymmetrical in that it not only places too great an emphasis upon difference and diversity, upon what divides us more than what unites us, but also that it ignores the needs of majorities. Simply put, “the issue of a majority culture is simply absent” (Bouchard 2011: 465; see also Bouchard’s Chapter 5 in this volume). It thus encourages resent-

ment, fragmentation and disunity. In BRAP’s (2012: 15) terms, multiculturalism “separates rather than combines, it celebrates difference rather than asserts collective experience”. This can be prevented or overcome, as Alev (2007) and other commentators put it, through invocations of community cohesion on a local level, and more broadly through the promotion and subscription to national citizenship identities as forms of meta-membership:

- **Interculturalism is a better term than multiculturalism.** It emphasises interaction and participation of citizens in a common society, rather than cultural differences and different cultures existing next to each other without necessarily much contact or participative interaction. Interculturalism is therefore equivalent to mutual integration.
- **While multiculturalism boils down to celebrating difference, interculturalism is about understanding each other’s cultures, sharing them and finding common ground on which people can become more integrated.**

These common grounds embody a kind of commonality that members of society need to have and which has been obscured by a focus on difference. Maxwell and colleagues (2012: 430) repeat this reading in their view that:

- **In Multiculturalism, the pursuit of integration and diversity management capitalizes on the promotion and valorisation of cultural diversity as a political end in itself.** By contrast, Interculturalism regards the integration of new citizens as part of a dynamic, open ended process of transforming a common societal culture through dialogue, mutual understanding, and intercultural contact.

It is argued that European societies and states have been too laissez-faire in promoting commonality and this must now be remedied (Joppke 2004), hence the introduction of measures such as swearing of oaths of allegiance at naturalisation ceremonies, language-proficiency requirements when seeking citizenship, and citizenship education in schools, amongst other things. What such sentiment ignores is how all forms of prescribed unity, including civic unity, usually retain a majoritarian bias that places the burden of adaptation upon the minority, and so is inconsistent with interculturalism’s alleged commitment to “mutual integration” as put forward in Alev’s account.

As Viet Bader (2005: 169), reminds us: “all civic and democratic cultures are inevitably embedded into specific ethno-national and religious histories”. But it does not follow that national identities should simply be backward looking, seeking “to select from all that has gone before that which is distinctive, ‘truly ours’, and thereby to mark out a unique, shared destiny” (Smith 1998: 43). It was this very assessment which, at the turn of the millennium, informed the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain’s (CMEB) characterisation of British national identity as potentially “based on generalisations [that] involve a selective and simplified account of a complex history”. Chaired by Bhikhu Parekh, it feared such an account would be one in which “[m]any complicated strands are reduced to a simple tale of

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One scholarly intervention in this vein can be found in Modood’s (2007a) restate-
ment of multiculturalism as a civic idea that can be tied to an inclusive national iden-
tity, and some of the responses this has elicited (see Modood 2007b), which
helps to cast light upon this debate. This concern was present in his 1992 publication,
identity, and some of the responses this has elicited (see Modood 2007b), which
underscored a further form of pluralism as the next step: (iv) cultural pluralism.
More precisely they insisted that integration issues should take into account relevant
cultural dimensions and that it no longer made sense to qualify the descendents
of migrants as “migrant” or “allochtone”, terms respectively used in the Walloon
and Flemish regions, but that instead “cultural minorities” would be a much more
relevant definition. The report on the whole focused its conclusions on the lack of
cultural recognition in a manner that invited the criticism that the Commission had
been highly influenced by communitarian theories instead of “trying to develop
civic responsibility and common citizenship rather than thinking about an increas-
ing space for cultural communities” (La Libre 2005).

[1] It does not make sense to encourage strong multicultural or minority identities and
weak common or national identities; strong multicultural identities are a good thing –
they are not intrinsically divisive, reactionary or subversive – but they need the comple-
ment of a framework of vibrant, dynamic, national narratives and the ceremonies and
rituals which give expression to a national identity. It is clear that minority identities are
capable of exerting an emotional pull for the individuals for whom they are important.

Multicultural citizenship, if it is to be equally attractive to the same individuals, requires
a comparable counterbalancing emotional pull. (Modood 2007b)

This restatement contains at least two key points that are central to the preceding
discussion. The first concerns an advocacy and continuity of earlier forms of mul-
ticulturalism that have sought to accommodate collective demands and incorporate
differences into the mainstream. These demands or differences are not only tolerated
but respected, and include the turning of a “negative” difference into a “positive”
difference in a way that is presented in the ethnic pride currents as elements of racial
equality. The second is to place a greater emphasis upon the unifying potential of
an affirmation of a renegotiated and inclusive national identity therein. While the
latter point is welcomed by some commentators who had previously formed part of
the pluralistic left, the bringing of previously marginalised groups into the societal
mainstream is, at best, greeted more ambivalently.

**Illiberalism and culture**

The fourth charge is that multiculturalism lends itself to illiberality and relativism,
such that “there is often uncertainty surrounding the tackling of culturally specific
practices that infringe on people’s rights such as forced marriage” (BRAP 2012:
63). Illiberalism has the capacity to criticise and censure culture (as part of the
process of intercultural dialogue), and so is more likely to emphasise the protection
of individual rights. In Bouchard’s (2011: 467) terms:

> Interculturalism is built on the basic wager of democracy, that is, a capacity to reach
> consensus on forms of peaceful co-existence that preserve basic values and make room
> for the future of all citizens.

In Europe this charge clearly assumed a role in the backlash against multicultur-
alisism since, as Kymlicka (2005: 83) describes, “it is very difficult to get support
for multiculturalism policies if the groups that are the main beneficiaries of these
policies are perceived as carriers of illiberal cultural practices that violate norms
of human rights”. This view is particularly evident in the debates concerning the
accommodation of religious minorities, especially when the religion in question
takes a conservative line on issues of gender equality, sexual orientation and pro-
gressive politics generally (something that has arguably led some commentators
who may otherwise sympathise with religious minorities to argue that it is difficult
to view them as victims when they may themselves be potential oppressors; see
Meer and Modood 2009).

Kymlicka (2005: 83) narrows down this observation further in his conclusion
that “if we put Western democracies on a continuum in terms of the proportion of
immigrants who are Muslim, I think this would provide a good indicator of public
opposition to multiculturalism”. As Bhikhu Parekh (2006: 180-1) notes, this can
be traced to a perception that Muslims are “collectivist, intolerant, authoritarian,
illiberal and theocratic”, and that they use their faith as “a self-conscious public
statement, not quietly held personal faith but a matter of identity which they must
Interculturalism and multiculturalism: similarities and differences

Our fourfold intellectual delineation means we are well placed to discuss some strengths in, whether these be racial, religious or ethnic (Modood 2007b). Should be given to the identities that marginalized groups themselves value and find kinds of groups and does not itself privilege any one kind, but that “recognition” better to acknowledge that the “multi” in multiculturalism will encompass different alienated many religionists, especially Muslims, from multiculturalism. It is much favour ethnicity and problematise religion is a reflection of a secularist bias that has among various ethnic groups, and yet has little support from any religion. So to practice in the discussions we are referring to. It is, however, a cultural practice not religious but cultural. Clitoridectomy, for example, is often cited as an illiberal while on the other hand assuming that ethnic identities are free of illiberalism. It is difficult, however, not to view this as a knee-jerk reaction that condemns central to a “liberal–illiberal” front in the new “war” on immigrant multiculturalism. This suggests a radical “otherness” about Muslims and an illiberality about multiculturalism, since the latter is alleged to license these practices.

One example of this perception can be found in Nick Pearce, former director of the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) and former Head of the Research and Policy Unit at 10 Downing Street under Prime Minister Gordon Brown. Pearce rejects the view that religious orientation is comparable to other forms of ethnocultural belonging because this “may end up giving public recognition to groups which endorse fundamentally illiberal and even irrational goals” (Pearce 2007). He therefore argues that one obstacle to an endorsement of multiculturalism is the public affirmation of religious identities, something Kymlicka (2007: 54) identifies as central to a “liberal–illiberal” front in the new “war” on immigrant multiculturalism.

It is difficult, however, not to view this as a knee-jerk reaction that condemns religious identities per se, rather than examining them on a case-by-case basis, while on the other hand assuming that ethnic identities are free of illiberalism. This is empirically problematic given that some of the problematic practices are not religious but cultural. Clitoridectomy, for example, is often cited as an illiberal practice in the discussions we are referring to. It is, however, a cultural practice among various ethnic groups, and yet has little support from any religion. So to favour ethnicity and problematise religion is a reflection of a secularist bias that has alienated many religionists, especially Muslims, from multiculturalism. It is much better to acknowledge that the “multi” in multiculturalism will encompass different kinds of groups and does not itself privilege any one kind, but that “recognition” should be given to the identities that marginalized groups themselves value and find strength in, whether these be racial, religious or ethnic (Modood 2007b).

Policy implications

Our fourfold intellectual delineation means we are well placed to discuss some of the policy implications from the dialogue between interculturalism and multi-culturalism, and especially equipped to consider the ways in which a conception of multiculturalism is integral for robust equality and diversity approaches. For example, using the UK as a detailed example, the key pieces of UK legislation advancing equality (of opportunity) for ethnic and racial minorities in the labour market, education, and the provision of public goods and services more broadly, have been the Race Relations Acts (RRAs). It is over 35 years since the third RRA (1976) cemented the state support of race equality by consolidating earlier, weaker legislative instruments (RRA 1965, 1968), extending the act to include indirect discrimination and statutory public duties. In Cantle’s (2012: 141) view, however, “this approach also ‘locked in’ the notion of a binary racial divide … in which accommodations between majority and minorities became the key issue, rather than a developmental process for identity across all communities”. Not unrelated to this, and citing Fanshawe and Sriskandarajah (2010) to support his criticism of tick-box categories, is Cantle’s charge that multicultural policies have “hindered” a policy recognition of an ethnic landscape that is in flux, signalled in his understanding of “super-diversity”. These two positions then return us to some of our intellectual discussions as well as offering some test cases, so let us explore them.

Our first observation is to highlight how difficult it is to sustain the view that UK multiculturalist policy has been locked in the past when its dynamism is clearly evident. If we take the question of anti-discrimination – perhaps the cornerstone of British multicultural policies – then one would have to ignore some profound developments that have moved the UK quite some distance from initial categories of white and black in earlier decades. Recent equality legislation, for example, has combined all UK equality enactments by borrowing from each other so as to provide comparable protections across all equality strands. Those explicitly mentioned in the 2006 Equality Act include age; disability; gender; proposed, commenced or completed gender reassignment; race; religion or belief; and sexual orientation. This act is particularly noteworthy because it is probably the first occasion on which equality and diversity have been expressly linked in the UK, and presented as a blend of traditional non-discrimination obligations, substantive equality goals around equal participation, and statutory duties to promote respect for diversity, human dignity and human rights (Meer 2010b). Indeed, the most recent 2010 Equality Act firmly entrenched this policy recognition of “intersectionality” in a manner that reflects a maturation in the understanding of multicultural diversity.

These, of course, are examples from UK legislation around anti-discrimination, when in fact there are several other instances from different policy arenas, especially during New Labour’s first term (1997-2001). Illustrations of what we mean include the abolition of Primary Purpose rule (which placed arbitrary restrictions on family reunifications), the creation of Holocaust Memorial Day (HMD), the expansion of voluntary aided status to faith schools, which saw the inclusion of the first Muslim, Sikh and Hindu schools. Each of these developments marks a significant advance several decades on from where Cantle identifies multiculturalism as having atrophied. Nor does it end there. The incorporation of Muslim actors in faith-
Interacting interculturalism with multiculturalism

sector governance, especially through the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), the Macpherson Inquiry into the murder of Stephen Lawrence (and the subsequent Race Relations Amendment Act), and the introduction of a religion question in the 2001 Census each point to the emergence of white, mixed and religious identities (not just amongst Muslims), and novelties in multicultural policy which recognise this. But this does not sufficiently address the policy questions arising from “super-diversity” that Cantle and others believe interculturalism is better placed to pursue. Drawing upon the argument put forward by Fanshawe and Sriskandarajah (2010: 5), Cantle in particular sounds “super-diversity” as a death knell for multicultural policy. In Fanshawe and Sriskandarajah’s (2010: 5) view, “people do not identify around single identities and feel conflicted allegiances (if any allegiance at all) to predefined groups, activism around particular ‘strands’ seems irrelevant to many people and may not even be that effective in addressing the true causes of inequality”. As we have elaborated in a recent debate (Meer and Modood 2012; Modood and Meer 2012), it is clear that people do identify with groups, and though they do so in a number of ways that may give emphasis to different subjective boundaries (which in turn may shift over time), it is implausible to suggest that group identities based around “standard identifications” have withered away. In particular, in their reading, Fanshawe and Sriskandarajah (2010) appear to retreat to a “choice”-based view of social identity which, to take one example, ignores how processes of racialisation may create new groups not necessarily chosen by minorities themselves (though of course how a minority will respond to this process of racialisation will vary). This has implications for conceptions of interculturalism, as super-diversity understood as the undermining of group categories appears politically naive and analytically simplistic. No less important, however, is how some proponents of super-diversity understand and use the concept as a means to add to and broaden out (instead of eliminate) the role of standard group categories (see the discussion of super-diversity in Meer, forthcoming).

Much of course hangs in super-diversity on what is in addition to multiplicities of ethnic categories, religions, languages and other cultural differences; namely that which is conceived as novel that super-diversity is seeking to explain. To this end, Vertovec (2007) identifies some core features, from which three related characteristics stand out. Each, however, are arguably more about registering and taking seriously the implications of diversity rather than pointing to qualitatively new experiences of it. One, for example, turns on the following possibilities for methodological innovation:

Research on super-diversity could encourage new techniques in quantitatively testing the relation between multiple variables and in qualitatively undertaking ethnographic exercises that are multi-sited (considering different localities and spaces within a given locality) and multi-group (defined in terms of the variable convergence of ethnicity, status, gender and other criteria of super-diversity). (Vertovec 2007: 1046)

So a concern with super-diversity would be more responsive to space, multiplicity and flux than conventional registers of diversity. One question this raises is whether this is best pursued by replacing or refining existing approaches. For example, in one study of capturing super-diversity in survey and census questionnaires, the author concluded that the most viable approach would necessarily be “paired with traditional categorical question [for example, what is your ethnic group] only where space on the schedule and human resources permit” (Aspinall 2012: 362). Notwithstanding the methodological discussion of what is plausible and meaningful in terms of data collection, being sensitive to super-diversity has implications for policy formulation in a number of respects, not least minority participation in governance regimes. Here channels of engagement and representation need to be alert to “smaller, less (or not at all) organized groups” in addition to larger and well established associations (Vertovec 2007: 1047). This includes the danger that “new immigrant populations are effectively ‘squeezed out’ of local representative structures and consequently wield little power or influence” (Robinson and Reeve 2005: 35, quoted in Vertovec 2007: 1047). It is a question of participation which spans a range of sectors “concerning the assessment of needs, planning, budgeting, commissioning of services, identification of partners for collaboration and gaining a broader appreciation of diverse experiences in order generally to inform debate” (ibid. 1048). What is striking, however, is that such an activity requires a significant governmental commitment that is facilitated by a wider political consensus that is supportive of the kinds of comprehensive examination of super-diversity’s implications for public services that Vertovec would like to see. To a large extent then this depends on a deepening and enriching commitment to many of the core features of multiculturalism, for example, tailoring social policies for the needs of different groups more precisely, and targeting them more accurately.

We offer five key policy suggestions to promote inclusion and participation in multicultural societies.

– The work undertaken by multiculturalists, in debates over remaking national identities, common membership and meaningful forms of integration, should be recognised as an on-going task. If – as some argue – societies are becoming even more plural (or “super-diverse”), then advocates for pluralist modes of integration will need to build on past successes rather than seek to erase them.

– Equality and diversity go hand in hand. Policy makers cannot pursue programmes of equal treatment without registering and accommodating features of cultural, ethnic and religious diversity. Recognising diversity alone, however, is an insufficient means of tackling socio-economic and political disparities. Policy makers must therefore register that disadvantage is sometimes experienced differently by different groups. Moreover, this cannot be overcome by way of policies configured to individuals alone, in a manner that ignores how disadvantages occur at a groups level. Experience shows that the most effective policies are those which take community context into account.

– A genuinely democratic public sphere can only thrive if minorities (as well as majorities) feel confident enough to participate and audible enough to contribute. This includes religious minorities too. Europe is an increasing religiously
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Kymlicka understands better than most the dynamics of intellectual-political engagement, and as a leading publicly engaged scholar from whom we, as indeed very many others, have learned a great deal, this is a forceful observation. In our view, however, he overestimates the political power of the term “interculturalism” in Europe. Kymlicka argues, by reference to the White Paper on intercultural dialogue – “Living together as equals in dignity” issued by the Council of Europe in 2008 after consultations with various experts, NGOs and stakeholders and signed by ministers from the 47 member states, that by 2008 “there was a clear political consensus that we need a post-multicultural alternative, to be called “interculturalism”” (Kymlicka 2012). While we acknowledge that not all European countries are in the same position on interculturalism, we would emphasise three issues in particular. Firstly, the Council of Europe is a forum for international discussion but has no powers and is certainly not to be in any way confused with European institutions like the European Union and its Council of Ministers, the European Commission and the European Parliament.

Secondly, it is simply not the case that there is a consensus amongst European governments in favour of interculturalism; nor have European governments made much if any effort to promote the White Paper (a Google search on 15 October, 2011 showed that out of the first 100 items listed by Google, there were no newspapers, popular magazines, TV or radio channels endorsing interculturalism, only the Council of Europe and various NGOs, think-tanks or related networks websites). We suggest that this is because “interculturalism” belongs to certain kinds of NGOs and not to those making or implementing policies or the media which comments on them. When we do hear Western European politicians such as Merkel, Sarkozy and Cameron talk about multiculturalism, as they most conspicuously and loudly did in the winter of 2010-11 to denounce it (Fekete 2011), they did not mention let alone offer any advocacy for “interculturalism”. The most favoured alternative term to “multiculturalism” is “integration” and its synonyms in various languages. Given that this is the case, it is not obvious that the best political strategy is to subscribe to the intellectually shoddy “interculturalism myth” (as Kymlicka describes it). A better strategy is to ensure that multiculturalism is presented as one, amongst other, modes of integration, and that is what one of us has done (Modood 2012). Just as some politicians have recognised that “assimilation” is too politically damaged to be resuscitated and so have preferred to use terms such as “cohesion”, “integration” and national identity while giving them an assimilative interpretation, so advocates of multiculturalism should contest those meanings and demonstrate that these concepts are capable of multiculturalist interpretations. In so doing it is not unreasonable to point out to interculturalists that whilst they have good reasons for wanting some aspects of multiculturalism reformed, they should not be joining the pillorying of multiculturalism, as they do not have good reasons, intellectual or political, for abandoning multiculturalism.

Our final point is that we do not understand why Kymlicka offers the advice that he does to Europeans but does not act on it himself in respect of Canada. He says that
he can continue to advocate multiculturalism in Canada because it has, in contrast to Europe, substantial support there (2012). Yet he is fully aware that the majority of intellectuals, politicians and public in Quebec reject Canadian multiculturalism in favour of interculturalism. So, on the basis of “do as he does, not as he says”, we prefer to follow his example of continuing to argue that an intellectually persuasive critique of multiculturalism has not yet been made by interculturalists.

**Suggestions for further reading**

It has become commonplace for interculturalists and other critics of multiculturalism to define multiculturalism without reference to the key texts, policy frameworks and advocacy as advanced by multiculturalists. We cannot over-emphasise the importance of identifying multiculturalism in its own terms before proceeding with criticism.

The foundational political theory texts of multiculturalism include:


Following a string of pioneering articles in the 1980s and 1990s by Parekh, this book is one of the most profound and comprehensive philosophical statements of multiculturalism, which at the same time engages in detail with contemporary controversies and practical applications. Parekh grounds multiculturalism not on rights but on the search for cultural self-knowledge based on intercultural dialogue. The second edition includes a long chapter which offers detailed replies to academic critics.


One of the most seminal texts in the political theory of multiculturalism in which Taylor argues that all identities are dialogical and offers the concept of “recognition” to explain how respect for certain despised group identities is an outgrowth of the democratic demand for equality.


A book that shows how a just citizenship cannot be achieved through individual rights alone. Pointing to non-voluntary aspects of social identity, Young argued that blindness to group difference disadvantages those whose experience, culture and socialised capacities differ from those of privileged groups. Not being attentive to group differences can, therefore, lead to a form of oppression. Very much a feminist and multiculturalist, Young’s text was an important precursor to contemporary debates about intersectionality.

For later statements of multicultural citizenship, which is specially informed by British Muslim assertiveness and the socio-political context in which it has evolved, see the following:


Explores the dynamic interactions of multiculturalism with Muslim identities. Theoretically informed by writers concerned with minority consciousness, difference and recognition, it charts progress on policy questions in the arenas of education, discrimination legislation, and public representation. Cumulatively, it shows how multiculturalism can foster a meaningful citizenship for Muslims today.


Offers a defence of political (as opposed to philosophical) multiculturalism, arguing that different minorities need to be accommodated in different ways, and so a single template is not appropriate nor necessary as long as there is a strong sense of an inclusive, plural national identity and religious and other identities are welcomed on equal terms. The second edition develops the argument that a policy of integration is incomplete without multiculturalism and a moderate secularism.

For a recent academic debate about the relationship between multiculturalism and interculturalism, see the following:


Leading writers on cultural difference and citizenship debate the ways in which we should understand the key contrasts between multiculturalism and interculturalism. Some of the questions under consideration include: is the latter a substantive departure from the former? If so, how is this evidenced in theory and in policy? What are the political questions against which this debate is taking place, and do these have any bearing? Where does culture feature in the two concepts, and how should we configure an understanding of it? And finally, what can each learn from the other as we move forward? Contributors include: Will Kymlicka, Geoff Levey, Nasar Meer, Tariq Modood, Pnina Werbner and Michel Wieviorka.

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7 – Interculturalism, multiculturalism and language issues and policies

Maria del Carmen Méndez García and Michael Byram

Introduction

The preceding chapters in this volume reveal how multiple approaches to cultural plurality have paved the way for the current debate about “interculturalism” and “multiculturalism”. The multifaceted concept of language can similarly be considered from different standpoints. For the Council of Europe, “language” is an umbrella term that covers fields like minority languages, the mother tongue, foreign or second languages, and migrant languages. The two terms “multilingualism” and “plurilingualism” are used to analyse the relationships that exist among these languages in societies and in individuals respectively, but this duality is different from the dichotomy of “interculturalism” and “multiculturalism”. A second distinction between “pluricultural” and “intercultural” is made within the Council of Europe’s work on language education. “Pluricultural” is used to refer to someone who is plurilingual and identifies with more than one language and culture, whereas “intercultural” refers to the competence required to interact with people of another cultural background. This is important in the theorising of “plurilingual and intercultural education” but does not correspond directly with the distinction in the “multiculturalism” versus “interculturalism” debate.

The principal purpose of this chapter is therefore to discuss the concepts of “multilingualism”, “plurilingualism”, “pluricultural” and “intercultural”, and to consider the place of “language” in the general debate on “multiculturalism” and “interculturalism” and in the Council of Europe’s White Paper on intercultural dialogue – “Living together as equals in dignity” in particular, with a view to considering the implications for policy making on language and language education.

The chapter will begin with the treatment of language issues in the White Paper, where the question of multiculturalism and interculturalism is raised, and then turn to the work of the Council of Europe on language and language education as it has developed over several decades, before returning to discuss if and how there is any significant distinction between interculturalism and multiculturalism with respect to language and language education.

Languages in the White Paper on intercultural dialogue

On its website the Council of Europe states that the White Paper on intercultural dialogue – “Living together as equals in dignity” (Council of Europe 2008) aims at “the promotion of intercultural dialogue within Europe and between Europe and its
neighbouring regions”. The White Paper is a document issued for “policy makers and practitioners at national, regional and local levels” that contains guidelines “for the promotion of intercultural dialogue”.

The White Paper sets out the Council of Europe’s views on interculturalism and multiculturalism and emphasises that human interaction and dialogue rest on the possibility of understanding one’s interlocutor(s). A sine qua non requirement for the existence of dialogue is that the people who interact share a common language, and one might expect that language would figure prominently in the text. Yet, on close examination, language seems to be on the periphery of the concept of dialogue.

The number of occurrences of the word “language” is relatively low, with approximately 25 appearances in the whole document; “culture” appears more than 40 times. The majority (16) of the language references are to minority languages. Together with identity, ethnicity, culture or religion, language appears as one of the defining features of minority groups (groups smaller in numbers than the rest of the population) (p. 12) and as a distinguishing characteristic of groups in general (p. 21).

Other references underline the difficulty when communicating in several languages (p. 21). Language is seen as a “barrier to conducting intercultural conversations” (p. 29).

Quoting the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (1993), the White Paper echoes the need for protection of lesser-spoken languages to prevent them from becoming extinct, and highlights the value of multilingualism. However, the languages spoken by minorities, even though valued tools of communication, do not seem to suffice to allow them to act as full citizens. The official language(s) need(s) to be learned as well. In this context, language learning is said to help “learners to avoid stereotyping individuals, to develop curiosity and openness to otherness and to discover other cultures. Language learning helps them to see that interaction with individuals having different social identities and cultures is an enriching experience” (p. 29). Thus, the term “multilingualism” is restricted to speakers of minority languages – perhaps because it was related to them in the charter – who are implicitly said to need the official language(s) to function in society and to avoid stereotyping individuals. This seems to be a biased view as no similar argument is made for speakers of the official language(s) who are not included in this description of the process and the postulated gain of language or intercultural skills.

The “intercultural dimension” is deemed to be present across the curriculum in formal education, “language education” – probably referring to all languages or perhaps just to the second or the foreign languages – being one of them (p. 30). In the White Paper statement of future actions there is reference to “language policies for intercultural dialogue” (p. 45) and the promise to provide assistance to authorities in reviewing their “policies for all languages in education”. This establishes a link between language and intercultural dialogue, albeit lacking in specificity, and a promise to develop “consultative guidelines and tools for describing common European standards of language competence”, a statement which presumably refers to languages other than foreign languages since The Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (2001) already provides descriptions of standards for foreign languages.

To summarise, the only reference to language, culture and enrichment (p. 29) is in the context of minority individuals learning official languages. There is just one implied reference to foreign language (p. 48) in the context of training. Multilingualism is uniquely mentioned on p. 29, but again exclusively in the context of minority languages. The White Paper has remarkably little on language competence as a basis for dialogue (except to say that language can be a hindrance or a barrier) in spite of the fact that in the concept of dialogue language cannot be dealt with as if it were unproblematic.

In other words, over 50 years’ work on language education in the Council of Europe is passed over in silence. There is one reference to migrant languages on p. 12 which is not substantial and yet the work on language learning for migrants was the beginning of the focus on languages and is now a substantial part of the current work of the Language Policy Unit within the Education Department. This is in contrast to the emphasis in the White Paper on minority and regional languages, and the protection of them. The Council of Europe has made declarations of various types on minority and regional languages but not on migrant languages. This might be all the more reason to pay attention to migrant languages in the White Paper.

To conclude, there are no indications of an understanding of the “language culture nexus” as Risager (2006) calls it and its significance in overcoming the “barriers” the White Paper envisions. No mention is made either of the relationship between language and identity for individuals – neither for minorities, nor majorities, nor migrants – which is again an indication of a poor understanding of language. On the other hand, it is recognised that minority groups can sometimes identify as language minorities, i.e. it is their distinguishing feature.

The Council of Europe’s work on languages

The Council of Europe has endeavoured to bring language issues to the fore by formulating language recommendations and encouraging their practical implementation. Recommendations specifically for language education issued by the Council of Europe, and seminal works such as The Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (2001) have influenced member states, which have progressively incorporated Council of Europe recommendations into their educational legislation, training programmes and educational system, and have also had worldwide impact (Byram and Parmenter 2012).

The Council of Europe has also taken action to create tools, projects and institutions that facilitate the implementation of recommendations. The European Centre for Modern Languages was set up with a view to promoting language education in Europe. One of the most salient activities of the centre is the organisation of international programmes and projects on language education. Council of Europe tools such
as the European language portfolio (Council of Europe 2011), the Autobiography of intercultural encounters (Council of Europe 2009) and the Autobiography of intercultural encounters through visual media (Council of Europe 2013) have likewise been designed to explore language and cultural learning from a practical perspective.

For more than half a century the Council of Europe has been committed to language policy and education in fields such as minority languages, foreign or second languages and migrant languages.

Regional and minority languages

Europe’s linguistic diversity constitutes one of its signs of identity. The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (1993), which aims at explicitly promoting regional and minority languages, regards languages as Europe’s cultural wealth and declares that some regional or minority languages may be under the threat of extinction. Regional or minority languages need to be protected and “interculturalism and multilingualism” are deemed to be vital in this process. Defined as “different from the official language(s) of the State”, regional or minority languages are characterised by being the languages of “nationals of that State who form a group numerically smaller than the rest of the State’s population” (1993: 2).

The charter stresses the need to articulate the use of these languages in writing and in speech, in private and in public life and at all levels of education. Article 8 on Education stipulates that regional or minority languages have to be made available, as an integral part of the curriculum, in pre-school, primary and secondary education, technical and vocational education, university and other higher education, adult and continuing education, and teacher training. Emphasis is laid on the relevance of teaching not only the language but also the history and culture of the people who speak these languages. In this sense, the charter has become a landmark because it recognises the importance of lesser-spoken languages and the cultures they represent. Governments are urged to adhere to the charter and implement it. States send a periodical report on implementation to the Council of Europe and monitoring groups evaluate implementation every 3-4 years.

The terms “interculturalism” and “multilingualism” appear once, in the preamble to the charter, as the main way of protecting regional and minority languages. It is noteworthy that the term “interculturalism” is used at a time when “multiculturalism” was more prevalent in discourse about European societies. Nevertheless, interculturalism and multiculturalism are otherwise absent from the body of the text, are not defined, and their relationship with regional and minority languages is never made explicit. This vague reference to interculturalism and multiculturalism is a flaw in the charter given that it shows a partial understanding of language and culture pluralism in connection to regional and minority languages.

Foreign and second languages

The Council of Europe’s work on “modern languages”, the term used to encompass second and foreign languages, has led to two major outcomes.

The Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (2001) (CEFR) provides descriptors of levels of proficiency in many languages, including minority languages. It is accompanied by a practical tool, the European language portfolio which helps the user record their language profile and language-learning experience.

The CEFR centres on communicative language competences as “those which empower a person to act using specifically linguistic means” (ibid.: 9), and presents this communicative competence within the framework of the general competences which individuals possess (ibid.: 11-13). In this paradigm people are able to display four main general competences: a) knowledge (or savoir) of the world and sociocultural knowledge; b) skills and know-how (savoir-faire), or practical and intercultural skills or abilities at social, professional or leisure levels; c) existential competence or attitudes, values or beliefs (savoir-être); d) ability to learn (savoir apprendre), including study skills and language and communication awareness.

Communicative language competence (ibid.: 108-30) appears, in this wider framework, as a whole with three major sub-competences: linguistic competence, including lexical, grammatical, semantic, phonological, orthographic and orthoepic competence, that is to say, all the elements that allow individuals to form meaningful, grammatically and phonologically understandable utterances; sociolinguistic competence, which comprehends all the constituents that make for the production of speakers’ utterances appropriate to a specific social situation (linguistic markers of social relations, politeness conventions, expressions of folk wisdom, register, dialect and accent); and pragmatic competence, the coherent construction of chunks of language longer than the sentence, and which includes discourse and functional competence.

The CEFR specifies that having communicative language competence goes beyond linguistic competence at sentence and discourse level and the production of utterances appropriate to a specific communication act. In order to communicate, individuals also need to put into practice their general skills or know-how, which interweave with their general knowledge, are shaped by individuals’ own way of being, values and experiences, and are dynamic, since people’s ability to learn make it possible to constantly acquire new knowledge.

On the basis of this comprehensive conception of communicative language competence, the CEFR proposes a common scale of reference levels expressed as “can-do” statements: basic user – A1, A2; independent user – B1, B2; proficient user – C1, C2. These levels are used with reference to the individual’s communicative language competence in five communicative skills: listening, reading, spoken interaction, spoken production, writing at a particular moment. Communicative language competence is, therefore, seen as a dynamic and ever-changing process.
Plurilingual and intercultural education (PIE)

The work on “modern languages” has been complemented from approximately 2000 by attention to language education more generally. This includes the teaching and learning of “language(s) of schooling”, i.e. the language(s) which are usually national and/or official languages of a state, which are taught as subjects in themselves – usually associated with the teaching of literature – and which are the vehicles of learning throughout the curriculum. It also includes “regional, minority and migration languages”, i.e. those that are referred to in the charter plus the languages of recent migration throughout Europe.

The work here is aimed at ensuring that all language education is envisaged in a coherent and holistic way, that all languages are taken into account in education – irrespective of whether they are formally taught – and that language education is understood as related to the values of the Council of Europe: human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Languages are not treated merely as a matter of proficiency in skills. Education for plurilingualism shall ensure that learners’ languages develop to their full potential as a matter of right and as a necessary basis for participation in democratic society.

Furthermore, language competence is seen as indivisible from intercultural competence, i.e. the ability to interact with people of other languages and cultures, to be active and successful in intercultural dialogue. Intercultural competence is distinguished from pluriculturalism, which refers to questions of identification, of how individuals may identify with two or more languages and the groups which use these languages and are in turn identified with them. These may be the minority groups referred to in the charter and in the White Paper but also include other national or regional groups.

Work on PIE is located on the “Platform of resources and references for plurilingual and intercultural education”.

**Key concepts**

As indicated in our introduction, there are key concepts within work on language education at the Council of Europe – and beyond, although we shall focus here above all on the Council of Europe definitions – which appear to have some parallelism with the terms “interculturalism” and “multiculturalism”. It is important to clarify these concepts before we can relate them to “interculturalism” and “multiculturalism” as treated in earlier chapters in this volume.

Languages are not isolated entities. They interact among themselves in different ways. The CEFR employs two terms to refer to language plurality: multilingualism and plurilingualism. Multilingualism is, by far, the concept with the lower number of occurrences: five in the whole document – the term is used generically twice to refer to “multilingual and multicultural Europe” – and three times in the appendices – where the “can-do” statements are reported to be multilingual, i.e., translated into different languages. Multilingualism is defined as:

> The knowledge of a number of languages, or the co-existence of different languages in a given society. Multilingualism may be attained by simply diversifying the languages on offer in a particular school or educational system, or by encouraging pupils to learn more than one foreign language, or reducing the dominant position of English in international communication. (Council of Europe 2001: 4)

The concept of multilingualism is not clearly conceptualised in the CEFR even though it is apparent that it contrasts with monolingualism. Multilingualism is said to be fostered in formal education by diversifying the languages on offer, and by urging individuals to learn foreign languages other than English. Nevertheless, it is not evident whether it is a social (“coexistence of different languages in a given society”) or an individual phenomenon (“the knowledge of a number of languages”) (ibid.).

The *Guide for the development of language education policies in Europe. From linguistic diversity to plurilingual education* (Beacco and Byram 2007) – henceforth “the guide” – makes clear that multilingualism constitutes a social phenomenon which accounts for the co-existence of different languages in the same geographical area. A further key element in this conception is that the presence of several languages in the same territory does not ensure that its inhabitants are familiar with them:

> Multilingualism refers here exclusively to the presence of several languages in a given space, independently of those who use them: for example, the fact that two languages are present in the same geographical area does not indicate whether inhabitants know both languages, or only one. (Beacco and Byram 2007: 20)

Multilingualism can occur at national level in officially recognised multilingual states (for example, Switzerland). In this case, explicit language policies are required on how languages may coexist as official languages. Multilingualism can also emerge with an increase in the offer of languages of the educational system. However, neither of these alternatives guarantees that citizens will develop their language skills in these languages: “the fact that a state is officially multilingual does not automatically guarantee that citizens will have a plurality of language skills; similarly, an increase in the supply of languages in education systems does not necessarily mean that everyone learns more languages” (ibid.: 39)

A third scenario is formed by multilingual societies where regional and minority languages, some of which may be threatened varieties, are not officially acknowledged and which may have little “space in society and education” (ibid.: 40). A fourth instance is multilingual family environments, where children are exposed to one or several languages other than the official variety/ies. Finally, multilingualism is more likely to appear in major cities where migration and other forms of economic and cultural activities facilitate contact among people of different linguistic and cultural origins.

The guide explains that monolingualism, like multilingualism, refers to geographical areas. However, the existence of monolingual or homogeneous national entities is questioned since “all national entities” are said to be multilingual (Beacco and Byram, 2007: 22). In essence, multilingualism is considered as an enrichment of the environment, although it may lead to conflict:

It is nonetheless true that most linguistic conflicts can be traced back to lack of concordance, from the point of view of cultural constituted communities or particular groups, between the linguistic varieties which are available to them and which they use in private and the place these are given in the life of the wider community, between forms of individual plurilingualism and forms of multiculturalism supported by the state. (ibid.: 61)

The counter-productive effects of multilingualism, or societal contact, are similarly emphasised by Coste et al. (2009), who insist on the need to surpass the mere fact of “placing communities side by side” if a particular territory is to benefit from multilingualism. In this context, plurilingualism emerges as the most comprehensive approach to deal with language diversity. An individual or personal phenomenon, plurilingualism can be defined as the language repertoire at a person’s disposal. The CEFR envisages plurilingualism as a natural process that occurs when this language repertoire expands throughout the individual’s life: “from the language of the home to that of society at large and then to the languages of other peoples (whether learnt at school or college, or by direct experience)” (Council of Europe 2001: 4). All these language-and-culture experiences make up their plurilingual and pluricultural competences which are not stored in different mental compartments but are part of a composite communicative language competence. Thus, for the CEFR, communicative language competence means plurilingual and pluricultural competence (ibid.: 136). This is why the promotion of plurilingualism has become the major goal and lies behind the guidelines of the Council of Europe:

Plurilingual and pluricultural competence refers to the ability to use languages for the purposes of communication and to take part in intercultural interaction, where a person, viewed as a social agent, has proficiency, of varying degrees, in several languages and experience of several cultures. This is not seen as the superposition or juxtaposition of distinct competences, but rather as the existence of a complex or even composite competence on which the user may draw. (ibid.: 168 – emphasis in original)

Plurilingualism is inextricably related to pluriculturalism and to interculturality. The CEFR acknowledges that plurilingual and pluricultural competence “enable the individual to develop an enriched, more complex personality and an enhanced capacity for further language learning and greater openness to new cultural experiences” (ibid.: 43).

One of the defining features of plurilingual competence is the irregular or uneven shapes it takes: greater proficiency may be attained in one language than in others; there may be a greater mastery of one language skill (for example, reading) than of the others; good knowledge of a language may be coupled with poor knowledge of a culture with which it is linked, or vice versa. And this leads to the second characteristic of plurilingual and pluricultural competence: its dynamic, transitional and ever-changing nature marked not only by education and career, but also by language and cultural experience, travel experience, family history, reading and hobbies (Council of Europe 2001: 133). Partial or limited as it may be at a given moment, in a specific language or for certain skills or language components, plurilingual and pluricultural competence is seen as an achievement rather than as a limitation, as a resource rather than a deficit:

It is not a matter of being satisfied … with the development of a limited or compartmentalised mastery of a foreign language by a learner, but rather of seeing this proficiency, imperfect at a given moment, as forming part of a plurilingual competence which it enriches. (ibid.: 135)

The guide points out that language diversity has sometimes been the target of assimilation policies rather than policies for linguistic heterogeneity, mainly when regional and minority or migrant languages have been involved. Even when it comes to foreign language teaching, fragmentation is perceived at all stages: dichotomy between the mother tongue and foreign languages, distinction between modern and classical languages, distinctive teacher staff for all educational levels and languages, or even pedagogical fragmentation with different teaching methods for different languages. Education for plurilingualism has the potential of redressing the balance by providing a coherent and holistic approach to language learning. Plurilingualism thus constitutes “one of the preconditions for maintaining the multilingualism of communities” (Beacco and Byram 2007: 40) and becomes one of the goals of foreign language learning.

This is the position presented in the CEFR and the guide, but as indicated above in the section on “Plurilingual and intercultural education”, later documents have refined the discussion of pluriculturalism.

The first element of this process is to show how discourse about “culture” takes two forms. It can be discussed as if it were fixed and inherited, as if it were the essence of a group of people and in this case is most often found in discourse about national groups. Second, it is found in discourse about how cultures are “made” or “constructed”, often in conversations of people from different backgrounds interacting and engaging in common interests. Thus culture is talked about both as something established and as something constantly (re)-constructed and dynamic (Byram et al. 2009: 8).

Given this conceptualisation of culture, pluriculturalism can be defined as “identifying with at least some of the values, beliefs and/or practices of two or more cultures, as well as acquiring the competences which are necessary for actively participating in those cultures” (ibid.: 6). Pluricultural individuals can function as social actors within two or more cultures, whether established or dynamic.

Pluriculturalism is then distinguished from “interculturality” which refers to “the capacity to experience and analyse cultural otherness, and to use this experience to reflect on matters that are usually taken for granted within one’s own culture and environment” (ibid.: 6). Interculturality is therefore comparable with pluri-
lingualism in that it is envisaged and defined as a matter of competence, rather than identification. Interculturally competent people can act as mediators among people of different cultures, to explain and interpret different perspectives. Interculturality does not involve identifying with another cultural group or adopting the cultural practices of the other group.36

Language in “interculturalism” and “multiculturalism”

The White Paper’s conceptual framework (p. 17, section 3) begins with defining “The notion of intercultural dialogue” and continues with “Identity-building in a multicultural environment” (p. 18). It is noticeable that “culture” and “cultural affiliation” are much in evidence whereas, as mentioned above, “language” is not. “Identity-building”, despite references elsewhere in the document to language as an indicator of minority groups and their identities, is not linked to language when the individual is being discussed, notwithstanding the widely attested role of language in identity building (for example, Block 2007; Edwards 1985; Le Page and Tabouret-Keller 1985). The concept of identity, used in the singular and referring to personal identity, is complemented by the concept of “cultural affiliation”, which refers to identifying with groups. Where groups speak different languages or different varieties of language – and this is the usual case – identification involves linguistic competence as sine qua non, but this is not recognised in the White Paper.

Further analysis of the implicit theory of identity in section 3.2 of the White Paper would be interesting but takes us too far from our purpose. What is important here is the assertion that “intercultural dialogue is therefore important in managing multiple cultural affiliations in a multicultural environment”. At this point it is not clear whether the reference is to multiple affiliations of one person i.e. their identifying with multiple groups, or the presence of people of different affiliations in one environment. In either case, the notion of intercultural dialogue needs further analysis.

It is in the previous section (3.1) that this notion is presented. It is defined as “exchange of views”, developing “a deeper understanding of diverse world views and practices to increase cooperation and participation”. The precondition is said to be the “ability to express oneself” and to “listen to the views of others”. Despite words such as “express” and “listen”, there is no reference to communicative language competence, and this absence is also noticeable in the assertion that intercultural dialogue is “a powerful instrument of mediation ... across cultural fault-lines”.37 It is evident then that “interculturalism” as presented in the White Paper cannot be properly conceptualised without reference to plurilingual and intercultural competence.

36 For a further development of reflections on interculturality, see Barrett, Byram, Lázár, Mompont-Gaillard and Philippou (2013).
37 This despite the fact that the CEFR has a specific albeit limited discussion of the concept of “mediation”.

In contrast, the White Paper presentation of “multiculturalism” argues that it “fostered communal segregation and mutual incomprehension” (p. 20, section 3.3). The implied position here is that, even if plurilingual and intercultural competence existed, “multiculturalism” provided no opportunity for individuals to communicate across cultural fault-lines, or identify with more than one social group and their language. However, there is no apparent concern with language in the analysis of multiculturalism, any more than in that of interculturalism.

Turning now to the more general debate about interculturalism and multiculturalism, we can examine what account is taken of plurilingual and intercultural competence there. For the sake of brevity, we shall take the debate in the Journal of Intercultural Studies (2012, Volume 33, Issue 2) as representative.

In general, the absence of awareness of language (or plurilingual) competence in this collection is similar to that in the White Paper. Wieviorka (2012) is the only contributor who is concerned with language but mainly with respect to the very important but not exhaustive matter of the “linguistic hegemony” of English in the debate. He later raises the question of “organising communication between cultures” or, which seems to us more relevant, “between individuals and groups belonging to different cultures” and suggests the need for “third-party acts as an intermediary” (p. 230). There is however no indication of awareness of the need for plurilingual and intercultural competence here either.

Others, notably Meer and Modood (2012), refer to dialogue and communication but do so in the context of arguing that multiculturalism involves communication and that this does not form a distinguishing characteristic of interculturalism. In this they differ from the position of the White Paper. Yet here too there is an assumption that communication is unproblematic with respect to the competences required of individuals.

In neither the White Paper nor other discussions of multiculturalism and interculturalism is there an adequate knowledge of the role of language in society and of the significance of plurilingualism and intercultural competence, and it is therefore not surprising that policy recommendations are weak with respect to language matters.

Implications for policy and practice

The recommendations of the White Paper include “learning and teaching intercultural competences” (p. 44, section 5.3). Two locations are postulated as relevant: citizenship and human-rights education, and the learning and teaching of history. It is also stated that an appreciation of “world religions and non-religious convictions” is important, as are music, art and dance. There are also references to language education and suddenly to “plurilingual competence”: “All students should be given the opportunity to develop their plurilingual competence”. It is stated that the Council of Europe will “provide assistance and recommendations to the competent authorities in reviewing their education policies for all languages in the education system” (Council of Europe 2008: 46). Furthermore it will “produce
consultative guidelines and tools for describing common European standards of language competence” (ibid.) and this by implication also refers to all languages. The significance of language is present in this recommendation in a way which is absent in the rest of the text.

There is also a promise to produce, for formal education, “a framework of reference describing competences for intercultural communication and intercultural literacy” (ibid.), the latter phrase, like “plurilingual competence”, appearing for the first and only time.

It will be evident from our analysis above that any such framework needs to take plurilingual and intercultural competence seriously, as a major component of intercultural competence for intercultural/multicultural dialogue. Elements of this are already present in the CEFR and in the “Platform of resources and reference for plurilingual and intercultural education”, and it is to be hoped that, unlike the White Paper, future developments do not ignore existing and past work on language matters.

**Suggestions for further reading**


This is a seminal document that sets the bases for language teaching and the development of language competences. It is widely known for the descriptors of the common reference levels, now adopted in language-learning certifications, materials and institutions across Europe and in many non-European countries. The framework includes a detailed description of the notion of language competences, the process of language learning and teaching, and language assessment.


The charter brings regional or minority languages to the foreground, acknowledging their role and relevance in Europe and underlining the need for protecting them in private and public life. Regional or minority languages are linked to education, judicial authorities, administrative authorities and public services, the media and cultural activities and facilities, economic and social life and transfrontier exchanges.


This document is conceived as a response to the need to articulate language education policies to encompass language education for Europe’s linguistic plurality. Multilingualism as a social phenomenon is contemplated against the backdrop of the European citizen’s development of plurilingual competences.

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**References**


Interculturalism and multiculturalism: similarities and differences


8 – Intercultural competence: a distinctive hallmark of interculturalism?38

Martyn Barrett

This chapter discusses the nature of intercultural competence. It also discusses the issue of whether an emphasis on intercultural competence and intercultural education is a distinctive hallmark of interculturalism, and whether this emphasis is one of the hallmarks that serve to differentiate interculturalism from multiculturalism.

Recent treatments of interculturalism have certainly placed considerable emphasis on the concept of intercultural competence. For example, in building its case for interculturalism, the Council of Europe’s *White Paper on intercultural dialogue – “Living together as equals in dignity”* (2008) argues that intercultural dialogue offers the best approach for managing issues of cultural diversity within contemporary societies. The White Paper defines intercultural dialogue as the open and respectful exchange of views between individuals and groups from different ethnic, religious, linguistic and national backgrounds on the basis of mutual understanding and respect, and it argues that such dialogue is crucial for promoting tolerance, mutual respect and understanding, preventing conflicts, and achieving social cohesion (sections 2.1 and 3.1). However, the White Paper also observes that the competence that is required for participating in intercultural dialogue is not acquired automatically by individuals. This competence instead needs to be learned, practised and maintained throughout life (section 4.3), and education professionals, public authorities, civil society organisations, religious communities, the media and all other providers of education therefore have a crucial role to play in equipping citizens with intercultural competence (section 4.3).

Similarly, in his book *Interculturalism*, Cantle (2012) argues that, in today’s culturally diverse societies, it is vital that citizens acquire cultural navigational skills and intercultural competence (pp. 206-11) so that citizens are able to explore other identities, understand other cultures, and appreciate other nations, ethnic groups and faiths (p. 207). He also proposes that citizens should be encouraged to learn about others within their local, national and international communities, with schools, colleges, workplaces and community organisations having a responsibility to provide opportunities for citizens to acquire a better understanding of people with other identities and affiliations (p. 211).

38. This chapter draws upon three previous commentaries on intercultural competence, namely those presented in Barrett (2012a), Barrett (2012b) and Barrett, Byram, Lázár, Mompont-Guillard and Philippou (2013). I would like to express my gratitude to Mike Byram, Ildikó Lázár, Pascale Mompont-Guillard, Stravroula Philippou, Josef Huber and Christopher Reynolds for the stimulation and exploration of ideas that occurred during the writing of the third of these papers. I would also like to thank Mike Byram for his very helpful feedback on the first draft of this chapter.
What is intercultural competence?

However, neither the White Paper nor Cantle provides a detailed explanation of what intercultural competence actually is. To understand what is meant by this term, it is instead necessary to turn to the social science research literature, where considerable attention has been given to this concept over the past 20 years in disciplines such as management, business studies, health care, counselling, social work, education and psychology. Indeed, there has been a proliferation of different models of intercultural competence in all of these various disciplines.

These models have been reviewed by Spitzberg and Changnon (2009), who classify them into five types:

- **Compositional models**, which identify the various components of intercultural competence but do not specify the relations between them – these models therefore contain lists of the relevant attitudes, knowledge, skills and behaviours which together make up intercultural competence;
- **Co-orientational models**, which focus on how communication takes place within intercultural interactions, and how perceptions, meanings and intercultural understandings are constructed during the course of these interactions;
- **Developmental models**, which describe the stages of development through which intercultural competence is acquired;
- **Adaptational models**, which focus on how individuals adjust and adapt their attitudes, understandings and behaviours during encounters with people from other cultural backgrounds;
- **Causal path models**, which postulate specific causal relationships between the different components of intercultural competence.

Examples of these five types of models are provided by INCA (2004) (a compositional model), Kupka et al. (2007) (a co-orientational model), Bennett (1993) (a developmental model), Kim (1988) (an adaptational model), and Griffith and Harvey (2000) (a causal path model).

Spitzberg and Changnon draw attention to two main problems concerning these various models. First, they note that many of the terms that are used to describe intercultural competence in all five types of models (for example, adaptability, sensitivity, etc.) have not yet been properly operationalised or validated in empirical research. Second, they note that many of these models are likely to have an ethnocentric bias, as most of them have been developed within western European and North American societies and for this reason probably lack cross-cultural generalisability. Certainly, most of the models reviewed by Spitzberg and Changnon are underdetermined by the available evidence – they contain many speculative elements, and are typically tested in very restricted situations with limited numbers of participants drawn from a small range of countries (and sometimes from only a single country). Compositional models make the fewest assumptions concerning the nature of intercultural competence, because they only aim to identify the attitudes, knowledge, skills and behaviours which make up intercultural competence, without speculating about the interconnections, casual pathways or developmental relationships between these various components.

Despite the large number of models available in the research literature, there is a substantial consensus among researchers and intercultural professionals concerning the main components of intercultural competence. This conclusion emerged from a study by Deardorff (2006). This study used a survey to collect data from scholars of intercultural competence and from university international administrators. The survey revealed that 80% or more of the respondents agreed on 22 of the core components of intercultural competence.

Deardorff also found that the definition of the term “intercultural competence” that was endorsed the most strongly by researchers (although not by the administrators) was: “The ability to communicate effectively and appropriately in intercultural situations based on one’s intercultural knowledge, skills and attitudes”. This is a somewhat problematic definition for a number of reasons. First, the existing research suggests that the components of intercultural competence include not only knowledge, skills and attitudes but also values and a range of other cognitive, affective and behavioural components. Second, this definition focuses exclusively on intercultural communicative competence. However, intercultural competence is not only exercised in situations involving communication with people who have different cultural affiliations from one’s own. It can also be exercised when making judgements about such people, when viewing images of such people, when reading accounts about such people, etc. Third, this definition does not make it clear what is meant by the term “competence”. This term can be used in a variety of ways, including its usual everyday use as a synonym for “ability”, its more technical use in vocational education and training, and its use to denote the ability to meet complex demands in a particular context (Fleming 2009). It is unclear from this definition which, if any, of these meanings is intended. Fourth, this definition also fails to provide an explanation of what the term “intercultural” means. For these various reasons, this definition fails to unpack the meaning of “intercultural competence” sufficiently clearly.

The meaning of the term “culture”

In order to understand the meaning of the term “intercultural”, it is necessary first to understand what the term “culture” means. “Culture” is a difficult term to define, not least because cultures display considerable internal heterogeneity, the meanings associated with cultures are often contested, and cultures are constantly evolving and changing. That said, distinctions may be drawn between the material, social and subjective aspects of culture (Chiu and Hong 2006). Material culture consists of the physical artefacts which are used by the members of a human group (for example, food, clothing, housing, goods, tools, artistic products); social culture consists of the shared institutions of the group (for example, the language, religion, laws, rules of social conduct, family structure, labour patterns, folklore, cultural icons); and
subjective culture consists of the shared knowledge, beliefs, collective memories, identities, attitudes, values and practices which group members use as a common frame of reference for thinking about, making sense of and relating to the world. Culture itself is a composite formed from all three aspects, consisting of a network of material, social and subjective resources. This total set of cultural resources is distributed across the entire social group, with each individual member of the group appropriating and using only a subset of the total set of cultural resources that are potentially available to them.

Defining “culture” in this way means that social groups of any size can have their own distinctive cultures. This includes nations, ethnic groups, faith groups, cities, neighbourhoods, work organisations (for example, universities), occupational groups (for example, politicians), gender groups, sexual orientation groups (for example, gay men), disability groups (for example, hearing-impaired people), generational groups (for example, youth), families, etc. For this reason, every individual belongs simultaneously to many different groups and participates in multiple cultures, some of which may fit together well and be readily compatible, but some of which may not.

Which particular culture predominates in a person’s thinking and behaviour is often context-dependent. For example, within the family home, family culture is likely to predominate; within the workplace, organisational or occupational culture is likely to predominate; when relaxing with members of one’s peer group, peer-group culture is likely to predominate. People’s multiple cultural affiliations can also interact and intersect with each other (so that, for example, being a young Muslim female might be the most important cultural affiliation for an individual rather than being a youth, a Muslim or a female). As a result, individuals may inhabit highly specific cultural positionings.

It is important not to underestimate the variability that exists within cultural groups. All cultural groups are internally complex collectivities in which the material, social and subjective resources that are perceived to be associated with membership of the group are contested by different individuals and subgroups within it. In addition, even the boundaries of the group itself, and who is perceived to be within or outside the group, may be contested by different group members, with the result that cultural boundaries are often blurred.

This internal variability of cultures is, in part, a consequence of the fact that all people belong to multiple cultures but participate in different constellations of cultures, and therefore the ways in which they relate to one of their cultures may well depend on the points of view which are yielded by the other cultures in which they also participate. Also, the meanings and feelings which people attach to the particular cultures in which they participate are usually personalised as a consequence of their own life histories, personal experiences and individual personalities. Adding further to this internal differentiation and variability within cultures, different perspectives on the same cultural affiliation may be deployed by a person in different contexts according to their own needs or goals within those contexts (for example, presenting it as internally unified and homogeneous on one occasion, but presenting it as internally variable and heterogeneous on another) (Baumann 1996).

Because cultural participation and cultural practices are context-dependent and variable, cultures provide fluid sets of resources from which individuals actively construct and negotiate their own meanings and interpretations of the world across the various contexts which they encounter in their everyday lives. If, in this process, an individual develops new meanings, interpretations or practices that are sufficiently attractive to others, the total pool of cultural resources may be expanded and the culture itself subtly changed.

All cultures are dynamic and constantly change over time not only as a result of internal contestation and the generation of new meanings, interpretations and practices by those who are affiliated to the culture, but also as a result of historical, political, economic and technological developments and events. Cultures also change as a result of interaction with other cultures. No culture is insulated from influence by other cultures – all cultures assimilate elements from other cultures, with their material, social or subjective resources being extended, adapted and adjusted accordingly. Indeed, this kind of cultural mixing and hybridisation has taken place throughout human history (Nederveen Pieterse 2004).

In short, all people participate in multiple cultures; the way that people participate in their various cultures is context-dependent and fluid; people’s multiple cultural affiliations intersect and interact with each other; cultural affiliations are personalised; all cultures are internally variable, diverse and heterogeneous; and all cultures are dynamic and constantly evolving.

**The concept of “intercultural” revisited**

To return to the concept of “intercultural”, the underlying complexity of this term can perhaps now be appreciated. If we all participate in multiple cultures, but we each participate in a unique constellation of cultures which are constantly changing and which we also personalise to fit our own life circumstances and experiences, then every interpersonal situation is potentially an intercultural situation.

However, the characteristic that differentiates an intercultural situation from an interpersonal situation is that the individual perceives the other person as being culturally different from themselves. Social-psychological research has revealed that there are several factors that prompt individuals to shift their frame of reference from the interpersonal to the intercultural (Oakes, Haslam and Turner 1994; Ellemers 2012). This shift typically takes place when one or more of the following circumstances apply:

− If there are perceptually salient cultural signs, emblems or practices present which serve to elicit the cultural category in the mind of the individual;
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- If cultural categories are frequently used by the individual to think about other people, so that these categories are primed and are readily accessed by that individual when he or she interacts with, or perceives, other people;
- If cultural categories help the individual to make sense of the pattern of similarities and differences between the people who are present within a situation;
- If cultural categories help the individual to make sense of why another person is behaving in the way that they are;
- If the individual’s own cultural affiliations are experienced as being disadvantaged, devalued, discriminated against or threatened in some other way by the cultural group to which the other person is perceived as belonging.

When other people are perceived as members of another culture rather than as individuals, the research findings suggest that the self is also categorised as a cultural group member rather than in purely individual terms, and intergroup comparisons are then made. These comparisons, which are often automatic and implicit rather than conscious and explicit, commonly involve comparing one’s own and the other person’s cultural groups in terms of their levels of friendliness, competence, honesty and trustworthiness, and making judgements about these qualities through the deployment of cultural stereotypes.

The crucial point here is that, in intercultural situations, one does not respond to the other person on the basis of their own individual characteristics, but on the basis of their affiliation to another culture or set of cultures. Intercultural situations, when identified in this way, can involve people from different countries, people from different regional, linguistic, ethnic or faith backgrounds, or people who differ from each other because of their lifestyle, gender, social class, occupation, sexual orientation, and so on.

When an interpersonal situation becomes an intercultural situation, because cultural differences have been perceived and made salient either by the situation or by the individual’s own psychological orientation or cultural positioning, these are the conditions under which intercultural competence becomes relevant.

Hence, a definition of intercultural competence which is consistent with the preceding considerations, and which builds on the definition that Deardorff (2006) found to be strongly endorsed by researchers, is as follows.

Intercultural competence is the set of values, attitudes, knowledge, understanding, skills and behaviours which are needed for:
- understanding and respecting people who are perceived to be culturally different from oneself;
- interacting and communicating effectively and appropriately with such people; and
- establishing positive and constructive relationships with such people

(where “respect” means that one has regard for, appreciates and values the other; “effectively” means that one is able to achieve one’s objectives, at least in part, in these interactions; and “appropriately” means that the interactions do not violate the cultural rules and norms which are valued by the participants in the interaction).

The term “competence” here is intended to denote not merely an ability or skill which is applied in a particular context. Instead, it denotes the capacity to respond successfully to a type of situation which presents tasks, difficulties or challenges for the individual, where the response requires the application of a complex set of values, attitudes, knowledge, understanding, skills and behaviours. Intercultural situations are one such type of situation. Intercultural competence is therefore the complex set of psychological and behavioural characteristics and functions required to deal with the tasks, difficulties or challenges presented by intercultural situations when these occur.

The core components of intercultural competence

On the basis of this definition, and drawing on the extensive body of research that has been conducted in this field over the past 20 years and the numerous conceptual models that have been proposed, it is possible to argue that all of the following are core components of intercultural competence. These components are broken down here into values, attitudes, knowledge and understanding, skills and behaviours.

The values involved include:
- valuing cultural variability and diversity;
- valuing pluralism of perspectives and practices.

The following attitudes are also involved:
- respecting people who have different cultural affiliations from one’s own;
- being open to, curious about and willing to learn about and from people who have different cultural orientations and perspectives from one’s own;
- being willing to seek out opportunities to engage and co-operate with individuals who have different cultural orientations and perspectives from one’s own;
- being willing to question what is usually taken for granted as “normal” according to one’s previously acquired knowledge and experience;
- being willing to tolerate ambiguity and uncertainty.

The knowledge and understanding that contribute to intercultural competence include:
- understanding the internal diversity and heterogeneity of all cultural groups;
- understanding the impact of situational, social and historical contexts on people’s cultural behaviour;
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– understanding the impact of language and culture on people’s experience and perceptions, including the impact of one’s own language and cultural affiliations on one’s own experience and perceptions;
– awareness and understanding of one’s own and other people’s assumptions, preconceptions, stereotypes, explicit and implicit prejudices, and overt and covert discrimination;
– communicative awareness, including awareness of the fact that people with different cultural affiliations may follow different verbal and non-verbal communicative conventions which are meaningful from their perspective, and awareness of the fact that other peoples’ languages may express shared ideas in a unique way or express unique ideas difficult to access through one’s own language(s);
– knowledge of the specific beliefs, values, practices, discourses and products that may be used by people who have particular cultural orientations;
– understanding of processes of individual, societal and cultural interaction.

The skills involved in intercultural competence include cognitive skills such as:
– listening to and paying attention to the behaviour of people with other cultural affiliations and perspectives;
– empathy – the ability to understand and respond to other people’s thoughts, beliefs, values and feelings;
– multiperspectivity – the ability to centre from one’s own perspective and to take other people’s perspectives into consideration in addition to one’s own;
– cognitive flexibility – the ability to change and adapt one’s way of thinking according to the situation or context;
– skills in discovering information about other cultural affiliations and perspectives;
– skills in interpreting other cultural practices, beliefs and values and relating them to one’s own;
– skills in critically evaluating and making judgements about cultural beliefs, values, practices, discourses and products, including those associated with one’s own cultural affiliations, and being able to explain one’s views.

Skills also include behavioural skills such as:
– skills of adjusting and adapting one’s behaviour to new cultural contexts and environments;
– linguistic, sociolinguistic and discourse skills, including skills in managing breakdowns in communication;
– plurilingual skills to meet the communicative demands of an intercultural situation (where “ plurilingual skills” refers to a repertoire of skills in different languages to different levels for use in situations where more than one language is being spoken: see Méndez García and Byram, Chapter 7 in the present volume);
– skills of acting as a “mediator” in intercultural exchanges, including skills in translating, interpreting and explaining.

While values, attitudes, knowledge, understanding and cognitive and behavioural skills are all necessary components of intercultural competence, possessing these components alone is insufficient for intercultural competence: it is also necessary for these components to be deployed and put into practice through behaviour. Research has shown that people often profess values and attitudes, and often acquire knowledge and skills, which they fail to put into practice. For this reason, in order for an individual to be credited with intercultural competence, they must also apply their intercultural values, attitudes, knowledge and skills in their behaviour.

Relevant behaviours include:
– seeking opportunities to engage with people who have different cultural orientations and perspectives from one’s own;
– interacting and communicating appropriately, effectively and respectfully with people who have different cultural affiliations from one’s own;
– co-operating with individuals who have different cultural orientations on shared activities and ventures, discussing differences in views and perspectives, and constructing common views and perspectives;
– challenging attitudes, behaviours and representations of others (whether presented in speech, in writing or in visual media) which undermine the dignity of, and the respect which should be accorded to, people who have different cultural affiliations from oneself.

In other words, at the behavioural level, intercultural competence involves taking on an active participatory role in the social world. Being interculturally competent does not only entail analysis of and reflection about intercultural experiences and situations – it also entails acting on that analysis and reflection through appropriate, effective and respectful communication, through co-operation and participation in community life (whether this be at local, national or global level), through engaging with others in order to achieve common goals and, where necessary, through taking action to defend and protect the dignity of those who have different cultural affiliations from oneself. For this reason, intercultural competence engenders active intercultural citizenship (Byram 2008).

Some further observations on intercultural competence

Several aspects of intercultural competence warrant further comment. First, even in cases where people’s intercultural competence is highly developed, this competence is always capable of further development and enrichment because of the sheer diversity of cultural positionings that others may occupy. This means that it
is always possible to obtain novel experience of previously unencountered forms of cultural difference, and to expand and extend still further one’s knowledge and understanding of culture and one’s intercultural skills.

Second, it is important to note that intercultural competence does not involve abandoning one’s own cultural identifications or affiliations, nor does it require one to adopt the cultural practices, beliefs, discourses or values of other cultural affiliations. A conceptual distinction may be drawn here between pluriculturality and interculturality (Byram et al. 2009; see also Méndez García and Byram, Chapter 7). Pluriculturality involves holding multiple cultural affiliations and having the linguistic and behavioural competences that are necessary for actively participating in these cultures. Thus, we are all pluricultural in so far as we all hold multiple cultural affiliations and participate actively in a variety of different cultures. Sometimes, individuals extend their pluricultural repertoire further, perhaps by learning a new language and coming to identify with and internalising at least some of the values, beliefs and/or practices of the people who speak that language, thereby acquiring the competence which is necessary for actively participating in their culture. By contrast, interculturality involves being open to, curious about and interested in people who have other cultural affiliations, and having the ability to understand and interpret their practices, beliefs, discourses and values, while remaining located within one’s own existing cultural affiliations. Intercultural competence enables an individual to respect other people, and to interact and co-operate effectively and appropriately with those people, in situations where cultural “otherness” and difference is salient. It also enables people to act as “mediators” among people who have different cultural affiliations, and to interpret and explain different perspectives. However, it does not require individuals to abandon their own identifications and affiliations. In this sense, interculturality allows cultural diversity to flourish, as it enables individuals to appreciate and respect the different cultural perspectives of others without sacrificing their own cultural perspectives. For this reason, interculturality is respectful of the existing cultural affiliations of both cultural minorities and cultural majorities, and does not present a threat to either (cf. Bouchard 2011, and Chapter 5 in the present volume).

Third, encounters with others who have different cultural affiliations from oneself can nevertheless be a catalyst for deep personal development and enrichment. Because intercultural competence involves learning about and interpreting other people’s cultural perspectives and relating them to one’s own, interculturally competent individuals are able to use their encounters with others to learn about and reflect critically on their own cultural affiliations. Due to the enculturation process in which cultural beliefs, values and practices are acquired especially through childhood and adolescence, it can be difficult to psychologically decentre oneself from one’s own cultural orientations and perspectives. Interculturally competent individuals acquire a more critical awareness and understanding of their own cultural positionings, beliefs, discourses and values through comparing and relating them to those of other people. For this reason, intercultural competence not only enhances one’s knowledge and understanding of other people – it also enhances self-knowledge and self-understanding and can lead to considerable personal enrichment.

Fourth, although the definition of intercultural competence offered earlier states that such competence involves respecting people who are perceived to be culturally different from oneself, this does not imply respecting all practices on the grounds of “cultural difference” irrespective of their nature. From the point of view of those working within the framework of the Council of Europe, respect should be withheld from practices that violate the fundamental principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Human beings, human rights and the dignity and equality of all people should always be respected, but there are limits on the respect that should be accorded to cultural practices that violate these basic principles. Indeed, it might be argued that these three fundamental principles of the Council of Europe should not only determine the limits on the respect accorded to cultural practices, but should also form the core of the unifying civic values, narrative and identity needed to foster a greater sense of commonality and joint purpose across the differences within culturally diverse societies (cf. Modood 2007, and Meer and Modood, Chapter 6 in the present volume).

A fifth observation stems from the fact, as noted by the White Paper, that citizens require intercultural competence in order to be able to engage in intercultural dialogue with others. While intercultural competence is indeed necessary for meaningful intercultural dialogue to take place, it is often not sufficient. This is because there are invariably differentials in the allocation of resources within societies and systematic patterns of disadvantage and discrimination which effectively disempower many individuals with particular cultural affiliations from participating on an equal footing in such dialogue (irrespective of their levels of intercultural competence). These inequalities and disadvantages are often further compounded by disparities of power and by institutional constraints and biases, which lead to the terms of the dialogue being dictated by those occupying positions of power, privilege and influence. Thus, many individuals are prevented from participating in intercultural dialogue, not because they lack intercultural competence, but because they suffer from socio-economic disadvantage and forms of discrimination which effectively exclude them. For this reason, public authorities need to adopt anti-discrimination and equal opportunity measures to ensure that members of disadvantaged or marginalised groups are not excluded from intercultural dialogue. In other words, equipping citizens with intercultural competence needs to take place in conjunction with and alongside measures to tackle inequalities and structural disadvantages, including giving special assistance to those with socio-economic disadvantages, taking action to counter discrimination, and remedying educational disadvantages (cf. Cantle, 2012, and Chapter 4 in the present volume, and the Report of the Group of Eminent Persons, Council of Europe, 2011).

Sixth, and as noted earlier in this chapter, there is now a considerable body of social science research into intercultural competence. This research has revealed a number of findings concerning intercultural competence:
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- females, older individuals and minority individuals tend to have higher levels of intercultural competence than males, younger individuals and majority individuals, respectively (Pascarella et al. 1996; Zhai and Scheer 2004);
- intercultural competence is related to holding a more global, international perspective and lower levels of ethnocentrism (Caligiuri et al. 2000);
- some individual and personality characteristics such as optimism, openness and extroversion are also related to higher levels of intercultural competence (Caligiuri et al. 2000);
- advanced proficiency in one or more foreign languages is also sometimes related to higher levels of intercultural competence (Olson and Kroeger 2001);
- intercultural competence can be enhanced through intercultural education and training (Klak and Martin 2003; Pascarella et al. 1996);
- intercultural competence can also be enhanced through a range of intercultural experiences, for example by attending international schools, attending multi-ethnic institutions which have a non-discriminatory environment, or by having extensive contact with people from other countries where that contact has the potential to allow meaningful relationships to develop and involves co-operation rather than competition (Pascarella et al. 1996; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006; Straffon 2003; Zhai and Scheer 2004).

Finally, there are still many currently unanswered questions about intercultural competence. In particular, the relationship between the various component values, attitudes, knowledge and understanding, skills and behaviours which together comprise intercultural competence has not yet been established. This is a matter for empirical investigation rather than a priori theorising. Questions that still need to be answered include the following.

- How does each of the components of intercultural competence develop within the individual?
- What are the social, educational, cognitive, affective and motivational factors that influence the development of each component?
- Are there particular sequences in which the various components are acquired?
- Is the acquisition of some components a necessary prerequisite for the acquisition of other components?
- How are the different components cognitively and affectively inter-related?
- To what extent does the acquisition of particular components vary depending on the specific cultural setting in which an individual lives, and the specific intercultural situations which the individual experiences within that setting?

Despite the large volume of existing research on the topic of intercultural competence, there is still a substantial research agenda that needs to be addressed in this field.

The role of education in developing intercultural competence

As has just been noted, there is good evidence that intercultural competence can be enhanced through intercultural education and training, and through exposure to a range of intercultural experiences. Education therefore clearly offers a prime area in which the intercultural competence of citizens may be enhanced. However, education should not be interpreted as being limited solely to formal education (i.e., the structured education and training system that runs from pre-primary and primary through secondary school and on to higher education and lifelong learning). Intercultural learning can also occur through non-formal education (i.e., any planned programme of education designed to improve skills and competences outside the formal educational setting) and informal education (i.e., the lifelong process whereby every individual acquires attitudes, values, skills and knowledge from influences and resources in his or her own social environment – for example, from parents, peer groups, neighbours, workplace colleagues, places of worship, the mass media, etc.). The White Paper on intercultural dialogue – “Living together as equals in dignity” (Council of Europe 2008) acknowledges this wide diversity of influences on people’s intercultural competence by proposing that it is not only formal educational institutions and professionals that have a responsibility to equip individuals with intercultural competence, but also civil society organisations, religious communities, the media and all other providers of education.

Implemented effectively, intercultural education develops people’s intercultural competence by enhancing their cognitive and behavioural intercultural skills and their knowledge and understanding of people who have different cultural affiliations from their own. By developing skills such as empathy and multiperspectivity, which help individuals to see the world as others see it and to see oneself from the perspective of others, and by facilitating individuals in learning about and interpreting other cultural perspectives and practices and comparing these to their own, intercultural education helps individuals to develop an awareness of people’s preconceptions, stereotypes and prejudices, including their own. It encourages the development of openness towards and curiosity about other people, and a willingness to accept the notion that the world contains many different perspectives which may be irreconcilable but may also have points of similarity that are not always readily apparent. Intercultural education also helps individuals to develop the skills, understanding, knowledge and attitudes required for interacting and communicating with people who have other cultural affiliations. In addition, it encourages and supports active civic engagement and co-operation with others and participation in community life.

More generally, intercultural education helps individuals to value cultural diversity and pluralism, and to reflect critically on their own cultural positionings, beliefs and values through comparisons with others, enhancing and enriching their knowledge and understanding of themselves in the process.

39. These definitions of formal, non-formal and informal education are taken from the Council of Europe (2010) Charter on Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education.
A detailed account of how intercultural education can be implemented by actors in the formal, non-formal and informal educational spheres is presented in Barrett et al. (2013). This document, Developing intercultural competence through education, explains the principles of pedagogical planning that should be used, relevant methods of learning and teaching, issues to consider when implementing intercultural education in each of the three educational domains, and issues concerning evaluation and assessment. It also provides a wide range of approaches and concrete activities that can be used by facilitators in all three forms of education to develop the intercultural competence of individuals. The document emphasizes that, in the case of formal education, intercultural education is not a separate school subject but is instead a holistic approach which should be embedded throughout the curriculum and the school, with all teachers, irrespective of the age of their students and the subject they teach, having responsibility for its implementation.

Is an emphasis on intercultural competence and intercultural education a distinctive hallmark of interculturalism?

One issue to which the preceding discussion gives rise is the extent to which interculturalism places a unique emphasis on intercultural competence and intercultural education, an emphasis which is missing from multiculturalism. As we have seen, some of the principal statements of interculturalism, such as the White Paper and Cantle (2012), do indeed place considerable emphasis on the importance of developing intercultural competence, based on the argument that intercultural competence enables individuals to live together harmoniously within culturally diverse societies in a spirit of tolerance, mutual understanding and respect. Both statements likewise assign the responsibility for equipping citizens with intercultural competence to a wide range of actors in formal, non-formal and informal education.

Is this emphasis on intercultural competence and intercultural education a novel characteristic of interculturalism which is absent from multiculturalism? At first glance, this might appear to be the case. A strong distinction is drawn between multiculturalism and interculturalism by both the White Paper and Cantle. For example, the White Paper argues that multiculturalism is a specific policy approach that advocates the political recognition of the distinct ethnos of minority communities on par with the “host” majority, the implementation of which has fostered communal segregation and mutual incomprehension (section 3.3), whereas interculturalism as a policy approach is instead grounded upon intercultural dialogue, mutual understanding and respect. Cantle (2012, see also Chapter 4 in the present volume) offers a more nuanced view of multiculturalism, noting that it has varied over time and across countries, but he also stresses numerous differences between multiculturalism and interculturalism, especially the former’s encouragement of “parallel lives” and segregated communities and the latter’s distinctive focus on a sense of openness, dialogue and interaction.

However, a close reading of classic texts on multiculturalism, as well as the literature on multicultural education, suggests that the concepts of intercultural openness, dialogue, intercultural understanding and respect are already present within the thinking of at least some multiculturalists. For example, Parekh’s (2006) seminal book Rethinking multiculturalism contains the following passages on the goals of a good multicultural education:

A good education should expose pupils to different conceptions of the good life, systems of belief and modes of conceptualizing familiar experiences, and get them to enter into the spirit of other cultures, see the world the way they do and appreciate their strengths and limitations. While rightly developing the powers of independent thought, analysis, criticism and so on, it should also cultivate “softer” and less aggressive capacities such as sympathetic imagination, the ability to get under the skin of others and feel with and for them, the willingness to look at oneself from the standpoint of others, and the capacity to listen to them with sensitivity and sympathy. (p. 227)

Since events and institutions are multifaceted, so is the truth about them, and a balanced judgement on them can only be formed in a conversation between different perspectives. One of the central aims of education should be to equip the student to participate in such a conversation and, thereby, to broaden her sympathies and get her to appreciate the complexity of truth and the irreducible diversity of interpretations without nervously seeking for a final answer. (p. 229)

multicultural education is an education in freedom, both in the sense of freedom from ethnocentric prejudices and biases and freedom to explore and learn from other cultures and perspectives. (p. 230)

In other words, good multicultural education should develop openness towards other people, multiperspectivity, empathy, skills in analysing and critically appraising cultural perspectives and practices, listening to others, tolerance of ambiguity, understanding of one’s own prejudices and biases, and a willingness to learn from other cultural perspectives. All of these capacities are components of what has been termed “intercultural competence” throughout this chapter. Insofar as these capacities are presented by Parekh as the goals of multicultural education, it is clearly impossible to make any hard distinction between his vision of multicultural education and what others would term “intercultural education”, the primary aim of which is to develop individuals’ intercultural competence.

Multicultural education has, of course, taken many different forms in response to different educational concerns in different contexts and settings over the years, and Parekh’s vision is just one particular form. For example, anti-racist multicultural education, especially forms influenced by critical race theory, can have a very different focus and orientation from intercultural education – in particular, challenging and changing power relations, systemic barriers and discriminatory institutional structures that disadvantage racialised students, and centring the perspectives of subordinated groups (Carr and Lund 2008). That said, in their History of multicultural education, Grant and Chapman (2008) comment that one widespread conception of multicultural education in the 21st century is that it “seeks to promote the valuing of diversity” and aims to develop an “understanding of the contributions and perspectives of people of different races, ethnicity, culture” (p. 12). Going still further, one of the leading figures in contemporary multicultural education,
Banks, has argued that education should be transformative, enabling students to acquire “positive racial and ethnic attitudes as well as the knowledge, skills and perspectives to deliberate with students from diverse groups” so that “students from different groups can interact in ways that enable them to view events from diverse perspectives and to deliberate in equal-status situations”; the aim is to help students to “acquire knowledge related to their homes and community cultures and languages”; and to “take thoughtful individual or collective civic action” to help solve problems, enhance democracy and promote social justice (Banks 2008: 135). These goals overlap significantly with the goals of intercultural education.

Finally, it should be noted that psychologists have also developed guidelines on multicultural education, training, research and practice (aimed primarily at the education, training and practice of psychological practitioners such as clinical, counselling, organisational and school psychologists) (American Psychological Association 2002). These guidelines similarly show considerable overlap with the aims of intercultural education. For example, the guidelines encourage psychologists to recognise that, as cultural beings, they may hold attitudes and beliefs that can detrimentally influence their perceptions of and interactions with people who have other cultural affiliations, and to recognise the importance of multicultural sensitivity/responsiveness, knowledge and understanding about such people. Counselling psychologists, in particular, have engaged in a concerted attempt to develop explicit models of the “multicultural competence” which is required by psychological practitioners (see, for example, Arredondo et al. 1996, and Sue 2001). These models emphasise that such competence consists of attitudes, beliefs, knowledge, understanding, skills and behaviours, including cultural self-awareness, acceptance of cultural differences, respect for other cultures, willingness to seek out multicultural experiences, knowledge of one’s own and other people’s cultures, ability to engage in a variety of verbal/nonverbal styles, and working to eliminate bias, prejudice and discrimination. All of these are components of intercultural competence as it has been described in this chapter.

In conclusion, it is difficult to draw a hard distinction between multicultural and intercultural education, or between “multicultural competence” as discussed under the banner of multiculturalism and “intercultural competence” as discussed under the banner of interculturalism. Thus, while an emphasis on intercultural competence and intercultural education is indeed a notable characteristic of interculturalism, in the final analysis it is difficult to sustain the position that this emphasis represents a distinctive hallmark of interculturalism which clearly differentiates interculturalism from multiculturalism.

**Implications for policy and practice**

The issues discussed in this chapter have a number of implications for policy and practice. These are as follows.

- In order to support the development of intercultural competence in students, schools and other formal educational institutions should implement intercultural education. They should use a holistic approach that is embedded throughout the curriculum and throughout the school, with all teachers, irrespective of the age of their students and the subject they teach, having responsibility for its implementation.
- All teachers should receive training in intercultural education, which should be aimed at enabling them to appreciate the importance of intercultural competence and to understand the principles of planning in intercultural education, appropriate methods of learning and teaching, and how intercultural education can be implemented within their own school subject.
- Schools and other formal educational institutions implementing intercultural education should eliminate all biases and barriers that might stem from students’ own cultural affiliations and should ensure that they have strong anti-discrimination and equal opportunities policies in place which are consistently applied in practice.
- In order to support the development of intercultural competence in citizens more generally, providers of non-formal education such as youth clubs and organisations, leisure centres, adult education centres, youth and education NGOs, minority community centres and faith organisations should implement intercultural education throughout all of their activities and should adopt a reflective stance on how their activities and the ways in which these are organised might be impacting on participants’ intercultural competence.
- All staff working for non-formal education organisations, public authorities and the mass media should receive training in intercultural issues. This training should be aimed at enabling them to appreciate the importance of intercultural competence and how this competence can be fostered through their own professional practices and activities.
- Because intercultural contact can enhance intercultural competence, public authorities at all levels (including local, regional, national and international authorities) should support organisations and activities that facilitate those forms of intercultural contact which are beneficial for the development of intercultural competence. These include, *inter alia*, mobility and exchange schemes for students, workers and volunteers; inter-faith dialogue schemes; and those institutional twinning and cross-community twinning schemes which allow meaningful relationships between individuals to develop. Public authorities should also promote these activities to citizens and encourage their participation and involvement.
- Public authorities at all levels should collate examples of good practice in formal, non-formal and informal education that foster intercultural competence, and these examples should be documented, supported, promoted and disseminated throughout the public sphere.
- Because opportunities to exercise intercultural competence and to participate in intercultural dialogue are negatively affected by structural disadvantages, inequalities and discrimination, public authorities should adopt anti-discrimination policies to ensure that all citizens have equal access to these opportunities.
and equal opportunity measures to ensure that members of disadvantaged or marginalised groups are not excluded from intercultural dialogue. In particular, special assistance should be given to those suffering from socio-economic disadvantage, and positive action should be taken to counter all forms of discrimination and to remedy educational disadvantage, so that all sectors of society are enabled to participate in intercultural dialogue.

Suggestions for further reading


This book is an invaluable resource for those who wish to acquaint themselves with the current range of research on intercultural competence. The first section of the book includes the review chapter by Spitzberg and Changnon (which covers models and components of intercultural competence), and a series of further chapters on different conceptualisations of intercultural competence including perspectives from a variety of cultures around the world. The second section contains chapters on applications of intercultural competence in professional fields such as human resources, business, teacher education, foreign language education, international education administration, social work, religious organisations and health care. The third section covers methodological issues in researching intercultural competence and the assessment of intercultural competence. The comprehensive nature of the book makes it an essential source book for specialists and general readers alike.


This document expands upon some of the practical issues concerning intercultural education which were excluded from the present chapter due to space limitations. This additional material provides detailed advice on planning and implementing intercultural education. The document also offers a wealth of suggestions concerning the current range of research on intercultural competence. The first section of the book includes the review chapter by Spitzberg and Changnon (which covers models and components of intercultural competence), and a series of further chapters on different conceptualisations of intercultural competence including perspectives from a variety of cultures around the world. The second section contains chapters on applications of intercultural competence in professional fields such as human resources, business, teacher education, foreign language education, international education administration, social work, religious organisations and health care. The third section covers methodological issues in researching intercultural competence and the assessment of intercultural competence. The comprehensive nature of the book makes it an essential source book for specialists and general readers alike.

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Interculturalism and multiculturalism: similarities and differences


9 – Educational challenges and perspectives in multiculturalism vs. interculturalism: citizenship education for intercultural realities

Léonce Bekemans

Introduction

Starting from the need to know and understand other cultures in today’s increasingly interconnected human societies, education is conceived in this chapter as a means as well as an objective for living together and for learning differences in a positive, peaceful, respectful and mutually beneficial way. Interculturalism and multiculturalism are two approaches to define the way that different cultures relate to each other in our daily lives. These approaches are perceived as attitudes and policies for facing the reality of multiple societies, cultures and identities.

In the first part of this chapter, the role of culture and education in society is briefly introduced. In line with an anthropological definition of culture, its main functions (i.e., communication, socialisation, identification and self-expression) are set within the complexities of current social life. It is further argued that education has always been shaped throughout history by cultural developments that have radically changed the position of education in society.

The second part of the chapter focuses on the impact of Europe’s cultural approach, “unity in diversity”. Different languages and cultural traditions present specific challenges and opportunities in relation to the role of culture and identity building beyond national statehood. Connection with other cultures is seen as an added value from the transformation processes of increasing interdependence and globalisation. This requires a pluralism of individual identities, a community of shared values and the respect of cultural diversity.

In the last part of the chapter, the place of education is further explored within today’s European cultural realities. Firstly, the main educational challenges for dealing with the existence of multiple cultures and identities within an integrated (European) living area are specified. Secondly, some reflections and guidelines are proposed on the perspectives, opportunities and practices offered by education for responsible citizenship and the learning of the life competences that are needed to live (and to benefit from) intercultural realities.

Premises

The question of how to define what we mean exactly when we talk about “culture” is not so easy because there are so many different approaches and convictions that the answer does not appear to be a question of concept and knowledge, but rather
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In today’s globalising world, most human societies no longer live in isolated territories, so their cultures are no longer the specificity of a given society limited by closed boundaries. We live in contact with each other, more or less intensively, and therefore other cultures are part of our daily life. This is the result not only of increased migration flows, but also of modern technologies which transform communication systems and rebuild relationships. Various cultural interactions have become a way of living in today’s world. Indeed, it becomes important in order to avoid conflict and even war to understand that others do not see their world as we see our own, do not follow the same values when judging similar situations, or do not use the same criteria as our own to identify themselves as different. The Council of Europe’s White Paper on intercultural dialogue – “Living together as equals in dignity” (2008) claimed two distinct approaches to define the way that different cultures relate to each other and manage cultural diversity: multiculturalism and interculturalism.

Multiculturalism relates to a policy approach which recognises various and diverse cultures within a society; it indicates that different cultures exist and may interact within a given space and social organisation. A multitude of expressions always implies diversity but may still be perceived as a unity. Multiculturalism suggests therefore that human beings are able to merge diversity of cultures within one society on the same territory and that the remaining existing differences can be considered as a richness for all without being denied or eliminated. Culture, from this perspective, is not only a heritage which determines what we are and what we believe, but also what individual human beings are able to build together.

Interculturalism, on the other hand, presents itself as a dynamic policy approach that believes and affirms that cultures should be recognised for what they are, as different and separated as the social groups to which they belong. It endorses and encourages respectful and open interaction between and among individuals and groups from different cultural backgrounds, and it recognises the opportunities of various cultures within a given society and space. The important goal is to mutually benefit from intercultural encounters, while respecting each other’s diversity, which in turn can help to promote tolerance and understanding, prevent conflicts and enhance social cohesion.

Regardless of the academic debate on this distinction, it is obvious that these two approaches are not the result of factual observations of reality, but rather modes of defining what could be the most desirable attitudes and policies to face the “fact of multiplicity”. However, it is argued here that it is the way people approach and define the diversity of cultures in a given society which determines the nature of that diversity, and not the reality itself. It implies that the existing multiplicity needs to be understood from an “intercultural” point of view, recognising that we should move from a multicultural to an intercultural reality.

Therefore we propose an anthropological definition of culture, distinguishing three aspects: i) conservation: culture as an asset, tangible or intangible and a carrier of local identity; ii) production: culture as a commodity which needs to be re-produced not only to reconstitute cultural capital but also as a source of economic development insofar it is embedded in production processes; and iii) valorisation: culture as a set of norms and capacities which enrich communities, used as a bridge builder and carrier of good relations for social and economic exchange. A dynamic and interactive process between these three aspects of culture implies not only peaceful co-existence of different cultures within society but also a mutually influencing and open dialogue between cultures. Moreover, such a conceptual shift from multicultural co-existence to intercultural dialogue may avoid the trap of cultural relativism and provide the basis of a true living together.

The role of culture and education in society

The relation of the individual to his/her environment, in particular the role of culture in society, has changed drastically in recent decades. We are living in an increasingly interconnected and contextualised world in which societies, cultures and peoples meet and interact across the globe. We are living in a “global village” where the “other” has become my neighbour and the transformation of societies generates economic, political, cultural and personal impacts. Further, the European integration process has led to the elimination of the frontiers between countries and people, and the free circulation of European citizens has resulted in a transformation of the relationship between national territories and cultural identities. We are therefore entering an era in which old traditional realities and separations are slowly disappearing. The “other,” who contributed by his or her cultural difference to enable me to discover who I am, is no longer a stranger; he or she is today a member of my own society. The reality is that my own culture is no longer the only one existing in my own environment.

In order to clarify this changing relation, four functions of culture may be noted in line with its anthropological definition.

First of all, a culture enables communication. It concerns verbal and non-verbal cultural communication: the way people talk to each other and use sounds, signs, meanings, movements and attitudes so that each individual of the group understands what the others are saying and doing, and can tell them what he or she wants to share. Communication uses mostly language, but there are other means to share and communicate with all members of the group (for example, body language, sounds, music, colours, images, symbols, perfumes, etc.). Of course, communication means change with time and technical progress, but whatever means are used, social groups will recognise themselves in the way they understand each other.
– Secondly, culture becomes an instrument of socialisation: the feeling of belonging to a group and being recognised as a member of the group based on a common understanding and use of the group’s cultural communication means. This process of socialisation, existing in all social groups (for example, family, ethnic group, nation, religion, profession, political party, private club, etc.) represents one of the goals of education systems, i.e. transmitting the language, behaviour and liturgies of the group.

– The third impact of cultural belonging is the process of identification. It represents for the individual a growing awareness of his or her multiple identities. It is very important to find one’s own place and role within the groups to which one belongs. But it certainly plays a more important function in a society where different groups are living together. Of course, Europe is still very much shaped by historical events in which the notion of identity has been applied by nation-states, illustrating the complexity of cultural or political identity. Pluralism of individual identities is indeed growing in relation to professions, education, religion, family, careers, etc. Today the process of identity-building very much relates to a growing awareness of multiple identities in communities and societies beyond nation-states, set in a relational and contextual perspective.

– Finally, the fourth function of culture is that of self-expression: the capacity of the individual to use his or her heritage to consolidate, express and create cultural value. It comes from the ability of individuals not only to use their acquired linguistic and cultural tools to participate in social life, but also to give a new dimension to them. It is unnecessary to underline the role that literature and the arts have played in contributing to help civilisations to be remembered in history. But cultures are not only what we inherit from our past, but also what is created for the future as new forms of expression and new symbols of identification, diversity and multiplicity. These various forms of self-expression may contribute to the development of a future intercultural society.

As to the role of education in society, education has always been very much linked to general cultural developments. It has been shaped throughout history by important revolutions, or fundamental ruptures. The following changing cultural realities have radically changed the position of education in society.

– The invention of scripture or writing. This implied that the content of education was no longer limited to the knowledge transmitted by earlier generations who were proposing their views of the world to younger people, but that education developed with the accumulation of knowledge through time, relating it directly to traditions and memories. Thus education contributed to the historical development of a culture, determining the ways people would look at their own lives and that of their society. Fundamental reference books established human cultures through time whose values could be transmitted by education.

– The creation of schools, that is, the establishment of a particular institution whose specific function is the transmission to future generations of the acquired and accumulated knowledge that writing allowed. The responsibility for educating future generations was therefore no longer exclusively that of parents, families or communities, but that of social, religious, political, military or other powerful economic institutions. They could create, control and maintain with their own power the educational function within society. Thus education as such became professionalised, but developed more or less according to the role of knowledge which was recognised by the cultures of that time. Education institutions controlled the content of transmission, without requiring everyone to have the ability to read. This influenced, of course, the content of cultural transmission according to the role and situation of local education systems, which favoured local languages and tradition, while for centuries church-related institutions transmitted Latin as a common language for all Europe. It is only recently that education has been considered as a right for all human beings.

– The invention of printing in the 15th century fundamentally transformed the power of education systems. The cultural heritage of society became available to everyone and thus was no longer the privilege of education systems. Certainly, it took a few centuries until the effect of this transformation became real, because societies had first of all to decide to educate everyone and not only a privileged minority. It also facilitated the spreading of local cultures to other territories, thus contributing to the recognition in Europe of the diversity of cultures throughout the continent.

– In today’s globalising world, the new information technologies, and especially the development of the Internet, are fundamentally changing the content and manner of learning, access to information, and are certainly breaking the territorial aspect of current education systems. The use of languages is also affected, and new concepts are altering the relationship between the four functions of culture. It seems evident that education through “software” will not remain conventional and cannot be imagined on the sole basis of local, ethnic or national cultural heritages. Several elements are playing a role here. The extremely rapid development of new knowledge in sciences and technologies makes it impossible to determine what should be learned in order to be considered up to date and thus fully qualified. Education can no longer be considered as a process with a secured finality. As a consequence, schools and education systems are progressively losing the power they had over defining the final goals of education. Education therefore becomes an ongoing process for everyone that can no longer be controlled by the political and social powers. If each individual has a direct influence on what he or she would like to learn, his or her decision will be shaped directly by the cultural dimension of individual experiences and identification. In this perspective, the European dimension of culture and education is crucial.
Europe’s impact on cultures and identities

History illustrates that Europe is a dynamic and evolving entity with many faces, multiple identities, multiple expressions and experiences, and diversified forms of co-operation. Europe is a two-thousand-year-old civilisation with a multiplicity of cultures; it is also a socio-economic model, and has a unique integration process. The whole of European history is characterised by forms of, and attempts at, economic, political, military and cultural co-operation in the search for equilibrium between integration and diversity within certain contours. Europe is, however, in the first place a community of shared values, such as the centrality of the human being, freedom, equality, human rights, respect for diversity, tolerance, justice and solidarity. Today, however, Europe is struggling to keep its diversified societal model alive in the midst of interconnected supranational and intergovernmental governance devices which respond to emerging complex cultural realities in the globalisation vs. Europeanisation debate.

Identity and identity-building have been treated by numerous scholars from various disciplines and perspectives. Many have contributed to understanding the complexity and the dynamism of these terms, and have offered theoretical readings for dealing with changing realities. However, identity remains an open and fluid concept, increasingly shaped by growing interdependencies, societal transformations and different spheres of belonging.

The globalising world is characterised by some asymmetry between the growing extra-territorial nature of much power and the continuing territoriality of the ways in which people live their everyday lives. This is evidently a world-wide phenomenon, but Europe faces the special challenge of how the emergence of a multiple European society of countries, regions and peoples, with different languages, cultural traditions and common institutions, will influence the functions of cultures. Will the communicative function of languages change? Should we admit that only one or two languages will become the main tools of communication for all, while many others will remain traditional tools of identification and creativity? Will socialisation and identity remain related to territories and conditioned by cultural majorities, or are they going to become more and more individualised and thus alter the character of our common political culture?

The nation-state structures which are still the dominant reference points of the international system do not relate directly to the aforementioned functions of cultures, but are based on a direct linkage between notions of identity, nationality and citizenship within given state borders. Today, governments of single states struggle to meet global challenges that far surpass their capacity for governance. People move across state borders, creating multicultural societies with intercultural opportunities.

At the same time, citizenship has formally been introduced in Europe as a quality which the nationals of all member states have in common. According to Article 9 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), “every national of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship”. With the establishment of a European citizenship, a common citizenship has been legally institutionalised: it covers many nationalities, and rights are not exclusively limited to national frontiers. This has changed radically the traditional nationalistic way of thinking about identity and groups of peoples. If one accepts that the idea of citizenship can relate to a multiplicity of nationalities, it becomes feasible that a multiplicity of identities can be envisaged under the traditional notion of nationality, implying the emergence of a transnational European entity.

We are indeed entering a new period of restructuring the cultural relationships of communities throughout Europe (Bekemans et al. 2007). It therefore seems obvious that, in the coming decades, demands for the recognition of particular identities and minority rights (based on language, culture, religion, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, etc.) will develop even more strongly within national and regional structures. At the same time, requests and initiatives for greater citizen participation at the supranational and transnational levels will contribute to accelerate changes in our ways of thinking about our own cultural reality. We thus believe that interculturalism will become the European cultural paradigm of tomorrow, rooted in a context of respect for diversity, mutual understanding and trust-building. Therefore, the valorisation of the educational and cultural dimensions of European citizenship-building, through promoting places of intercultural learning and exchange programmes and introducing innovative learning methods and tools, is needed now more than ever.

Education and multiculturalism vs. interculturalism in today’s world

Education systems transmit and shape the value systems of the societies in which they are embedded. European education, at all levels from primary schools to institutions of lifelong learning, now faces the critical challenge of reflecting and guiding the manifest plurality present among European cultures: both to embody a commitment to the equal dignity of all, and to offer a sufficiently rich vision of human flourishing. Education concerns capacity building in diversity management at the citizenship level. It should therefore prepare people of different backgrounds and of varying talents for a life together: this includes but goes beyond preparing them for livelihoods, and consists of providing information and training not only of life skills, but also of cultural development.

Educational challenges of multicultural and intercultural realities

Yet many European education systems, at all levels, increasingly have an overriding concern with specifically economic performance. This emphasis affects both the objects of study (i.e., a preference for scientific, legal and economic subjects rather than for the traditional humanities) as well as the methods of pedagogy and assessment. The “Bologna Process”, for example, intends to create a “European Higher Education Area”, by making university degrees and degree standards more consistent and mutually compatible, favouring mobility and diverse cultural encou-
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The education process: learn to know; learn to do; learn to be; learn to live together. The Delors Report, summarises this perspective very well when it identifies the four pillars of the learning of intercultural (life) skills, social and communicative competences. 

A learning capacity for dialogue and intercultural exchange, which in turn requires indicating people, especially young people, to be responsible citizens. This presupposes in Europe also has the task, among others, of revitalising the European idea by edu-

The crucial role of education, as well as the use and practices of teaching and learning, need therefore to be reset within the dramatic acceleration in the speed of social change brought about by the process of globalisation. In short, the interlocking crises and intersecting challenges require answers to an increasingly intercultural reality from all spheres of European society. Moreover, the role and responsibility of education in multicultural and complex societies should reinforce the overall substance of the challenges: the search for adequate and concrete responses in the learning agenda dealing with education and responsible citizenship.

Given current interpenetrating crises, it is of concern that the prevalent vision of education places it so predominantly at the service of economic growth as to instrumentalise it and reduce the full scope mentioned above. We need critical thinking, for example, about prevalent economic goals, and their weight in relation to other societal purposes, no less than we need to learn how to live together in a globalising world with diverse cultural realities. However, the question remains open as to what extent a common vision, founded on the acceptance of shared rights and responsibilities, can survive in a context of economic globalisation and cultural pluralism. This implies that the crises of social inequality and poverty manifest in the non-accessibility of the benefits of globalisation, the urgency of internal and pluralism. This implies that the crises of social inequality and poverty manifest in societal purposes, no less than we need to learn how to live together. Only such a learning approach might finally lead to an active and responsible citizenship-building that favours the integral human development perspective of education.

In short, the interlocking crises and intersecting challenges require answers to an increasingly intercultural reality from all spheres of European society. Moreover, the role and responsibility of education in multicultural and complex societies should reinforce the overall substance of the challenges: the search for adequate and concrete responses in the learning agenda dealing with education and responsible citizenship.

In this context, see Eurydice (2005), a comparative survey which focuses on different national approaches to citizenship education and examines its European and international dimensions.
Objectives and competences

Education is a dynamic process of learning that creates added value and forms the person through integral development. It should transmit possibilities and opportunities with conviction, intuition and motivation. It is always a meeting with the other; hence the role of teachers as key agents for change and the need to accompany and respect their role in the educational landscape. Also, Europe and the international context are an integral part of the general curriculum as well as of each individual learning path. This implies the need to transmit in an open and critical way ideals and principles that valorise the person at the centre of education systems and national curricula, recognising the European and international dimensions of the learning process. Yet the priority task of education should be to help (young) people to become responsible citizens, providing them with information, knowledge, competences, skills and open behaviour, in line with fundamental values such as peace, human dignity and respect for diversity.

Key competences refer to knowledge, skills and attitudes that serve personal fulfilment, social inclusion and citizenship-building. These include the traditional competences but also the more transversal ones such as learning to learn, social and civic competences, cultural awareness and expressions. In this context, reference to Edgar Morin (2000) is essential. He proposes four objectives in the transmission of knowledge and the activities of teaching: (i) to form a well-developed mind (rather than a too-full mind); (ii) to teach the human condition; (iii) to educate to live (learning does not mean only the acquisition of knowledge, techniques and productive modes, but also an interest in relations with the other and with oneself); and (iv) to learn the dignity of the citizen.

Citizenship education: education for responsible citizenship in a plural Europe

If education has the priority task of transmitting knowledge and competences that give scope and responsibility to the development of each person, a number of fundamental questions need to be addressed. These relate to: (i) education of and for all; (ii) education of humanity: this involves cross-cutting the dichotomy between a culture of education and a professional education; (iii) education to change: this deals with the meaning of creativity and the use of a critical mind; (iv) education to master a variety of languages; and finally (v) permanent education in the search of values: this implies surpassing the so-called contradiction between tradition and innovation. In other words, multicultural and intercultural realities urge for an education oriented to responsible citizenship-building in a plural Europe. However, transmission of knowledge is not sufficient to affirm the principle of the centrality of the person. The educator and teacher has to act within a given socio-cultural context, which needs to respond to the challenges of globality and complexity, cultural disintegration and the dispersion and fragmentation of knowledge. All this requires an integration of a diversity of learning sources and levels.

In sum, citizenship education in Europe has the task of being an agent of change and has the responsibility to revitalise its original project and consequently to mobilise and inspire its citizens, in particular young people. This can only be done through (formal, informal and non-formal) education for responsible citizenship which stimulates the commitment of (young) people to a plural Europe which is a Europe of dialogue and interculturalism. Various aspects may be distinguished here, as follows.

A modern and dynamic concept

The notion of “responsible citizenship” concerns an awareness and knowledge of rights and responsibilities (duties). It is closely related to civic values such as democracy and human rights, equality, participation, partnership, social cohesion, social justice and the knowledge and exercise of rights and responsibilities beyond the legal status and judicial relationship between the citizen and the state. A citizen may be regarded as a person coexisting in a society. As noted earlier, the theoretical conceptions and practical implementation of citizenship have been changing recently. The concept is steadily broadening, as lifestyles and patterns in our relations with others become more diversified. Far from being limited to the national context, the notion of harmonious coexistence among citizens relates to the concept of a community embracing all contexts – local, regional, national and international – in which individuals live. Much valuable work has been done by the Council of Europe in this regard (see, for example, the items listed under the Council of Europe in the Suggestions for Further Reading at the end of this chapter).

The link between citizenship and education is very close. Today’s challenge is to strengthen the need for citizenship in societies and develop learning modes which respond to the need for information, knowledge, capacity and qualities that citizens should be equipped with to deal with the societal developments and cultural realities of today’s world. Accordingly, the concept of citizenship education relates to educating young people to become “responsible citizens”, who are capable of contributing to the development and well-being of the society in which they live. Teaching people to learn to become responsible citizens implies giving them access to those capacities and skills which they need to participate efficiently in economic, political, social and cultural life. This also includes knowledge of languages. This is the core of the pedagogical approach to citizenship education.

Moreover, responsible citizenship is a lifelong process. Learning citizenship is interactive and deeply embedded in specific formal, non-formal and informal contexts. Support should therefore also be given to citizenship learning within civil society as well as within the informal settings of the family. Although the sense of citizenship is embedded in each individual’s life history and its relationships with others, no standard model for developing citizenship can be applied.

41. See GHK (2007). This report, based on an extensive literature review, provides a European-wide search for good practices of citizenship education.
Objectives of responsible citizenship education

While its aims and content may be highly diversified, key objectives of responsible citizenship education in today’s complex world should relate to political and (multi)cultural literacy, critical thinking, the development of certain attitudes and values, and active participation. The realisation of these objectives implies the learning of specific skills and competences.

- The development of political and cultural literacy may involve: learning about social, political and civic institutions, as well as about human rights; the study of the conditions under which people may live harmoniously together, including social issues and ongoing social problems; teaching young people about national constitutions so that they are better prepared to exercise their rights and responsibilities; promoting recognition of cultural and historical heritage; and promoting recognition of the cultural and linguistic diversity of society. In this perspective, increased political and cultural literacy should favour active communication and participation in democratic societies; in short, the building of responsible citizenship in a life-long and life-wide dimension. However, the impact of globalisation on our lives necessitates a growing awareness of the existence of different cultures, religions and political systems in order to develop respect for otherness. In other words, the increasing diversity of peoples in European societies requires a reconceptualisation of literacy towards a political, multicultural literacy, which might be a vehicle to mutual understanding and learning in European multicultural societies and beyond.

- The development of critical thinking and the adoption of certain attitudes and values may entail: acquiring the skills needed to participate actively in public life; developing recognition of and respect for oneself and others with a view to achieving greater mutual understanding; acquiring a sense of social and moral responsibility, including self-confidence and learning to behave responsibly towards others; strengthening a spirit of solidarity; constructing values, with due regard for differing social perspectives; learning to listen and resolve conflicts peacefully; learning to contribute to a safe environment; and developing more effective strategies for fighting racism and xenophobia.

- Finally, the active participation of young people may be promoted by: enabling them to become more involved in the community at large (at international, national, local and school levels); offering them practical experience of democracy at school; developing their capacity to engage with each other; encouraging pupils to develop project initiatives in conjunction with other organisations (such as community associations, public bodies and international organisations), as well as projects involving other communities.

In short, it should be clear that citizenship education is not just concerned with imparting theoretical knowledge to enhance political and (multicultural) literacy in issues such as democracy, human rights, the functioning of political institutions, cultural and historical heritage, etc. It is also crucial for integral human development that positive civic attitudes and values be developed and that active participation by learners be promoted – be it at school or in society at large.

The European dimension of citizenship education

As noted before, until recently, the concept of citizenship was conceived mainly in state and institutional terms. In today’s Europe, the concept of citizenship has become more fluid, dynamic and contextual, linking it to the multiple identities of Europe. This means that learning to live together positively with differences and diversity is becoming the central dimension of practising citizenship in Europe. Therefore, citizenship education is a modern and dynamic concept with a European dimension.

Although citizenship always has a territorial-based connotation, whatever its scale and limits, education processes should take account of the fact that citizens identify with different entities and dimensions, whether local, regional, national, European, international or global. Four aspects should therefore be considered in developing the European dimension of citizenship education: curriculum building, teacher education, support for teachers and teaching materials, and extra-curricular activities involving mobility and exchanges.

- Curriculum building: The European and international dimension of citizenship should be part of the overarching general aims of various levels and phases of education to stimulate a sense of belonging and commitment to Europe. Aspects which could be addressed in education and learning paths are: the rights and obligations of European citizens; the contemporary history of European countries; the EU integration process; the functioning of European and international institutions; the main economic, political and social issues in European and international co-operation; knowledge and promotion of socio-cultural diversity; learning about European culture, arts, literature, etc. From the curricular standpoint, citizenship education can be offered as a separate stand-alone compulsory or optional subject, or integrated into one or more other subjects (such as history, social studies, geography or philosophy), or as a cross-curricular educational theme, so that the principles of citizenship education might be present in all subjects of the curriculum. These different approaches are not mutually exclusive. The development of a multi-layered curriculum on integral human development may enhance the understanding of the continuous socio-cultural and political transformations of European multicultural societies, as the new intercultural reality of European citizenship.

- Teacher education: The European dimension of citizenship education should be taken into account in initial teacher education as well as in the provision of in-service teacher training.

- Support for teachers and teaching materials: Teacher-support measures relevant to the European dimension of citizenship education may exist in a wide variety of forms. They may be devised by the education authorities of a particular country, public research institutes and institutions for teacher education, asso-
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The principle of equality may integrate with the recognition of diversity and finally citizenship. The notion of solidarity may then open up to the concept of hospitality; unity and diversity in various situations of multicultural and plural Europe. Dialogue level of interaction.

The specificity of intercultural education refers to learning processes that lead to a knowledge of other cultures and install behaviour patterns of availability, openness and dialogue. It concerns a rather complex type of knowledge. The primary objective of intercultural education should be the promotion of the capacity for constructive conviviality in a multiform cultural and social context, valorising the cultural dimension of responsible citizenship. It consists not only of the acceptance of and respect for diversity, but also the recognition of the place of a proper cultural identity. Such mutual learning is expressed at the cognitive and affective level of interaction.

The unifying perspective of intercultural education lies in the reconciliation between unity and diversity in various situations of multicultural and plural Europe. Dialogue and mutual enrichment can be developed to manage cultural diversity and strengthen citizenship. The notion of solidarity may then open up to the concept of hospitality; the principle of equality may integrate with the recognition of diversity and finally lead to mutual responsibility. In short, education will need to play a key role in developing the ability to conduct authentic intercultural dialogue, as an integral part of developing democratic culture. Henceforth, intercultural education accepts the paradigm of human rights as the universal point of departure, implying the importance of human rights education and consequently of education for democratic citizenship. Therefore, we propose a multidimensional approach to intercultural education. Such an education responds to the learning objectives of reciprocity, complexity, interpersonal communication, conflict prevention, conviviality of differences and value-driven peace-building.

Once we accept the idea that a multiplicity of identities living together within a European space does not necessarily contradict its unity, steps have to be taken so that people become prepared to live such an experience positively. Because, in spite of the de facto changes that the evolution of Europe has introduced to the emerging cultural paradigm, people are not always free from values and norms inherited from the past, and certainly not conditioned to think about their own culture in terms of future creativity. Intercultural citizenship education can then be defined as empowering, stimulating people to contribute to social cohesion and cultural enrichment with respect for diversity and on the basis of equality. This implies recognition of the cultural dimension of the citizen’s identity in learning processes, recognition of the contribution of each culture to society, and a citizenship culture built through an ongoing intercultural dialogue and identification of shared public values in education. In short, such an intercultural citizenship education requires the learning and teaching of intercultural competences.

Policy priorities for intercultural citizenship education

Summarising, education and culture will always influence each other in the choices of individuals and their encounters, and thus contribute to the building of sustainable societies which will consequently become more and more diversified and intercultural. Interculturalism will therefore develop in the long term, not so much because of increasing migration flows, but mainly because of the changing nature of contemporary societies, the emergence of new cultural realities and the key role of civil society organisations in resolving the problems of daily life.

Everyone is forced by the development of knowledge and the multiplication of means of information and human contacts to develop his or her own way of living together. If interculturalism is to succeed in Europe and beyond, creative incentives have to be launched to learn active and responsible citizenship. International organisations such as UNESCO, the Council of Europe and the European Union, as well as civil society organisations, will have to play a more proactive role in favouring and supporting intercultural practices at all levels of human-centric development.

42. In a concrete follow-up to the Council of Europe’s White Paper on intercultural dialogue, a very interesting tool to foster intercultural competence in learners was developed by Byram, Barrett, Igrave, Jackson and Méndez García (2009). See also Chapter 8 by Barrett in this volume.
In the sphere of education and learning, the following policy-oriented activities to strengthen an intercultural drive in Europe’s future are proposed.

- Valorise the educational and cultural dimension of European citizenship-building. This implies the promotion of places of intercultural learning through European exchange programmes and the introduction of innovative learning methods and tools at the various educational levels.
- Develop a multilayered curriculum on “Integral Human Development”. This may enhance the understanding of the new intercultural reality of European citizenship, i.e. the continuous socio-cultural and political transformations of multicultural societies in Europe.
- Launch creative incentives and develop life competences to learn active, responsible and intercultural citizenship. Formal, non-formal and informal learning, in an interdisciplinary perspective, are all needed to preserve and enrich our European heritage – political, cultural and economic.
- Launch an integrated strategy to foster human rights and responsibilities education. This can be done by building on the work of the United Nations, the Council of Europe, and UNESCO, especially on two key international instruments: the UN Declaration on Human Rights Education and Training (2011) and the Council of Europe’s Charter on Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education (2010).

Suggestions for further reading


This book offers a well structured and interdisciplinary view of culturally founded and value-driven reflections on Europe’s future. The volume presents these readings within a broad policy-oriented, institutional and international law of human rights framework, following a non-conventional but inspiring approach. The book proposes a reading of the complexities of transforming realities, oriented towards a common destiny of sustainable and cohesive societies in a globalised world, i.e. a human-centric development of Europe’s future.


This book offers an interdisciplinary in-depth analysis of the relation between intercultural dialogue and multilevel governance seen from a human rights-based perspective. The papers deal with the broad and diversified framework of concepts, policy approaches and linkages between multilevel governance and intercultural dialogue, particularly in the fields of governance, education and civil society participation. Its innovative approach addresses complex issues of today’s societies, which are in need of sustainable, cohesive and responsible answers at conceptual and policy levels. It proposes multilevel and multi-actor trajectories that depart from a human rights perspective.


This book explores the role of higher education in developing intercultural dialogue in society at large. The book sets out the political context for intercultural dialogue, and explores how universities can move from dialogue on campus to dialogue in society, and hence become actors of intercultural dialogue. It also offers examples of good practice from various parts of the world.


This book addresses the question of how to reconcile the inherent diversity of the modern Western world with the democratic demands of a nation-state. What are the right political responses to assertions of identity? Does it compromise the notion of citizenship to question the necessity of recognising the cultural specificity and identity of minority groups? While avoiding a utopian view of multiculturalism, this book pleads in favour of a shared multicultural citizenship at the heart of a democratic system capable of combining unity and diversity.


This study gives a good overview of national approaches to intercultural policies and practices for intercultural dialogue in Europe, focussing on education as a means to provide the basis for understanding and respecting diversity; youth programmes and sports activities which facilitate practical experience with intercultural dialogue; and culture which connects different value systems and challenges established aesthetic criteria.

Useful United Nations contributions to education:

Education for All (1990); Agenda 21 for the Environment (1993); World Plan of Action for Education on Human Rights and Democracy (1993); World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna (1993); The Contribution by Religions to the Culture of Peace (1994); Declaration of Principles on Tolerance (1995); Declaration on Social Development (1995); Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing Declaration (1995); International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-violence for the Children of the World 2001-2010 (1998); Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace (1999); UN Millennium Declaration (2000); The Earth Charter in Amsterdam (2000); Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (2001); Declaration on Dialogue among Civilizations (2003); International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence for the Children of the World, 2001-2010 (UN Recommendations A/Res/63/113, 26 February 2005); The Hague Agenda on City Diplomacy (2008); Charter for a World without Violence (2009).
Interculturalism and multiculturalism: similarities and differences

Relevant contributions by the Council of Europe:

Second Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe: Final Declaration (Strasbourg, 10-11 October 1997); Committee of Ministers’ Declaration and Programme on Education for Democratic Citizenship, Based on the Rights and the Responsibilities of Citizens (Strasbourg, 1999); Recommendation Rec(2002)12 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on education for democratic citizenship (Strasbourg 2002); White Paper on intercultural dialogue – “Living together as equals in dignity” (May 2008); Council of Europe Charter on Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education (CM/Rec (2010); Recommendation CM/Rec (2010) of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the Council of Europe Charter on Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education.

The European Commission has published various White Papers and studies on European citizenship education:


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This book examines the relationship between two policy approaches for managing the cultural diversity of contemporary societies: interculturalism and multiculturalism.

The relationship between these two approaches has been a matter of intense debate in recent years. Some commentators argue that they represent two very different approaches, while others argue that interculturalism merely re-emphasises some of the core elements of present-day multiculturalism. The debate arises, in part, because multiculturalism can take a variety of different forms, which makes it difficult to identify its key features in order to compare it with interculturalism. The debate has gained added momentum from the backlash against multiculturalism in recent years, and from the Council of Europe’s prominent championing of interculturalism as an alternative approach.

This book aims to clarify the concepts of interculturalism and multiculturalism, and to bring the various arguments together in a way that will assist politicians, policy makers, practitioners and interested lay people to understand the concerns that are driving the different orientations. The book is also intended to facilitate a comparison of the policy implications of interculturalism and multiculturalism. To this end, each chapter concludes with a concise statement of the implications for policy that follow from the viewpoint that has been expressed.